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Abstract 
 
Political Economy and the Rule of Law in Pakistan 1999-2004: Resistance to 
Implementation of the Law and Caste Capitalism 
By 
Foqia Sadiq Khan 
 
The thesis examines the relationship between the political economy and the rule of law 
in contemporary Pakistan. The premise is that the rule of law can be meaningfully 
studied if the undercurrents of the political economy are explored. It investigates the 
rule-of-law-based reforms pushed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) that 
are meant to promote a level playing field for intra-capital relations, and to regulate 
relations between capital and the state. 
 
The institutional governance reforms of the IFIs are analysed from 1999-2004 within the 
historical context. The thesis presents two case studies of the IFIs reforms: a tax law 
(General Sales Tax in the Value-Added Tax mode), and a corporate governance 
regulatory body (the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan). 
 
The third case study is about the textiles sector. In the productive textiles sector, the 
interplay of the rule of law and political economy is explored. This case study discovers 
caste capitalism even in the formal textiles sector. Here the lack of impersonalisation and 
the weak rule of law encourages reliance on the social structures that lead to perpetuation 
of business networks along the caste lines. Personalisation in the textiles sector in 
Pakistan comes from the society being in the transition phase. The textiles case study 
concludes that the textiles manufacturers do not want more mature capitalism. 
  
There is a political economy explanation to the resistance to the rule of law. We present 
an analysis of how IFIs institutional governance reforms are resisted by the capitalist and 
intermediate classes. This leads to these reforms having only limited success. 
 
The rule-violating behaviour of the capitalist class and the intermediate classes has led to 
varying impact on accumulation - ranging widely from theft of resources, investment in 
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value-enhancing activities, to no significant impact. The rule-violating behaviour 
presented in the case study chapters is viewed in terms of the transition of a traditional 
society to a modern “Weberian” state.  
 
The background literature review discusses the notions of the Weberian rational-
bureaucratic state, the rule of law and impersonalisation. The literature review also 
discusses the underlying structural basis of power in society, patron-client relationships, 
the politics of patronage and the need for rents creation for maintaining political stability.  
 
The thesis presents a nuanced analysis illustrating a spectrum of contestations between 
the forces which wish to promote the pro-market rule of law against those who resist it. 
Studying such a contestation enables the thesis to make a contribution in the overall 
understanding of the political economy and the rule-violating behaviour in the middle 
income countries such as Pakistan. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Political Economy and the Rule of Law in 
Pakistan 1999-2004: Resistance to Implementation of the Law and 
Caste Capitalism 
The impetus to this thesis comes from a wish to understand the kind of capitalism and 
the rule of law that is shaping Pakistan. My particular interest is to focus on the 
relationship between political economy and the rule of law. In part, this has to do with 
my background; I had worked on the justice system and law and order issues in Pakistan 
before starting the PhD. Academically, there are also good reasons to choose this 
analytical angle. The Weberian arguments in the development of a modern state are very 
much alive. They have inspired much mainstream thinking about the role of the state 
today, including, in some ways, the whole “good governance” discourse and the set of 
policies flowing from this. Hence, the thesis looks at Pakistan’s transition from 
traditional society to a modern “Weberian” state from the perspective of the rule of law.  
In Pakistan’s contemporary political economy, the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) have largely set the terms for Pakistan’s economy from 1988 onwards. This makes 
an engagement with the good governance discourse of the IFIs important. According to 
this approach, rent-seeking by public office holders is a core obstacle to development. 
The “good governance” perspective emphasizes the view that if the “rule of law” works 
and right incentives are provided through a level playing field, then the developing 
countries can move towards a modern state. However, to set up a binary construction of 
corrupt versus non-corrupt practices is inadequate. It is not uncommon for a state to 
provide targeted subsidies to bolster an emergent capitalist class. Such targeting is not 
‘corrupt’ per se – it does not violate the rules and laws. Such interaction amongst the 
state institutions and the emergent capitalist class led to industrialisation in Pakistan in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The state institutions used various instruments to intervene in the 
economy and not all of them fell under the rubric of corruption, despite them being 
transfers meant to change the property rights in favour of the emergent capitalist class. 
Hence, the corruption and rent-seeking approach is limited.  
What do IFIs wish to achieve in a developing country like Pakistan through their 
institutional governance reforms? The broader contours go back to the relationship of 
neo-liberal agenda with institutional economics. In institutional economics, Coase has 
made seminal contribution to the literature on institutional economics. In his insightful 
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articles on The Nature of Firm (1937) and The Problem of Social Cost (1960), Coase has 
cogently challenged the mainstream assumptions of economists’ reliance on price 
mechanism to direct economic resources. Coase’s view is that if the market were to 
function organically on its own, then there would be no raison d’être for a firm to exist 
in such an economic system. Firm comes into being because organizing production 
through price mechanism is not free of cost. Firm, in some sense, represents long term 
contract and preference of coordination over short-term contracts. Emergence of firms is 
quintessentially related to the prevalent uncertainty in economic transactions and process 
of production. Firms work through reducing some of that uncertainty (Coase, 1937). 
Coase’s contribution has led to development of literature around transaction costs 
concepts whereby firms exist to reduce transaction costs of market exchange 
(Williamson, 1985; Joffe, 2011). The transaction costs literature spearheaded by North 
(1990) states that there are clear information, searching, bargaining, transacting and 
exchange costs in any market. Hence, market does not work through ‘hidden-hand’ 
principles only. It works by minimising the transaction costs to the exchange process. 
North (1990) has defined rules as institutions. IFIs in their institutional governance 
framework borrow from the foundations of institutional economics to stipulate that if 
only the rules and regulations are implemented, sanctity of contract is honoured and 
transaction costs minimized, it will unleash the hidden potential of dynamic forces in 
developing countries and they will be able to gallop along the path of capitalism. Other 
than the institutional economics, the rule of law focus of the IFIs governance reforms in 
also inspired by the neo-Weberian notions, as we discuss later. 
The IFIs, however, fail to take account of the political economy considerations of the 
reforms process. Working through incentives and similar tools does make sense. 
However, any process of incentivisation cannot work unless there is an understanding of 
the power dynamics of the society. Not only are there are winners and losers of a reforms 
process, as the literature on reforms often points out; those winners and losers work in 
the framework of political, social, economic, legal and ideological structures. Often the 
interaction of the winners and losers of the reforms with socio-political and economic 
structures is mediated through power structures in the developing countries. This is the 
theme explored in depth in the literature review of the thesis.  
Structural and political economy explanations are needed to discuss the institutional 
governance reforms with due context. The thesis will learn from political economy 
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analysis and seek to apply it specifically to the rule of law challenges of transition to a 
modern “Weberian” state. 
 The empirical focus of the dissertation arose from an initial survey of relevant 
theoretical literature. This covered the role of “good governance” in the reforms 
literature on Pakistan, and professed moves towards a “Weberian” state in Pakistan.  
Given the fact that the thesis is about the relationship between political economy and the 
rule of law in Pakistan, there is a need for a theoretical focus that takes into account the 
complexity of an inter-disciplinary study. The thesis reviews key IFIs reforms in 
contemporary Pakistan which are largely inspired by the “good governance” discourse. 
There is a need to trace the theoretical roots of the “good governance” discourse and 
present its informed critique as well. 
The good governance reforms model is inspired by the “Weberian” conceptions of the 
rule of law, sanctity of contract and provision of a level playing field. IFIs documents 
reviewed for the thesis mention these concepts time and again. There is a need, therefore, 
to review the Weberian conception of legal-rational state. Another issue identified in the 
literature review is whether the Weberian analysis was meant for the developing 
countries or has it been erroneously applied to them? It may be desirable to establish a 
modern “Weberian” state in the developing countries like Pakistan. It may not, however, 
be possible to do so without going through a long, difficult, negotiated and complex 
transition process.  
The literature review discusses the challenges of transition to a modern “Weberian” state. 
It states that merely replicating the institutions of advanced countries in developing 
countries does not work. The structural analysis of Mushtaq Khan (2004, 2005, 2013), 
Lieven (2011) and North et al. (2013) discusses in detail the challenges of transition in 
the context of politics of patronage, patron-client relationships, and the role of rents. 
Rents are created outside the ambit of formal rules and do not conform to the 
“Weberian” notions of the rule of law. Yet, the market consensus is mistaken in 
considering all forms of rents to be bad for the society. Some forms of rents can be 
growth-enhancing. Some forms of rents can also help to maintain political stability and 
allow economic growth. Rents are the costs that have to be paid to ensure political 
stability in developing societies but the mainstream literature fails to take into account 
these necessary costs.  
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The literature review also states that the way redistribution of resources takes place in the 
advanced countries is fundamentally different from the developing countries. There are 
structural differences between the relationship of the capitalist sector and the rest of 
society that set apart the redistributive agenda in the advanced countries from the 
developing countries. These structural differences need to be taken into account in any 
debate on reforms. The literature also states that protection of property rights is costly 
and the developing countries do not have large surpluses or revenues to be able to afford 
it unlike the advanced countries. The literature also takes into account the state is weak 
and social groups are strong in Pakistan. Kinship-based networks help the majority of 
population to negotiate with the state institutions. While the state apparatus exists in 
Pakistan, most of the matters are settled outside the ambit of law.        
After discussing the theoretical direction of the thesis, we focus on the IFIs reforms and 
their impact on empirical case studies. The logical question is why study the IFIs 
reforms? There is a long history of foreign aid having played a crucial role in the 
economic development of Pakistan. The focus on the IFIs needs to be seen in the context 
of Pakistan’s history. 
Generous US aid started in the 1950s due to Pakistan’s geostrategic role in the Cold War.  
It played a major role in the country’s economic development. Some of the aid filtered 
into the national credit institutions. The state institutions supported the traders who 
became the industrialist class in the 1950s and 1960s. The Harvard Advisory Board also 
played an important role in steering the economy in those decades and Pakistan was 
showcased as a successful case-study for a ‘take-off’ economy with high GDP growth. 
Pakistan’s GDP growth averaged 5.2 per cent from 1958-1964 and rose to 9.4 in 1964-65 
(Zaidi, 2005, p. 98). The average growth rate in manufacturing reached the climax of 
11.7 per cent in 1960-65. During the 1980s, it again went up to 8.2 per cent (Zaidi, 2005, 
p. 130). The US aid closely coincided with high growth rates in Pakistan’s 
manufacturing.  
The US aid to Pakistan was often stopped. It first dried up when Pakistan went to war 
with India in 1965. It dwindled through late 1960s and the 1970s. In the 1980s the US 
reinvigorated its relations with Pakistan to gain its support to oust the Soviets from 
Afghanistan. This led to Pakistan’s over 6 per cent GDP growth. However, US aid 
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started to dry up with the pullout of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in the late 1980s and 
the dividend of being the front-line state in America’s proxy war largely vanished.  
Pakistan needed funds for its macroeconomic stability. The outgoing authoritarian 
government signed the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with the IMF in 1988. 
The democratically elected government of Benazir Bhutto which came into power after 
eleven years of dictatorial rule inherited the SAP. Since then Pakistan has been in the 
group of developing countries whose economies are closely regulated by the IFIs. 
IFIs remain the most important players in Pakistan’s economy. In the 1990s, Pakistan 
went to the IMF for a macroeconomic stability loan. IMF agreed to provide the loan tied 
to a set of conditionalities which required Pakistan to conform to the neo-liberal agenda. 
Pakistan carried out some “reforms” but fell short of meeting conditionalities. The 
structural adjustment loan was, therefore, stopped pre-maturely. Pakistan again fell into a 
dire macroeconomic situation and rushed to the IMF for support. Another structural 
adjustment loan was negotiated. The initial tranches were released along with the 
handing over of a list of conditionalities. Pakistan again failed to meet them fully. 
Another programme was aborted mid-way. This has been the classic pattern throughout 
the 1990s. 
At the same time, Pakistan’s domestic economy and industry suffered due to the 
conditions of the IFIs. The tariffs were brought down and imports liberalised. The 
domestic political instability coupled with the doing away of the protection for the 
industry had an adverse impact on the economy. The 1990s was considered the “lost 
decade” for Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan’s overall manufacturing growth was 4.8 per 
cent in 1990s; the first quarter of the 1990s registering a growth of 5.75 per cent and the 
last half registering a growth of only 3.22 per cent (Zaidi, 2005, p. 130). Pakistan’s 
manufacturing growth again went up to 6.9 per cent during 2000-2003 as Pakistan 
became a front-line state in the ‘war on terror’ post September 11, 2001 (Zaidi, 2005, p. 
130). Again, the US aid and softening of the IMF’s terms for loans helped. 
Some of the first generation IFIs reforms in Pakistan in the early 1990s were tariff 
liberalisation, freeing of exchange controls, devaluation, interest rate liberalisation, 
privatisation, financial sector liberalisation and imposition of a value-added tax called 
the general sales tax. By mid 1990s, the IFIs began to focus on institutional governance 
reforms. They are often called the “second generation reforms” in the literature on IFIs. 
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These reforms focused on accounting methods, regulation of the corporate sector, justice 
system reforms, accountability and transparency and civil service reforms. They also 
continued with the taxation and financial sector liberalisation from the earlier reform 
efforts. Later, the requirement for the automation of property records was added to the 
second generation reforms. 
The IFIs good governance reforms are meant to create a regime for the rule of law in 
Pakistan. The pro-market reforms are designed to provide a level playing field both for 
intra-capital relations and also capital’s relationship with the state. The real challenge is 
to find out how the inherent distribution of power in societies like Pakistan confronts the 
IFIs efforts for the implementation of the rule of law. However, IFIs are promoting a 
particular type of the “rule of law”. It is not applicable across the board to labour for 
example. The larger point is, however, to study the contesting efforts promoting the rule 
of law and how they are being contested by the societal power structures. The thesis aims 
to study the challenges to the rule of law in contemporary Pakistan from 1999 to 2004, 
with due historical context.  
The period of 1999-2004 was chosen to enable the study to capture two on-going 
developments of relevance. First, IFIs institutional governance reforms started from mid-
1990s after IFIs had seen the limitations of their structural adjustment programmes in 
Latin America and Asia. Hence, 1999-2004 was appropriate to see the implementation of 
the “rule of law” related reforms. Secondly, an authoritarian regime of General 
Musharraf was in government in Pakistan, which would have been more likely to push 
the otherwise difficult reforms. The fieldwork for the thesis was conducted in 2004; 
hence, it was the cut off year for the thesis. However, the time period 1999-2004 has 
been chosen with a clear understanding that this work will be seeped in due historical 
context.  
The thesis conducts case studies of a law (General Sales Tax in a VAT mode), an 
organisation (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan), and a productive sector 
(textiles). 
The VAT was imposed through a General Sales Tax Law in 1990 as a direct 
conditionality of the IMF, as part of the structural adjustment programme. Later, the IMF 
and World Bank attempted to strengthen the VAT/GST through further loans and 
conditionalities. The World Bank funded a multi-million dollar project to automate the 
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process of refunds in the VAT/GST. The purpose of investigating IFIs reforms in the 
thesis was to see how the rule of law reforms were actually implemented. They provide 
an interesting interaction of the political economy with the rule of law. GST in a VAT 
mode is embedded both in the political economy as well as in the rule of law.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) was formed as a result of 
a direct loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1999. The idea was to have an 
independent regulatory body for the public listed companies in particular and the 
corporate sector in general. Earlier, the Capital Law Authority, SECP’s predecessor was 
within the Ministry of Finance in the federal government. The SECP was to be an 
autonomous organisation where technocrats could regulate the financial sector and 
public listed companies in particular and supervise the corporate sector’s compliance 
with the relevant laws in general. Again, law was used to direct the economy in a certain 
way. Hence, again there is a clear linkage with both the law and the political economy.  
The third case study in the thesis is of the textiles sector and caste capitalism. There is 
more than one reason to look at the textiles sector. It is the largest industrial sector in 
Pakistan. It provides a useful perspective on the productive capitalist sector while 
reviewing the reforms aimed at the rule of law. Extensive interviews with the textiles 
manufacturers provided useful and interesting insights on VAT/GST and SECP. The 
thesis is therefore able to show linkages of the IFIs pushed reforms in the largest 
manufacturing sector of Pakistan.  
While analysing the textiles sector from the point of view of capital, the thesis discusses 
the role of two traditional trading castes, Memons and Chinioties, dominating the formal 
textiles sector in Pakistan. This phenomenon is rooted in its historical specificity. 
Harriss-White (2003) has discussed the phenomenon of caste, religion, gender and 
locality being used to “regulate” the informal market in India. The thesis terms the 
dominance of Memons and Chiniotis even in the formal textiles sector as “caste 
capitalism” and links it to the larger rule of law debate.  
The thesis also questions the ability of a weak state to deliver on the implementation of 
‘good governance’ reforms. The literature says that neo-liberal agenda has weakened the 
state in developing countries (Byres, 2005). Given the fact that IFIs have actively pushed 
for essentially the roll-back of the state in Pakistan, how do they expect the “rule of law” 
reforms to succeed in an atmosphere of a weak state? A contrast between the rule-
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violating behaviour and the rule of law reforms becomes even starker in the context of a 
weak state. 
 
The thesis uses qualitative research methodology throughout. It helps to throw light on 
the complicated issues analysed in the thesis.  In contrast, the causality methods used in 
quantitative research often struggle to capture such complex issues. Also, in terms of 
time and resource constraints, it was not feasible to use the quantitative methods. The 
methodology is discussed further in Chapter 4.  
 
The division of the chapters of the thesis is as below: 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
 
Chapter 2: The Literature Review. This chapter begins with the Weberian notions of the 
rational-bureaucratic law-abiding state. This is followed by themes around the state’s 
monopoly over the instruments of violence (or lack of it); the role of institutions; the 
compatibility of institutional capabilities with the distribution of power in the society; the 
structural basis of the power in developing countries; the patron-client relationships and 
the politics of patronage; the critical role of rents creation for maintaining political 
stability and also allowing economic development. This discussion is in the context of 
the transition to a modern “Weberian” state. 
 
Chapter 3: Background on the Political Economy. It reviews the literature on the political 
economy in Pakistan from the 1950s onwards. It looks into the role of the state provided 
subsidies, credit, import licenses in the realm of governance. It also looks at Bhutto’s 
nationalization and instruments of industrial policy in the 1980s. It also briefly discusses 
the role of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1990s. It overall discusses 
the background to the political economy of Pakistan. It also has a brief discussion on the 
role of landowning class and its link with the politics of patronage. 
 
Chapter 4: Methodology. It discusses the qualitative methodology used in the thesis, 
qualifies the choice of case studies, sampling procedures and discusses the entire 
fieldwork process in detail. The chapter also operationalises certain terms used in the 
thesis such as the “rule of law” and “caste capitalism”. 
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Chapter 5: Structural Adjustment Programme and IFIs Role in Contemporary Pakistan. 
This brief chapter just sets the stage for the two case studies of the IFIs pushed 
institutional governance reforms. It briefly discusses the IFIs relationship with Pakistan, 
since the onset of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1988. It also gives 
details of the IFIs first and second generation reforms in Pakistan. 
 
Chapter 6: A Case Study of the Value added Tax (VAT) as the General Sales Tax (GST). 
It discusses the history of GST, its success and failures. The chapter discusses a key IFIs 
reform in the fiscal arena to raise revenues and increase documentation. An attempt is 
made to chronicle the kind of resistance GST (in a VAT mode) has received from the 
Pakistani capitalist and the intermediate classes. 
 
Chapter 7: A Case Study of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP). This case study discusses the challenges of Badla trading, unlawful intra-
corporate financing between firms and implementation of corporate governance amongst 
other reforms. It also discusses the family oriented nature of private businesses and 
resistance to the SECP reforms in regulating the listed companies in particular and 
supervising the corporate sector in general.  
 
Chapter 8: An Overview of the Textiles Sector through Manufacturers’ Perceptions. This 
chapter works as a background to the last case study on caste capitalism in the textiles 
sector. It presents key statistics by contextualizing the textiles sector historically, lays 
down the stages of production in the textiles sector, and discusses the main findings of 
the fieldwork through the manufacturers’ perceptions. Linkages to the overall rule of law 
debate have been made wherever applicable. 
 
Chapter 9: Inter-Generational Hereditary Entrepreneurship: Family, Caste Capitalism 
and Social Networks in the Textiles Sector. The chapter analyses caste capitalism in the 
context of literature on “social structure of accumulation”. Caste capitalism is prevalent 
even in the formal textiles sector in Pakistan both due to the reasons of historical 
specificity and also due to the dysfunctionality of Pakistan’s system of honouring 
contracts. The chapter discusses four case studies that show inter-generational hereditary 
entrepreneurship and various strategies to deal with the family control and ownership. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion. It sums up the main findings of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2. The Literature Review 
This chapter discusses the relevant literature regarding the transition from traditional 
society to a modern “Weberian” state in the context of the rule of law. It begins with 
Weber’s conception of legal-bureaucratic state, followed by its implication for the 
developing countries by discussing Mushtaq Khan’s work. To contrast the different 
viewpoints, an analysis along the lines of neo-patrimonial thinking is presented by giving 
the main ideas of Acemoglu and Robinson’s book. It is followed by a discussion on the 
patron-client relationship and the structural analysis of Mushtaq Khan and Lieven. 
Discussion on the limited access order by North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast and its link 
with rent creation, political stability, the rule of law and growth is presented thereafter. 
At the end, an analysis of the literature is given by briefly discussing the main strengths 
and weaknesses in the context of “Weberian” characteristics of the rule of law, 
impersonalisation and monopoly over the instruments of violence. 
We chose the “Weberian” focus for the literature review since the thesis discusses some 
key IFIs reforms in Pakistan. IFIs push the “good governance” reforms model which is 
inspired by neo-Weberian thinking. They focus on the implementation of the rule of law, 
sanctity of contract, a level playing field and rule-based governance. The theoretical 
roots of such rule-based governance go back to the “Weberian” analysis. We want to 
ascertain, on the basis of the literature, Weber’s view of legal-rational state. We also 
want to discuss the literature that explains how Weber’s writings have been appropriated 
(even wrongly) to justify the reforms package that is not compatible with the structural 
features of the developing countries like Pakistan. The focus of the literature review is, 
therefore, to link to the “Weberian” characteristics of modern state and present a more 
nuanced political economy structural analysis. 
 
2.1. The Weberian framework 
In the Weberian framework, the state has monopoly over the instruments of legitimate 
violence. Yet, business of the state is carried out with a “minimum of voluntary 
compliance”. A higher level of compliance would be desirable without coercion (Weber, 
1978, p. 212). According to Weber, there are three pure kinds of legitimate rule whose 
legitimacy is established on the following grounds (Weber, 1978, pp. 215-216): 
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1) Legal-rational authority: Enacted rules have sanctity under law. Those who 
occupy positions of legal authority do so on the basis of rules and they govern on 
the basis of the rules as well; 
2) Traditional authority: Loyalty to traditional authority is derived from honouring 
time-tested traditions and those occupying power under the traditional authority 
derive their legitimacy from those traditions; 
3) Charismatic authority: Dedication to some outstanding hero or sacredness is the 
basis of legitimacy for the charismatic authority. Rules or orders sanctified by the 
exceptional individual define the ways of charismatic domination. 
We mainly discuss the legal-rational authority in detail because it is most relevant for the 
thesis. Out of above three “pure” or ideal types, these categories can often overlap. For 
example, “hereditary monarchy” can gain its legitimacy both from traditions and 
charisma. A president under the legal-rational order can be chosen through a plebiscite 
due to his charisma (Weber, 1978).  The Weberian ideal types have their inner 
contradictions. There can be conflict between the rationale of charisma and of a rational-
bureaucratic order. Such sporadic tensions are sometimes necessary as they can 
challenge the bureaucratic rule by preventing its stagnation. Therefore, Weber’s 
conceptualisation is “deliberately ‘antinomical’” (Mushtaq Khan, 2005, p.714). 
 
2.1.1. Legal-Rational Authority 
Impersonalisation is the hallmark of the legal-rational order. Compliance to it is sought 
by those in authority (Weber, 1978). 
Legal rules are established on the basis of an agreement of members of the organisation 
or through an imposed obligation. These rules are decided on the basis of rationality or 
pragmatism or a combination of the two. Members of an organisation pledge to adhere 
by certain rules. Their jurisdiction is extended to a specific territory through an 
administrative process. For the legal-rational authority to succeed, both the leader and 
members of the organisation must follow the “law” in an impersonal manner (Weber, 
1978). 
An administrative agency in the legal-rational order works by “continuous rule-bound 
conduct of official business” (Weber, 1978, p. 218). It works according to the principles 
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of a division of labour and sets up clear “means of compulsion” with a specified 
jurisdiction. Functions of the administrative agency are regulated by established 
conditions. These principles apply in the case of government, large-scale business 
companies, in the army, political parties, church or trade unions (Weber, 1978, pp. 218-
222). 
Legal-rational authority is hierarchical. Higher officials supervise the lower officials, 
with arrangements for appeals and grievances procedures and norms/technical rules are 
stipulated to run an office. Given the technical nature of the rules, specialist training and 
qualifications are necessary for the officials (Weber, 1978). 
Weber emphasizes the impersonal nature of legal-rational authority repeatedly: 
“In the rational type it is a matter of principle that the members of the 
administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of the means 
of production or administration... There exists, furthermore, in principle complete 
separation of the organization’s property (respectively, capital), and the personal 
property (household) of the official... The dominance of a spirit of formalistic 
impersonality...The dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty without 
regard to personal considerations. Everyone is subject to formal equality of 
treatment; that is, everyone is in the same empirical situation. This is the spirit in 
which the ideal official conducts his office” (Weber, 1978, pp. 218-219, 225). 
The character of the office is objective and independent in order to best serve the rules. 
Administrative decisions are preserved in writing. Regular functioning of the office and 
written documents that record all necessary stages of decision-making are the essential 
core of an office. Security of tenure is assured. There is also a career in the bureaucracy 
where officials are promoted and their remuneration increased with grade. Arbitrariness 
is not acceptable – formalism is required. Due to the impersonal nature of bureaucracy, 
an official works “without appropriation of his office”. It runs under the control and 
discipline of the rules. The bureaucracy is “monocratic” rather than consisting of 
collegial bodies. It functions under one head and is needed to make quick decisions 
rather than reliance on collegial bodies. These work on the basis of compromise and 
decision-making process can be affected by “shifting majorities”. Monocratic 
bureaucracy is efficient and the most rational form of administration (Weber, 1978, pp. 
220-226). 
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Though capitalism and bureaucracy have evolved out of different historical processes, 
the development of capitalism has played a significant part in the evolution of modern 
bureaucracy. The coming together of a well-functioning, “calculable” and “stable” 
administration that runs according to the rules has happened “largely under the capitalist 
auspices”. The bureaucracy is a required for capitalism to grow in its modern form. 
Moreover, “...capitalism is the most rational economic basis for bureaucratic 
administration and enables it (the bureaucracy) to develop in the most rational form, 
especially because, from a fiscal point of view, it supplies the necessary money 
resources” (Weber, 1978, p. 224). In Weber’s framework social order is most rationally 
organised through a modern bureaucratic state just as economy is most rationally 
organised through capitalism (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005). 
Weber was of the view that the legal-rational bureaucracy is needed not only in the realm 
of government but also in other sectors including the “large-scale private enterprises” as 
stated earlier. The complete separation of powers is also needed in the private sector: 
 “With respect to the separation of the official from ownership of the means of 
administration, the situation is exactly the same in the field of public 
administration and in private bureaucratic organizations, such as the large-scale 
capitalist enterprise” (Weber, 1978, p. 222) 
The case studies presented in the thesis show that such impersonalization has not taken 
roots in the textiles sector in Pakistan. This sector is family-owned. The line between the 
private and the public is often blurry. It is discussed more in detail in the case study 
chapters. 
 
2.2. Framework for the Literature Review: 
Having established that the modern “Weberian” state has impersonalisation, division of 
labour, impartiality, hierarchy and a legitimate monopoly over the instruments of 
violence, we provide a framework for the literature reviewed. 
All the literature discussed in this chapter is directly or indirectly related to the notions of 
“Weberian” state. There is a near consensus that the advanced countries of the developed 
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North closely resemble the key characteristics of “Weberian” state. There is, however, a 
divergence of opinion about its application to developing countries.  
There is a “good governance” set of analyses that states that stable property rights, the 
rule of law, broad political participation and open competition are prerequisite for 
development. There is another structuralist (political economy) set of analysis that also 
contends that the modern “Weberian” state and socio-politically sustainable growth are 
desirable for the developing countries. The key difference among the two sets of 
analyses is that while the former aims to replicate the “Weberian” institutions of the 
advanced countries in the developing countries, the latter states that the rule of law and 
stable property rights are only possible after the developing countries have achieved 
dynamic growth. High growth, in turn, is only possible if the underlying distribution of 
power in the society is compatible with the institutional capabilities needed for 
transformation (see Khan, Mushtaq, 2004). 
 Another key difference amongst the two schools of thoughts is about the role of rents. 
The “good governance” school of thought considers rents to be inherently unproductive, 
damaging and a drain on society. While, the structuralist school of thought considers 
growth-enhancing rents as well as growth-damaging rents. The advanced countries 
historically changed property rights in favour of the capitalists during the process of their 
development. Rents are needed to constrain violence, maintain political stability and 
allow economic growth in the developing countries. The real dilemma is not that rents 
are bad per se, it is whether the rents are captured by the productive groups or 
unproductive groups. The issue is whether the process of rents creation leads to “elite 
bargains” that allow political stability and economic growth or whether it leads to further 
chaos and violence (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005; North et al., 2013). Within the structuralist 
school of thought, there is literature on the weak capacity of the state, kinship-based 
networks and the wider politics of patronage (Lieven, 2011).    
The literature reviewed in this chapter falls into the above-mentioned two categories. 
Most of the literature discusses the political economy inspired structuralist school of 
thought. It includes writings of Mushtaq Khan, Lieven and North et al. The “good 
governance” school of thought is either discussed in the critical manner within the 
structuralist framework or elaborated through the work of Acemoglu and Robinson 
31 
 
(2012) which is based on a limited interpretation of history (as the structuralist school of 
thought would contend). 
The “Weberian” modern state and dynamic growth is, generally, desired end for 
everyone. The real point of divergence is the path taken to make it possible. The “good 
governance” school of thought advocates characteristics of the modern “Weberian” state 
first in order to develop. The structuralist school of thought contends that you need to 
balance between political stability and economic growth. It also states that “Weberian” 
state characteristics are only possible once a certain level of economic growth has taken 
place. The point of divergence is how to make a transition to a modern “Weberian” state 
and achieve dynamic growth.   
The literature only discusses the relevant parts of the literature that directly or indirectly 
relate to the notions of modern “Weberian” state and/or weak state capacity.  
 
2.3. Implications of the Weberian Analysis for Developing Countries: 
Mushtaq Khan (2005) points out that the debate on clientelism in developing countries’ 
politics is often contrasted with the Weberian conception of the rational-bureaucratic 
state. Neo-Weberians check the health of developing countries against the “ideal-typical” 
characteristics. 
The developing countries fail to meet the criteria of Weberian rational-bureaucratic state. 
Indeed, Weber’s analysis was not meant for the modern developing countries. His 
analysis contrasts the traditional societies with the rational-bureaucratic state. For Weber, 
loyalty to a traditional leader is the hallmark of pre-capitalist patrimonial rule. Hence it is 
erroneous to compare the Weberian patrimonial rule with the personalized politics in 
modern developing countries (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005).  
In contrast, the idea of neo-patrimonialism is used to analyse the prevalence of pre-
modern features of governance in developing countries. Personalised power is the 
distinguishing feature of neo-patrimonialism. The leader’s personalised rule of the state 
is run with the support of clients who in turn are rewarded for their support. Formal 
regulations are not adhered to. Neo-patrimonialism is different from the standard 
Weberian analysis which only analysed patrimonialism. In the neo-patrimonial analysis, 
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democracy by establishing a rational- bureaucratic state is necessary for capitalism to 
function as a social organisation. The way neo-patrimonial analysis links democracy to 
capitalism was not part of original Weberian analysis. The “good governance” policy 
discourse in the post-Cold War period is largely based on the neo-patrimonial analysis 
(Khan, Mushtaq, 2005).  
Patron-client relationships are the hallmark of politics of developing countries and they 
are structured around payoffs rather than just traditional legitimacy or loyalty. Such 
relationships are structured along the “modern forms of exchange”. Patron accesses the 
resources of the state by using the political and organisational power of the clients and 
clients are rewarded for having played their part in the form of payoffs from the acquired 
public resources (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005).  
This sub-section clearly points out that neo-Weberian conceptualisation to measure the 
developments in developing countries against the yardstick of Weberian “ideal-types” 
(discussed in Section 2.1) is erroneous. Patron-client relationships are not just based on 
traditional loyalty but on modern forms of payoffs and are linked to the wider patterns of 
patronage which are part of the developmental process. 
 
2.4. ‘Limited Interpretation of History’ Analysis: 
We present an example of the ‘limited interpretation of history’ analysis done by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) in this literature review. Its detailed presentation helps 
to contrast it with the more structural analysis later. The point to present such a limited 
analysis is to highlight the necessity of having a structural analysis of the developing 
countries to refute rather simplistic “good governance”-oriented theories. 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s book differentiates between inclusive and extractive political 
and economic institutions. It attempts to explain why inclusive institutions emerged in 
some parts of the world and not others. Inclusive pluralistic political institutions are 
critical in engendering inclusive economic institutions based on competition, innovation 
and “creative destruction”. They encourage investment due to the property rights being 
well-defined and enforced. Inclusive economic and political institutions are critical in 
getting nations out of poverty and for putting them on the trajectory of long-term growth. 
They provide broad political participation, the rule of law, secure property rights, no 
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entry barriers, sanctity of contract and a level playing field for their societies (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2012). The features of the inclusive political institutions described by 
Acemoglu and Robinson have some “Weberian” characteristics such as the rule of law, 
sanctity of contract and a level playing field.  
 In contrast, extractive political institutions are absolutist. They concentrate power in the 
hands of a tiny elite. They do not have checks and balances and have much fewer 
constraints. Drawing from large body of historical data going back as far as the Neolithic 
Revolution, Acemoglu and Robinson explain the history of hundreds of years through a 
rather simple theory1 (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
Innovation and “creative destruction”2 led the developed world to adopt new 
technologies which created the “technological gap” between them and the developing 
countries. It is not geography or culture that determine the path of development of a 
particular country rather the institutions make the main difference. Inclusive economic 
institutions help to harness the talents and skills of the majority of people. Sanctity of 
contract and exchange is preserved through the rule of law. The state provides the 
                                                          
1
 Acemoglu and Robinson begin their book by considering an area on the US-Mexican border called the 
Nogaleses. They contrast the examples of two Nogaleses which are divided between the United States and 
Mexico. In the earlier form of democracy after the establishment of Jamestown colony in the seventeenth 
century in the United States, the population had a voice in the running of the government. Inclusive 
political institutions made the Nogaleses, Arizona in the US to be more developed compared to its 
underdeveloped half in Sonora, Mexico. The colonists initially tried to replicate extractive economic 
institutions by trying to force settlers to work as exploitative labour, but did not succeed. They had to 
provide incentives to settlers to make them work hard. The democracy-leaning political institutions had an 
impact on the growth of the economic institutions. Giving details of the divergent colonial past of the US 
and Mexico, Acemoglu and Robinson state that political instability in Mexico resulted in weak property 
rights. The Mexican state was inherently weak and could not raise enough taxes to provide effective public 
services. Its economic institutions were based on exploitation and monopolies due to its historical past. 
Exploitation and monopolies in Mexico did not provide enough economic incentives or competition to its 
people to flourish. Historically, the South America as a part of Aztec state was rich. It became poor due to 
colonialism and persistence of extractive institutions whereas the North America which was poor 
historically became rich due to setting up of the inclusive political and economic institutions. Due to the 
severe competition, banks provided finance at low interest rates in the US while competition was largely 
missing in Mexico. While the political and economic rights were consolidated in the US over a long 
period, most Latin American countries only became fragile democracies in the recent past. The political 
institutions in the US provided continuity and stability and also secured property rights according to the 
rule of law (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
2 Acemoglu and Robinson use the Schumpeterian concept of “creative destruction”. The old sectors are 
replaced by the new sectors, old firms give way to the new firms and old technologies become obsolete 
and new technologies hold forth. This process of change creates its winners and losers. The fear of change 
accompanying the process of “creative destruction” is at the heart of blocking inclusive economic 
institutions. Whereas, “creative destruction” is necessary for innovation, technological advance and 
enhanced productivity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
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necessary infrastructure and public services through a central authority. Without 
centralisation3, it is difficult to push for economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012). In terms of the rule of law preserving the sanctity of contract, we again see the 
linkage to the Weberian legal-rational authority. The desire for centralisation that could 
ensure monopoly over the instruments of violence also draws from the Weberian 
tradition.    
Absolute political systems create political institutions that only enrich the ruling elite, 
and create monopolies that benefit a tiny political elite. In the inclusive political 
institutions, power is distributed widely. Checks and balances are needed that constrain 
the ability of the ruling elite (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
The authors contrast the inclusive political and economic institutions with extractive 
political and economic institutions. They are of the view that there is “synergistic 
relationship” between extractive political and economic institutions. Extractive political 
and economic institutions are in “negative feedback loop” which makes these institutions 
“vicious”. The ruling elite with little checks and balances establish economic institutions 
that are exploitative, monopolistic and narrowly based. Such monopolistic economic 
institutions serve the interests of the ruling elite only rather than engendering broad-
based growth. Whereas the inclusive political institutions have a “positive feedback 
loop” with inclusive economic institutions and such a cycle is “virtuous” as inclusive 
institutions complement each other. The authors contrast the “positive feedback loop” 
that creates the “virtuous cycle” with the “negative feedback loop” that creates the 
“vicious cycle”4 (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  
                                                          
3 The process of centralisation requires one group within the society to be powerful enough to impose 
order over the rest of society. If this were to happen, it would dilute the power of other groups or clans in 
the society. The groups or clans who tend to lose political power as a result of centralisation block the 
process. It happened in Somalia. There is diffused political power in there but no group or clan is powerful 
enough to impose its power on others.  Diffused power in the absence of a centralised authority does not 
lead to inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
 
4
 They give the example of Sierra Leone where the pricing policies did not create incentives for the 
farmers. The rural interests did not hold power, hence, they could not get the marketing boards to make 
prices favourable to them. Property rights over land and tenure were also not secure. Chieftains did not 
allow cultivation of perennial crops for fear of letting others establish some sorts of property rights over 
the land controlled by them. Sierra Leone also suffered from the “indirect rule” during its colonial period 
where powers were vested with the chieftains. Sierra Leone is an example of “vicious cycle”. The British 
colonialists built the extractive institutions and the post-colonial rulers continued with them. Extractive 
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The authors are of the view that there is still the possibility of growth under extractive 
political institutions, at least, by two possible means. One is when the ruling elite in the 
extractive political institutions can allocate resources to highly-productive sectors and 
control it politically. The second way is when the political elite feel secure in their hold 
of power and they allow some degree of growth of inclusive economic institutions as this 
does not threaten their hold directly. Also, inclusive economic institutions persist due to 
the historical reasons where the elite decide not to block such institutions. In these 
circumstances, some degree of inclusive economic institutions is possible even under the 
extractive political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  
Extractive political institutions can generate growth as happened in the case of Soviet 
Union from 1928 till 1970. However, such growth is not accompanied by technological 
change and “creative destruction”. Such growth hits a limit and the economy begins to 
stagnate afterwards. Also, the economic growth under the extractive political institutions 
is fragile since this often leads to infighting and civil strife. Such infighting and civil 
strife prevents centralisation of power as in sub-Saharan Africa and in some other parts 
of the world (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
The way out of the “vicious cycle” of extractive political and economic institutions is to 
transform them into inclusive institutions. This can happen due to a variety of reasons: a) 
due to some certain elements of inclusiveness within these institutions; b) people rising 
up and challenging the extractive institutions and changing them toward inclusive 
institutions; c) it can happen due to the “contingent nature of history” as well (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2012). 
Although Acemoglu and Robinson present a largely path-dependent historical analysis5, 
yet they state that they do not favour historical determinism. They present a number of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
political and economic institutions complemented each other and there was no check against the use of 
arbitrary power to amass resources. There was abuse of power which also ignited infighting, civil war, 
state collapse and lawlessness. New groups wanted to wrench power away from the old groups to 
accumulate wealth. This took states further away from centralisation and economic growth (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). 
 
5
 They show that Britain became the first country to experience the Industrial Revolution due to the 
Glorious Revolution of the seventeenth century and the socio-economic changes resulting from the Black 
Death, and by the opening of the Atlantic trade route. The Industrial Revolution that started in Britain 
spread to Western Europe, the US and Australia. It is the brush with “critical junctures” that makes 
countries change. The Glorious Revolution heralded the onset of inclusive political and economic 
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caveats in their otherwise simple theory. Patterns of economic prosperity and partial 
inclusive institutions could be reversed as happened historically. They also state that 
there is no “cumulative process” of institutional change towards sustained growth. They 
call institutional differences as “institutional drift” and say that changes occur due to the 
“institutional drift interacting with critical junctures”. The “institutional drift” explains 
how small differences in their interaction with “critical junctures” lead societies to 
divergent paths (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  
As the structuralist political economy analysis discussed later in the chapter states that 
stable property rights and the rule of law emerged after the advanced countries reached a 
certain level of economic development. The structuralist analysis indicates that theories 
like the one by Acemoglu and Robinson that advocate inclusive political and economic 
institutions as a prerequisite of the growth have got the direction of causality wrong. 
Dynamic process of growth took place first and only later the property rights were 
stabilised and the rule of law was made applicable across the board. The advanced 
countries changed property rights in favour of their propertied classes as famously 
analysed by Marx in the case of the ‘Enclosures Movement’ in Britain, a process that 
started in the 16th century and was only completed in the 19th century. Resources were 
distributed outside the ambit of the formal law to the propertied classes and emergent 
capitalists historically. Once a certain level of dynamic growth was achieved, the 
property rights were made secure because the large surpluses enabled the state to earn 
fiscal revenues that could be spent on the protection of property rights, as per the 
structuralist analysis discussed later in the chapter.    
                                                                                                                                                                            
institutions in Britain. It undermined the power of feudal aristocrats and monarchs and consolidated power 
of peasants and led to spread of “independent cities”. Commercial farming started and cities grew due to 
the dynamism of industrialists and merchants. These new ascendant groups voiced their demands for more 
political rights from their monarch. Opening of the trade route in the Atlantic created opportunities for 
trade in the Western Europe. The authors discuss other paths to inclusive institutions as well. They take the 
French Revolution as one such critical path that led to the downfall of absolutism and led to a whole volley 
of “interstate conflicts” and these conflicts in turn led to institutional reforms. Such institutional reforms 
led to economic growth, the Industrial Revolution and the inclusive economic institutions in the Western 
Europe. The rule of law and the inclusive political institutions in turn led to the industrialisation (The US 
and Australia followed the path similar to the Britain). Once the rule of law was established and pluralistic 
institutions were in place, there was demand for more political rights and inclusiveness. Inclusive 
economic institutions in turn distributed wealth more equitably paving the way for an even playing field 
for all. Once inclusive political and economic institutions have been established, they generally tend to 
persist. However, one cannot exclude them from “irreversible” changes. They do face challenges and have 
to surmount these challenges to persist. Britain is an example of a “gradual virtuous cycle”. Each little step 
helped to take another step toward more inclusive institutions. The process by which the inclusive 
economic and political institutions emerge is, however, conflictual. The old elite had to give up their 
powers and the new groups sought broad-base political participation (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
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Going back to the notions of “Weberian” state, it is not possible for the developing 
countries to have the rule of law and legal-rational authority to begin with. Similarly, it is 
not possible to start off with inclusive political and economic institutions. Acemoglu and 
Robinson have reduced the history between countries and nations that have inclusive 
political and economic institutions and those that do not. This chapter calls it a ‘limited 
interpretation of history’ analysis because one cannot reduce history in terms of the 
prevalence of inclusive and extractive institutions only. There are other complex 
processes that enable the evolution of inclusive institutions and dynamic growth. Unless 
those complex processes have been analysed, such a simple theory of world history 
remains limited and reductive. Acemoglu and Robinson explain the way those inclusive 
political and economic institutions were established in the developed world through 
vague terms like “institutional drift” that took place in the history and such an 
“institutional drift” interacted with “critical junctures”. For them, such vague terms 
explain how small differences in their interaction with “critical junctures” led societies 
on different paths. Such ex-post facto analysis fails to analyse the material and structural 
basis of historical developments. As the structural analysis states that the advanced 
countries followed the process of dynamic growth by altering property rights and once 
dynamic capitalism emerged in those countries, they were able to have secure property 
rights, sanctity of contract, the rule of law and open competition. It is, therefore, not 
desirable to recommend the developing countries to have inclusive institutions and 
“Weberian” state characteristics as a prerequisite of development without analysing the 
underlying structural features of those countries and societies. We turn to the structural 
analysis in the next sub-section.  
 
 2.5. Structural Political Economy Analysis: 
In contrast to the limited analysis of Acemoglu and Robinson, Mushtaq Khan’s view is 
that the preponderance of the structural features determine the developments in the 
developing countries. The way socio-political and economic factors interact in the 
advanced countries are different from the developing countries. Political players in the 
democracies of advanced countries adopt different strategies from that of developing 
countries. There are underlying structural differences that need to be explained (Khan, 
Mushtaq, 2005).  
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In the advanced countries, the capitalist sector is dominant. The whole system depends 
on the capitalist sector for its healthy functioning6. Since the overall system depends on a 
viable capitalist sector, political differences are expressed in a manner which does not 
put the capitalist sector in jeopardy. The overall politics is constrained from being 
excessively testing to a viable capitalist sector. The overall dominance of the capitalist 
sector in the advanced countries’ democracies is preserved through “powerful feedback 
mechanism” (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005, p. 716). 
Given the nature of broad-based political activity7, the redistributive agendas whether in 
the form of regulations or subsidies are settled in a transparent and impersonal 
“Weberian” way. It means that political competition is open in the advanced countries 
and violations of rules are dealt by the state’s capacity to impose the law across the board 
through transparent bureaucratic procedures (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005).     
Due to economic development in the advanced countries, large surpluses are earned from 
viable economic activities and these large surpluses ensure that state earns enough 
revenue through taxation to offer effective protection for assets and economic activities. 
In turn, redistribution agendas are allowed through an open competition to determine the 
regulatory frameworks. Assets cannot be expropriated given the effective protection of 
property rights by the state.  Advanced countries are often described to have “stable 
property rights and a rule of law, with relatively low expropriation risk” (Khan, Mushtaq, 
2005, p. 717). The statistical link between the rule of law/secure property rights and 
economic development is strong. However, the statistical link does not easily determine 
the “direction of causality”. Stable property rights are likely to be ensured both because 
the redistributive coalitions do not “cross the line between redistribution and 
expropriation” and also due to the state’s ability to enforce property rights (Khan, 
Mushtaq, 2005, p. 717). 
                                                          
6 Private sector workers and professionals depend on it for their wages/salaries and the public sector 
depends on taxation revenue which is generated due to a well-functioning capitalist sector. The overall 
dependence of the whole system on a viable capitalist sector is obvious to all. There are of course 
competing interests between groups and classes and they are expressed in the democratic process through 
various ways (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005, p. 716). 
7
 Given the large national incomes and fiscal budgets, the redistributive coalition of politically active 
groups in the advanced countries is set by broad-based large organisations which are representative of 
large number of people of similar sectors, regions or classes. Such broad-based political organisational 
activity represents large groups of population sharing “common economic interests” (Khan, Mushtaq, 
2005). 
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In contrast to the advanced developed countries, the dominance of the capitalist sector is 
not established in the developing countries. Most of the population directly depends for 
its income either on the petty informal sector or non-capitalist agriculture. Decline in the 
capitalist sector will however have an impact on the people’s incomes if growth shrinks 
in the long-term. Here, dependence of the majority of population on the capitalist sector 
is at best indirect. The kind of constraining effect on redistributive coalitions that has 
been discussed in the case of advanced countries is therefore much weaker in the 
developing countries. The feedback mechanisms are also weak. Organising political 
activity for redistributive demands through mass movements may damage the economy 
of developing countries but it does not directly affect the income (in the short or medium 
term) of those engaged in these processes. Constraints on the organisation of vocal 
political activities such as mass movements are much weaker in developing countries 
(Khan, Mushtaq, 2005). 
Revenue generated through taxing the economy and incomes is much smaller compared 
to the advanced countries. Much smaller revenue8 earned through taxation also means 
that the state does not have resources to offer effective protection to assets and economic 
activities in developing countries in contrast with the advanced countries. Property rights 
protection is expensive and the governments in the developing countries cannot afford to 
provide protection unlike the advanced countries (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005). Property rights 
are not stable and the rule of law is weak in developing countries. The developing 
countries cannot afford to pay for across-the-board rule of law and characteristics of 
modern “Weberian” state unless they have dynamic growth.    
Unlike the advanced countries where broad-based economic interests of large groups are 
expressed through redistributive politics aimed at regulatory or fiscal measures, in the 
developing countries, the “political entrepreneurs” use different strategies to seek 
redistribution “through a combination of fiscal, off-budget and even illegal means” 
(Khan, Mushtaq, 2005, p. 719). In the developing countries, “political entrepreneurs” 
often belong to the middle classes. Unlike the advanced countries where there is 
congruence of interests between the middle classes and the capitalist sector, the 
                                                          
8
 Overall national income is small given the underdevelopment in developing countries. Similarly, the 
capitalist sector is small in the arena of formal economy. Taxes are generated from a “smaller share of a 
much smaller national income”. In contrast to the advanced countries, coalitions seeking redistribution do 
not focus on the budgets of their governments given the fiscal constraints discussed above. Neither do the 
redistributive activities focus on the regulatory measures given the large percentage of economic activities 
being unregulated (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005). 
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“intermediate classes9” in the developing countries are not directly dependent or 
constrained by the viable capitalist sector. Hence, they can organise political activities 
and mass movements even if such activities damage the formal capitalist sector. The 
“intermediate classes” seek redistribution of resources by using their organisational 
abilities that allow them to capture state’s resources by seeking economic payoffs from 
their patrons (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005).  
There is prevalence of patron-client relationships10 in developing countries. In contrast, 
neo-Weberian analysis assumes that patron-client networks exist due to the intentions or 
the will of leaders and can be done away with through more transparency, accountability 
and competition. The neo-patrimonial analysis says that patron-client networks are 
‘modern’ in the sense that they are not based on just traditional loyalty and legitimacy. 
They are based on the payoffs that clients, as rational members of the informal networks 
receive from their patrons. Informalisation of governance and patron-client networks 
cannot however be dispensed with through democracy. They are prevalent in both 
                                                          
9 “The intermediate classes include the educated classes with college or university education, the petty 
bourgeoisie, particularly those in the informal sector, and middling to rich peasants. This middle strata may 
be numerically small (possibly 10 to 30 per cent of the population) and economically weak (compared to 
emerging capitalists), but in terms of legitimacy and organizational power, they are collectively the most 
powerful political groups in most developing countries” (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005, p. 719) 
10 The pyramidal patron-client networks are the most rational way of political organisation in developing 
countries as economic gains from the patrons are more than what could be expected from the open 
budgetary processes. Faction leaders mobilise those below them in social and economic status and this 
pyramid goes down to “foot soldiers” who are only mobilised during the strikes, elections and riots for a 
small economic gain. Faction leaders also include the most aggressive sub-factions and clients to build the 
organisational muscle. Democracy operates through patron-client networks. Authoritarian regimes also 
need to include the “most powerful and vociferous groups” for political stability.  Political entrepreneurs 
from the “intermediate classes” often lead the factions and reproduce the politics of patron-client networks 
through their organisational abilities by building up political power. Faction-based patron-client networks 
do not work to aspire for the changes in the subsidies and taxes through open electoral politics. Their 
strategy to access the state’s assets or the revenue entails amassing enough resources to make payoffs to 
their clients. These payoffs are often redistributed in an uneven way according to the organisational 
abilities of the clients whose muscle is used to gain resources. If patrons fail to make the payoffs to their 
clients, they risk losing their sub-factions to other faction leaders. Changes in factional configuration and 
re-configuration mark the volatility and political instability in developing countries. While the policies of 
various governments do not often change, yet actors who are running the governments change quickly due 
to the political instability of factional patron-client network. It allows the new faction leaders to earn 
money by controlling the state resources while pursuing the policies similar to the government they 
replaced. Since property rights are not effectively protected in the developing countries, it can enable the 
powerful factional patron-client networks to potentially encroach on weakly protected economic resources. 
Even when the weakly protected resources are not taken away, their protection is bought for a price to 
allow for the functioning of economic activities (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005).   
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democratic and authoritarian rule and the reason for their prevalence are structural rather 
than the mere personal intentions of rulers in the developing countries (Mushtaq Khan, 
2005). 
The redistributive politics through patron-client factions can range from “growth-
enhancing strategies in some cases to growth-destroying strategies in others” (Mushtaq 
Khan, 2005, p. 721). If neo-patrimonialism in developing countries closely resembles 
warlordism, then it leads to near anarchy and “growth-destroying strategies”. Whereas, if 
patron-client relationships are managed in a way that lead to political stability with 
protection of property rights bought through payoffs, then such a situation can allow the 
functioning of economic activities and lead to “growth-enhancing strategies” (Khan, 
Mushtaq, 2005). 
Patron-client networks are part of the very economic and political structures of the 
developing countries. The neo-Weberian notion that personalised politics through 
clientelism needs to be tackled first for development to take place is flawed. Whether it 
is democracy or authoritarian rule, faction-based patron-client networks exist due to the 
structural features of the developing countries (Khan, Mushtaq, 2005).   
 
2.6. Weak State, Kinship-based Patronage, Power Structures and the State 
Failure: 
In this sub-section, we present Anatol Lieven’s analysis along with Mushtaq Khan. 
Lieven’s analysis is focused on Pakistan, however it has wider implications. According 
to Lieven, the state is weak and the society is strong in Pakistan. Social groups use their 
power to capture the state’s resources through patronage. They also use the bureaucracy 
and the law to their advantage for this purpose. There is not much difference between the 
civilian and military governments in Pakistan given the fundamental weakness of the 
state. There have been many changes in the governments, both civilian and the military, 
yet the deeper structures of the society have remained entrenched. The presence of 
bureaucracy, police and judiciary in Pakistan may give the impression as if there is a 
state apparatus. However, the social groups largely settle their scores outside the ambit of 
the state. Since the state does not function according to its formal laws, kinship groups 
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help negotiate power both with the state institutions and also at the societal level (Lieven, 
2011).  
Kinship groups mark the inherent strength of the society in Pakistan. People get favours 
and protection through their kinship relations. They on the one hand contribute to the 
weakness of the state and on the other offer stability in societal terms as the political elite 
(particularly in the rural areas) rely on them for their power. Kinship groups explain the 
dynastic political parties in Pakistan. Another consequences of the strong kinship-based 
patronage is that “even the best-designed” reforms cannot take place in Pakistan. 
Western discourse on corruption suggests that Pakistan’s political system should not be 
corrupt. Actually, corruption is part and parcel of the interlocking of patronage with 
kinship networks and the political system runs on the basis of these dynamics. Kinship 
groups and local power structures are strong in Pakistan (Lieven, 2011). 
Patronage continues as part of “favours” that government bestows to social groups. Some 
forms of patronage that keeps the state weak is distribution of ministerial posts as part of 
“favours” (that in turn allows the concerned ministers to make money using their offices 
in the government), bank loans (often not repaid), tax evasion, dishonest allocation of 
government contracts, fraud and undue tax advantages. Patronage keeps the state “poor” 
and weak but benefit the powerful social groups (Lieven, 2011).    
Kinship networks and patronage politics are deeply embedded into each other. Though 
Lieven acknowledges that there are not enough resources to be redistributed to everyone, 
“there just isn’t enough patronage to go around” (Lieven, 2011, p. 206). Yet, he says that 
patronage is distributed quite widely in the society. Just as Mushtaq Khan (2005) says 
that patron-client networks penetrate to the level of “foot soldiers” who are mobilised in 
elections or riots or strikes, so Lieven (2011) states that patronage networks go deep into 
the society where a wider part of the society seeks protection, negotiates with the state 
and seeks other favours through these networks. Even the very poor benefit from the 
food distributed in the villages by the political patrons on special occasions. It explains 
why social inequality is low in Pakistan and how the kinship-based patronage networks 
are a bulwark against Islamist or socialist revolution. Development works done in the 
constituencies of politicians in the form of water, electricity or constructing roads also 
form an important part of patronage politics.  
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Lieven (2011) describes the processes of patron-client networks which are similar to 
Mushtaq Khan’s description. One of the reasons why patronage is distributed widely in 
the society is linked to the political structures. Control over the state institutions helps to 
make money. In order to gain control of the state, political power is required. Political 
power is amassed through supporters who not only vote but also perform other useful 
functions. In order to keep the support of people as a source of political power, patronage 
has to be distributed widely amongst the supporters.   
The state is unable to provide adequate public services to its population in Pakistan. It 
can neither raise enough revenue nor stop the corruption of its own officials. There is 
almost a dialectical relationship of patronage politics with the “predatory state”. On the 
one hand, people need protection through patronage because the state is predatory. On 
the other hand, since the state is used by the kinship groups to accumulate economic 
resources, power and ascendance over competing kinship groups; the very process that 
makes the state predatory in the first place. Shahrukh Khan et. al. (2007) describe similar 
processes of people indulging in patron-client relationships in rural areas to access the 
state institutions and to deal with the police and courts. Lieven sums it up as follows: 
“So the ancient Pakistani kinship groups and the modern Pakistani state dance 
together down the years, trapped in a marriage that ought to be antagonistic, but 
has in fact become natural to each” (Lieven, 2011, p. 215). 
We have discussed how the state is weak in developing countries like Pakistan. Moving 
on to the state failure in developing countries, Mushtaq Khan (2004) distinguishes 
between the “service delivery model” and the “social transformation model”. The service 
delivery model advocated by the reformers focuses on the state’s ability to provide 
services, competitive markets, property rights protection, and low risk of expropriation. 
Such service-delivery model is also linked with the anti-corruption and pro-democracy 
discourse. While, the social transformation model focuses on the state institutions’ ability 
to intervene and create a capitalist class that can be incentivised to become productive so 
that viable capitalist transformation could take place The state failure is linked with the 
inability of a viable capitalist transformation to take place (Khan, Mushtaq, 2004).  
In contrast, the service delivery model’s roots can be traced in neo-Weberian thinking. 
Its application in the developing countries in out of sync with the structural features. 
Mushtaq Khan criticizes the main tenets of the “service delivery model”. According to 
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him, the market consensus model regards corruption as bribing public officials for illegal 
rent-seeking. It also states that the lack of democracy leads small groups to capture 
political power (and access privileges). It says that low salaries of the bureaucrats and 
weak judiciary gives incentives to the officials to accept bribes and indulge in rent-
seeking. To deal with the illegal rent-seeking, market reforms package focuses on 
strengthening democracy, decentralisation and civil society participation to keep check 
on the power of government. It also advocates a lean state  and civil service/judicial 
reforms. However, the “service delivery model” misses the main point. The state failure 
does not take place in the developing countries because they cannot provide services, 
competitive markets, property rights protection, and low risk of expropriation. The state 
failure takes place because developing countries do not have political and institutional 
capability to go through a dynamic capitalist transition. History shows that the states 
have been able to deliver effective services and protect property rights only after they 
first succeeded in achieving high-growth and not before it. The reform efforts to make 
the developing countries adopt institutions of the advanced countries without going 
through a viable transformation is not workable. The main issue for developing countries 
is not that they do not function on the lines of service-delivery model. Instead the main 
issue is whether the processes of rent creation would lead to a viable dynamic economy 
or whether unproductive groups would capture resources leading to chaos. The chances 
of the success or failure of a viable capitalist transformation depend on how political and 
organisational power is distributed amongst various classes and groups and in turn how 
such a “political settlement” interacts with the institutional capabilities in order to push 
for transformation (Khan, Mushtaq, 2004). As stated earlier, reforms based on the 
implementation of the characteristics of “Weberian” state are not likely to succeed unless 
the developing countries go through the process of a viable transformation.     
The process of rents creation is costly and rents could be growth-enhancing or growth-
retarding depending on the socio-political structures of the specific countries. In the 
market economy consensus, rents are reduced to subsidies or monopoly rents11. While 
there are other rents as well such as learning rents, Schumpeterian rents, natural resource 
rents and information rents. The process of rent creation and enforcement has costs. The 
enforcement costs result not only from the process of creating institutions but also 
                                                          
11 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) in their book also exclusively focus on the monopoly rents as stated 
earlier. 
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making them functional and enforcing their mandate. The market economy consensus 
regards the costs of enforcement as loss while ignoring that in the case of growth-
enhancing rents, “enforcement costs” are necessary to help economies take-off. High-
growth countries initially allowed significant changes in the distribution/reallocation of 
property rights in the favour of productive groups. The stability of property rights took 
place once the dynamic capitalism emerged and the new property rights were allowed to 
stabilize (Khan, Mushtaq, 2004). 
 “Indeed, the state’s ability to carry out relatively massive interventions in 
property rights systems and to create and manage growth-generating rents has 
been critical in high-growth economies. States have also carried out significant 
transfers that have contributed to political stability and thereby made the 
emerging institutional structure politically viable... In all successful countries, 
states manipulated changes in property rights to accelerate the emergence of 
proto-capitalists and managed rents to accelerate the acquisition of technology by 
these proto-capitalists while ensuring that inefficiency was not sustained or 
increased” (Mushtaq Khan, 2004, p. 176, 180). 
The underlying distribution of power in a country determines its compatibility with 
dynamic institutional capacities. Restructuring of organisational and political power is 
linked to institutional capacities. Any feasible reforms package needs to take into 
account the inherent distribution of power in the society in the form of its “political 
settlement”, its previous capitalistic growth and the technological capabilities of its 
industrialists. Reform in institutional capacities is a “deeply political” issue and reforms 
can only be meaningful when their intense political nature is recognised (Mushtaq Khan, 
2004).  
The rule of law cannot be enforced through apolitical, management-oriented reforms that 
emphasize establishing characteristics similar to a modern “Weberian” state without 
understanding the interaction and balance between socio-political and economic 
structures. The state institutions have historically made transfers to the social groups 
outside the ambit of law. The real question is not whether such transfers/rents should be 
created or not. The real question is whether the changes in property rights lead to value-
enhancement or theft of resources. Violation of the formal rule of law is not an issue. 
The issue is whether such violation leads to viable growth or retards growth. We expand 
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this debate in the next sub-section by introducing an explicit discussion on the role of 
rents for maintaining political stability. 
 
2.7. Limited Access Order, Rents Creation, Political Stability, the Rule of Law 
and Growth: 
North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast (2013)’s edited book presents the idea of “limited 
access order” whereby rents are generated to minimize violence, allow political stability 
and let some level of economic development to take place. Such rent generation amongst 
the ruling elite creates limited access order. There is a spectrum of limited access order 
ranging from fragile, basic to mature. Limited access order is contrasted with open 
access order where there is the rule of law, impersonalisation, open competition and 
monopoly over the instruments of violence. 
North et al. (2013)’s open access order is also “Weberian” in its nature. As stated above, 
in the open access order, there is the rule of law, impersonalisation, and monopoly over 
the instruments of violence and these are features of a modern “Weberian” state. North et 
al. also consider open access order to be desirable as an end of the complex process. 
They, however, are much more realistic that transition to such an open access order is 
likely not possible for  most of the developing countries till they reach the stage where 
they meet the “doorstep conditions”. For them, transition within the limited access order 
moving along the spectrum from fragile to basic and from basic to mature can also bring 
considerable improvements in the lives of people living in the developing countries.      
There is a consensus that institutions matter. However, it is erroneous to assume that 
transplanting the institutions of the OECD countries in the developing countries will 
solve the problem. The institutions of the OECD countries function quite differently 
when they are replicated in the developing countries. The neoclassical thinking is that 
social and political hurdles prevent markets from functioning to their full potential. 
However, an alternative nonlinear framework asserts that violence is pivotal in 
determining the parameters of development in the developing countries. Here, actual or 
threat of violence is used to accumulate economic resources and power. Hence, rents are 
generated by the political elite through social arrangements to constraint the violence and 
this is called the limited access order (LAO). Political, economic and social 
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arrangements that limit the use of violence and control the latent violence in a way that it 
allows development to take place are LAOs. Organisations are critical in facilitating rent 
generation, coordinating incentives to limit actual or latent violence. Negotiation to limit 
violence as a part of rent generation is part of the “elite bargains” framework. The 
critical issue is which types of the “elite bargains” have led to positive socio-economic 
development and which did not (North et. al., 2013). 
In LAOs, the possibility to start rival organisations is limited. Leaders of the each group 
control the behaviour of their members. Given the fact that central governments do not 
have monopoly over violence in the Weberian sense, the ability of the group leaders to 
control the behaviour of their members becomes important. These groups are 
organisations. LAO calls patron-client networks, political parties, ethnic groups or even 
crime families as organisations. The agreement amongst leaders is critical in making 
their organisations productive. Since they can depend on each other for support, it helps 
them to earn rents not only through their “privileged access” to the economic resources 
but also by making their own organisations more productive. Such agreement amongst 
leaders makes them a part of coalition. LAO framework calls it the “dominant coalition”. 
In a well-working LAO, dominant coalition members can be political, economic, 
educational or religious leaders. The dominant coalition plays the role of third-party 
enforcement in the absence of the enforcement capacity of a centralised state (North et 
al., 2013). In the LAO framework, the state’s monopoly over the instruments of violence 
is weak in the Weberian sense. There is a need, therefore, for the dominant coalition to 
act as third-party enforcement. 
Rent creation through privileged access is pivotal to the functioning of LAO. Like 
Mushtaq Khan, LAO does not consider all rent-creation as wasteful. Following the 
Ricardian classical political economy tradition, LAO discusses rents that contribute to 
social stability by limiting violence and thereby allowing development to take place. It is 
based on the assumptions that rational individuals and organisations work to maximize 
their rent generation. LAO framework differentiates its concept of rent generation from 
the directly unproductive (DUP) rent-seeking. It states that Krueger and Bhagwati 
expanded on the work of public-choice economists like Tollison, Buchanan and Tullock 
to come up with the concept of rent-seeking. Public-choice links rent-seeking with 
wastefulness and deadweight welfare loss for the society (North et al., 2013).  
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In DUP rent-seeking, resources are spent to capture rents and such use of resources has 
no useful function for the society. It only contributes to DUP behaviour. In the good 
governance and anti-corruption development discourse (inspired by the neo-Weberian 
analysis), all forms of rent-seeking has been reduced to DUP rents. While, the 
governance discourse has dropped the qualifier DUP and just equated the whole concept 
of rents to be bad for the society. Mushtaq Khan in his writings has distinguished 
between growth-enhancing rents and growth-retarding rents amongst many other types 
of rents. Similarly, the LAO framework criticizes reduction of various forms of rents to 
only DUP rents. It resuscitates the classical concept of rents whereby they can also be 
useful for the society (North et al., 2013).    
In the LAO framework, rents limit violence only because rents of the dominant coalition 
are reduced with the outbreak of violence. The dominant coalition can earn more rents 
from cooperation and limiting violence than indulging in violence. It leads to the process 
of rent creation as part of the effort to limit violence. The DUP framework does not take 
into account the violence in societies and how it impacts the very structures of society in 
which rents are created. It assumes that doing away with rents will create market 
economy based on competition. Actually, in violence-afflicted societies, doing away 
with rents will lead to violence and disorder (North et al., 2013): 
“The LAO focus on violence and instability highlights the trade-off between 
stability and efficient growth... rent creation in LAO is the means of creating 
stability, rents are a symptom of the development problem, not the cause of it” 
(North et. al., 2013, pp. 7-8).   
It does not however mean that LAO societies always grow rapidly. Rents creation is not 
predictable in LAOs and it can have mixed results. This phenomenon explains why 
LAOs have periods of rapid growth alternating with collapse or stagnation. LAOs do not 
always lead to steady productivity or stability due to the complicated nature of 
arrangements through which rents are negotiated. Due to the privileged access to the 
process of the rent creation, there are limitations and constraints on open competitive 
economy. Such restrictions and monopolies do not lead to competitive markets. Such 
limitations effect the long-term growth. LAO solves the problem of violence, however, 
this very solution is a problem for development in itself. It can allow a number of 
outcomes. In some cases, LAOs can grow steadily over the long period by having access 
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to the markets, technology and institutions of the advanced countries. While, in other 
cases, there have been reversals that lead to retarding growth and bringing living 
conditions down, at least temporarily. While, in the case of most LAO, there has been the 
possibility of attaining some growth within the LAO framework by limiting violence. It 
means while the majority of LAOs have not been able to make the transition to “open 
access order” (OAO), yet they have shown potential to grow within the LAO framework 
(North et al., 2013).  In other words, immediate transition to a modern “Weberian” state 
may not be possible for most of the developing countries. Yet, they can mature along the 
limited access order spectrum to move toward “Weberian” impersonalisation and the rule 
of law while balancing the need for political stability and economic growth. 
There are stark differences amongst the low and middle-income countries despite all of 
them being part of LAOs. Their per capita income differs widely. The authors present a 
spectrum within the LAO framework to differentiate amongst them. They present the 
continuum of spectrum rather than separate stages. This spectrum ranges from fragile, 
basic, to mature LAO (North et al., 2013).  
The dominant coalition barely survives the external and internal violence in the fragile 
LAOs. Organisations that can continue trading off between political stability and 
economic growth do not carry on for a long time in the fragile LAO societies. These 
organisations are generally closely associated with the leader and there is a great deal of 
personalisation. The government does not have monopoly over the instruments of 
violence. In fact, the government itself may or may not function. Violence is the main 
instrument to gain resources and rents. There is the possibility of the outbreak of 
violence if the equilibrium between rent creation and balance of power stumbles. There 
can be more instability and uncertainty given the inability to sustain the dominant 
coalition over long periods (North et al., 2013). 
The range of government organisations are well-established in the basic LAOs. 
Organisations do exist even outside the ambit of the government consisting of the 
dominant coalition members, yet the process of rent generation and “elite privileges” are 
closely associated with the government. Organisational set-ups are fairly stable in the 
basic LAOs in contrast with the fragile LAOs. Organisations including political parties 
are within the domain of the dominant coalition and often personally associated with it. 
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Basic LAOs do not generally allow the organisations to develop outside the ambit of the 
dominant coalition (North et al., 2013).  
In contrast with the basic LAO, the mature LAO allows organisation even outside the 
ambit of the dominant coalition. However, access of the private organisations is still 
limited. This limited order works by controlling competition, averting violence and 
creating rents. Institutional structures within the mature LAOs are more robust. Public 
law delineates the functions of the government. In mature LAOs, on the one hand the 
government functions are more developed and on the other hand the role of private 
organisations is also better developed. These private organisations work outside the 
ambit of the state. They are a kind of pressure group to make government adhere to its 
commitments12. They help governments to mature in their functions. Due to the mature 
nature of LAOs, they can better absorb shock compared to the fragile and basic LAOs. 
The government structures and the dominant coalitions are more durable. Nonetheless, 
breakdowns could occur in mature LAOs if the shocks are strong and they lead to 
sporadic crises in mature LAOs. However, overall the government structures are more 
durable and the role of private organisations more prominent in the mature LAOs (North 
et al., 2013). 
There is movement, progression and even regression along the spectrum of LAOs. If 
“elite bargains” are more profitable and they can earn more rents, LAOs can move from 
fragile to basic and from basic to mature. However, they can also regress if they are 
unable to absorb shocks or if the new power configuration leads to violence when groups 
within the dominant coalition want to out-compete others to capture more rents. If the 
elite peacefully negotiate the new terms of rents, then progress happens and it does not 
lead to violence. However, if arrangements are settled through show of force, then it 
leads to violence. It reflects issues of progression or regression along the spectrum of 
LAOs (North et al., 2013).  
It is obvious as LAOs progress from fragile to basic or from basic to mature, they get 
closer to “Weberian” notions of impersonalisation, the rule of law and relatively stronger 
monopoly over the instruments of violence. They do so through the process of rents 
creation which but helps to achieve political stability and allow economic development.  
                                                          
12
 This point is somewhat similar to Acemoglu and Robinson’s focus on having checks and balances. 
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Spreading out of the rule of law helps LAOs to mature. However, instituting some form 
of the rule of law is only possible when it is compatible with violence-restraining rent 
generation patterns. Even a limited form of the rule of law promotes economic 
development and restrains violence. During the process of maturity of LAOs, the rule of 
law covers elite’s “public relationships” only. Later in the maturation process the rule of 
law could be made applicable to the population at large or some aspects of it to be made 
valid across the board. Similarly, LAOs mature when the private organisations and 
opposition parties outside the ambit of the government can hold government accountable 
to its commitments. They play the role of third-party enforcement in the progression of 
the maturation process (North et al., 2013).  We again see the process of gradual 
transition to the “Weberian” notion of the rule of law as LAOs mature along the 
spectrum. 
The authors contrast LAOs with open access order (OAO). In OAOs, there is an open 
competition both between political and economic institutions. Open political competition 
allows open access in the economy. OAOs conform to the “Weberian” conceptualisation 
of the state. The state has monopoly over the instruments of violence through police and 
military while other organisations are barred from the use of violence. The commitments 
of the governments in OAO are durable and well-implemented. OAO allows the social 
groups to organise themselves to promote their interests and also check the government’s 
monopoly over the instruments of violence. Entry is free in the OAOs and political, 
economic, educational and religious activities are allowed given that they meet 
impersonalisation requirements. The rule of law is applicable across-the-board for all 
citizens in an impartial manner (North et al., 2013).  As stated earlier, OAO represents 
the model of a modern “Weberian” state. 
The authors claim that historically the rule of law was made applicable to the elite first. 
Once the elite interactions were guided by the rule of law, only then it spread to the 
wider public. It happened because making credible commitments to the property rights of 
elite in the initial phase was more enforceable than making such commitments to the 
property rights of the wider public to begin with. The whole process of the enforcement 
of the rule of law was linked to the growth of the developed public and private 
organisations that in turn made the commitments of the governments credible (North et 
al., 2013). It shows why reforms advocating establishing the “Weberian” rule of law as a 
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prerequisite of development are flawed. As stated earlier, the rule of law develops as the 
result of a gradual process where it has covered the elite interactions first.   
Discussing the transition from LAO to OAO, the authors identify three “doorstep” 
conditions to move towards impersonalisation of relationships amongst the elites. Rule 
of law that covers the elite interactions is the first condition. Continuity of the public and 
private organisations beyond the life time of its leader/s and support for such perpetual 
organisations is the second condition. Having a “consolidated political control” over the 
instruments of violence including the state organisations (police and military) is the third 
condition (North et al., 2013): 
“All three doorstep conditions are consistent with the logic of the LAO and arose 
historically within some limited access orders. The establishment of laws and 
courts is the means by which the dominant coalition regularizes relations among 
elites. Perpetually lived organisations are a vehicle for limiting entry and 
generating rents in a more systematic manner. Consolidating military power and 
other violence capacity under control of the political system creates a monopoly 
on violence that dramatically reduces the frequency of violence. Combines, the 
three doorstep conditions create the possibility of impersonal relationships within 
the elite” (North et. al., 2013, p. 19). 
As stated earlier, the three “doorsteps conditions” are rooted in the Weberian notions of 
impersonalisation, the rule of law and monopoly over the instruments of violence. They, 
however, cover the elite interactions. The rule of law is not applicable across-the-board 
manner. It advocates impersonalisation at the level of elite. The above-mentioned 
“doorstep conditions” are “Weberian” in nature and are applicable in the transition 
phase. Such is the nature of the LAOs’ transition to a modern “Weberian” state. In this 
transition phase, characteristics of “Weberian” state cannot be implemented to the entire 
population, they aim to cover the elite interactions to start off with.   
The Western donors attempt to impose characteristics of OAOs such as the rule of law, 
good governance, open competitive economy, democracy13 and property rights in the 
LAO countries by ignoring the logic of violence. Such an approach considers violence as 
a country-specific condition to be dealt with by the police and courts of LAOs rather than 
                                                          
13 Though, the authors also note that elections, even if they are not free and fair by the standards of open 
access order, help to act as agents of political stability in LAOs. 
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thinking of violence being embedded in the development framework itself. LAOs 
function to create rents as part of their efforts to limit violence. Due to lack of 
understanding of the relationship between violence and development, the Western donors 
fail in attempts to impose OAO characteristics, and sometimes make violence worse in 
LAO countries. If rents that give stability and prevent violence are taken away, it leads to 
more violence and disorder and not a competitive economy as proclaimed by the reforms 
discourse. Other than preventing violence, rents creation can also encourage 
productivity, efficiency and learning (North et al., 2013).  
Rent creation is more personalised in the fragile LAO. However, as LAOs transition 
towards a more mature spectrum in LAOs, rents distribution has more impersonal 
characteristics. Towards the fragile end of LAOs spectrum, organisation (be they 
political parties or others) are closely associated with personalities of the leaders of 
dominant coalition. These personality based organisations function in an uncertain 
environment and the conditions keep on changing. If the creation of rents provide 
incentives to entrepreneurs and increase the size of economic assets, then they are likely 
going to have a positive feedback into the transition from a privileged access society to 
more open impersonalised rights-based society (North et al., 2013). Contours of 
transition to “Weberian” impersonalisation are again evident here. 
The authors recommend improving the conditions of societies who are within the LAO 
framework and facilitating a transition from fragile LAOs to basic and from basic to 
mature rather than focusing on a transition from LAOs to OAOs. Maturity along the 
spectrum of LAOs leads to reduction in violence and increases income for people, even 
without the transition to OAO. Having established that rents provide incentives to limit 
violence, the authors, similar to Mushtaq Khan's framework, also distinguish between the 
rents that increase development and those that do not (North et al., 2013).  
Mushtaq Khan states that the dominant discourse is to implement the “good governance” 
agenda to achieve growth. While governance needs to be improved to maintain growth, 
however the priorities needed to institute governance capacity may not be the one 
advocated by the “good governance” framework. It does not address the costs required to 
maintain political stability and it does not give the elites in LAOs a workable solution. 
Some ways of accomplishing political stability may be better and more in sync with 
offering sustainability of growth than others. The policy agenda for LAOs needs to limit 
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violence at the political level and sustain growth at the economic level (Khan, Mushtaq, 
2013). 
Rents have to be created outside the ambit of the formal rule of law for the elites to 
achieve political stability. “Good governance” agenda fails to understand it. While, rent 
creation is necessary yet some types of rents have not been able to effectively achieve 
stability. Some types of rents also retard growth in the economy. While, other types of 
rents have been able to make some measure of stability possible. Yet, other types of rents 
have also at least allowed maintenance of economic growth or even contributed to 
improving growth. The political and economic impact of rents distribution needs to be 
analysed along the lines of above-mentioned nuances to understand the functioning of 
LAOs. Productive rents have to be created and managed to respond to market failures. 
Any efforts to reform LAO need to be based on the proper understanding of the 
challenges that the functioning of LAO faces in any particular country. The reform 
efforts should focus on “incremental institutional and organizational changes” that would 
allow mutual co-existence for the competing elites and also maintain economic growth 
(Khan, Mushtaq, 2013). The author calls mutual co-existence needed for the elite in 
LAO as “live and let live agreement” (Khan, Mushtaq, 2013, p. 61). 
The Weberian notions of the rule of law is again worthwhile to consider in the discussion 
of rents. As discussed above, the rents are created outside the ambit of formal laws. 
Therefore, a universal implementation of “Weberian” notions of the rule of law is not 
possible. Some forms of rents create political stability. If the ability to create such rents 
is taken away, it would lead to more violence and chaos. Rents creation is needed to 
maintain political stability and allow economic development. It means that “Weberian” 
notions of the rule of law cannot be applied in an across-the-board manner in the 
transition phase as rents are generated in contravention of formal rules. At the same time, 
during the transition phase, some level of maturity that can deepen impersonalisation and 
the rule of law at the level of elite interactions is desirable. In other words, a full-fledged 
replication of the institutions of the advanced country with the universally applicable rule 
of law, impersonalisation and a complete monopoly over the instruments of violence 
may not be possible in LAOs during the transition phase as rents have to created to 
maintain political stability and constrain violence. At the same time, as LAOs mature 
across the spectrum from fragile to basic and from basic to mature; the rule of law, 
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impersonalisation and a relatively stronger monopoly over the instruments of violence 
moves towards achieving “Weberian” characteristics to cover the elite interactions.    
 
 
2.8. Analysis of the Literature Review14: 
The literature review begins with Weber’s conception of legal-rational state. It has 
impersonalisation, hierarchy, impartiality, division of labour and above all legitimate 
monopoly over the instruments of violence. The principles of legal-rational bureaucracy 
are equally applicable to the government, large-scale private enterprises, army, political 
parties, church or trade unions.  
All analyses on the transition from pre-capitalist societies to high-growth states are 
directly or indirectly based on the Weberian conceptualisation of rational-bureaucratic 
state. Whether it is North et al.’s “open access order” or Mushtaq Khan’s description of 
high-growth advanced countries, all of them conceptualise the state as having monopoly 
over violence. The literature reviewed discusses other above-board characteristics such 
as the rule of law, stable property rights, open competition and well-functioning 
bureaucracies. Weber’s conception of the rational-bureaucratic state has acquired a 
universal acceptance as a benchmark of advanced societies. 
In the Weberian analysis, the relationship between capitalism and bureaucracy is 
mutually reinforcing. Capitalism provides the necessary resources for bureaucracy to 
function in its most rational form. Mushtaq Khan extends Weber’s ideas by stating that 
the advanced countries earn large surpluses from the viable economic activities that in 
turn enables them to earn enough revenue through taxation. High fiscal revenue makes it 
possible to protect the property rights across-the-board. Similarly, North et al. state that 
the process of rent creation can mature as a transition from limited access society to a 
more impersonalised society based on citizens’ rights. We once again see the contours of 
Weberian thinking here.  
                                                          
14
 All authors discussed below are the one whose literature has been reviewed in the chapter. To avoid 
duplication, we do not generally provide the years of publications below as we are only referring to the 
authors discussed above. 
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We discuss below some of the strengths and weaknesses of the literature review as it 
relates to transition to a modern “Weberian” state: 
The main fault line between neo-Weberian and the structuralist political economy 
approach is that the former recommends replicating the institutions of advanced 
countries in the developing countries to ensure stable property rights, the rule of law, 
open competition, broader political participation and monopoly over the instruments of 
violence. While the latter explain in great detail why replicating institutional 
characteristics of Weberian state in the developing countries is not going to work and 
painstakingly charts out a roadmap of a transition that is aligned with the more structural 
features of the developing countries. 
An important contribution of Mushtaq Khan in the literature discussed above is to clarify 
that Weber’s analysis (as described by neo-Weberians) was not meant for the modern 
developing countries. Weber contrasted traditional societies with the rational-
bureaucratic state. In a traditional society, loyalty to the leader is the distinguishing 
feature of patrimonialism. The pyramidal patron-client relationships in the developing 
countries are based on modern forms of exchange and payoffs. They are not based on 
just traditional loyalty. It is, therefore, erroneous to compare the Weberian 
patrimonialism with the politics of patronage in the developing countries. The neo-
patrimonial analysis links functioning of democracy necessary for capitalism. The way 
democracy is linked with capitalism was not part of original Weberian analysis. The 
“good governance” reforms agenda is based on (flawed) neo-patrimonial analysis. 
Mushtaq Khan clarifies the underlying theoretical confusion caused by appropriating 
Weberian analysis.   
Another contribution of Mushtaq Khan is to acknowledge the strong statistical link 
between the rule of law, stable property rights, low expropriation risk and economic 
growth but at the same time question the “direction of causality”. The conventional 
market consensus is that economic growth took place because there were stable property 
rights and the rule of law. Mushtaq Khan states that historically, the states have been able 
to protect property rights and ensure the rule of law only after having achieved high 
growth and not before it. By extending Khan’s analysis one could say that it is 
misleading to advocate stable property rights and the rule of law as a prerequisite for the 
economic growth.  
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The “direction of causality” issue is linked with the “Weberian” notions of the rule of 
law, even if in an indirect manner. The market consensus’s insistence on stable property 
right and the rule of law translates into categorizing rents as a loss to society per se. 
Since rents are created in contravention of formal rules, they do not meet the standards of 
the rule of law in the “Weberian” sense. As the literature reviewed shows, rents can be 
growth-enhancing as well as growth-destroying. It is wrong to reduce all forms of rents 
to directly-unproductive-rent-seeking (DUP) or monopoly rents. There are also learning 
rents, Schumpeterian rents, natural resource rents and information rents that can be 
growth-enhancing.  
Mushtaq Khan and North et al. reject the narrow view of rents. They not only view rent 
creation intrinsic to maintaining political stability in the developing countries, they also 
view the outcome of the development processes is dependent on how well rents are 
managed. Mushtaq Khan is of the view that the underlying structures in the society need 
to be compatible with the institutional capabilities for dynamic capitalism to develop. 
The underlying structures depend on the distribution of power in a society and he calls it 
the “political settlement”. If the “political settlement” is compatible with the dynamic 
institutional capabilities, then the developing countries can transition toward high-growth 
countries. North et al. emphasize the central role of some forms of rents in maintaining 
political stability, constraining violence and allowing economic development. North et 
al. also state that if useful forms of rent creation is stopped due to imposition of the 
institutions of the OECD countries in the developing countries, it can lead to chaos and 
violence rather than a competitive economy. One can extrapolate from the detailed 
discussion on rents in the literature review that neo-Weberian ideas of rents being 
violation of the rules and equating all forms of rents to be a loss for society are 
misplaced. A full-fledged transition to the “Weberian” rule of law (that can put an end to 
the process of rents creation) is not possible in the developing countries for the reasons 
discussed above.   
Another strength of Mushtaq Khan’s analysis is his discussion of the strong feedback 
mechanism between the capitalist sector and the rest of society in the advanced countries 
and a weak feedback mechanism between the capitalist sector and the non-capitalist 
intermediate classes in the developing countries. The whole system depends on the 
dominant capitalist sector for its functioning in the advanced countries. Given the large 
surpluses and fiscal budgets earned from a viable capitalist sector, the redistributive 
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coalition of politically active groups is set by broad-based organisations in the advanced 
countries. These broad-based organisations represent large number of people of similar 
classes, sectors and regions. Given that political activity is broad-based, the 
redistribution of resources in the form of subsidies or regulations takes place in a 
transparent and impersonal “Weberian” way. The redistributive agendas are settled in a 
different way in the developing countries. There are structural differences. The capitalist 
sector is not dominant in the developing countries. The majority of population depends 
on the non-capitalist or petty informal sector for its income. The non-capitalist 
intermediate classes can organise political activities and mass movements even if it may 
damage the capitalist sector since the feedback mechanism are weak. The redistributive 
agendas are, therefore, not settled in a transparent and impersonal “Weberian” way. They 
are settled through a combination of budgetary, off-budgetary and illegal ways of 
transferring resources. It again explains why the implementation of the “Weberian” rule 
of law is not possible in the developing countries. 
The main strength of Lieven’s work lies in his explanation how the state is weak and the 
society is strong in Pakistan. The state apparatus exists in the form of police, judiciary 
and bureaucracy. Yet, the kinships based social groups largely settle their matters outside 
the ambit of the state apparatus. They also negotiate with the state institutions on the 
basis of kinship networks. The state does not function according to its formal laws. The 
governments bestow “favours” to social groups through the politics of patronage. The 
Western donors want an end to the corruption. Corruption and politics of patronage is, 
however, part and parcel of the way the way the state and society functions. It again 
shows why the “Weberian” legal-rational bureaucracy and rules cannot be implemented 
in Pakistan as they are not congruent with the underlying structures of the society. 
Lieven states that there have been many changes in the government in Pakistan. The 
politics of patronage has remained entrenched both through the civilian and military 
governments (Similar point has been made by Mushtaq Khan as discussed in the 
literature).  
The main strength of North et al. is the conceptualisation of the limited access order as 
opposed to the “Weberian” open access order. They not only conceptualise the limited 
access order, they also differentiate across the LAO spectrum between fragile, basic and 
mature features. While the “Weberian” open access order where there is monopoly over 
the instruments of violence, impersonalisation, the rule of law and open competition is 
59 
 
desirable. North et al. thoroughly explain why it may not be possible for most LAOs to 
transition to the “Weberian” open access order. The gradual transition within the LAO 
framework is possible as a more robust balance takes place between the need of political 
stability and economic growth while moving from fragile to basic and from basic to 
mature LAO. However, LAOs can also regress, within the spectrum, when the old 
arrangements of rent creation breakdown and new mechanism have not evolved fully.  
North et al. state that privileged access to rents and the need to generate rents to maintain 
political stability and constraint violence is part of the development problem. It is, 
however, not acknowledged in the market consensus reforms. The conventional analysis 
fails to take into account the dynamics of the threat of actual or latent violence. In other 
words, there are costs to be paid for maintaining political stability and allowing 
economic development. The mainstream reform efforts emphasize replicating the 
institutions of the OECD countries in the developing countries without acknowledging 
the different structures in LAOs. The rule of law, impersonalisation and monopoly over 
the instrument of violence in the “Weberian” sense cannot be replicated in LAOs. There 
are “elite bargains” and the level of gradual maturity of LAOs depends on which sort of 
“elite bargains” lead to development and which do not. The rule of law has historically 
evolved to cover the elite interactions first. Only when it has been made applicable to the 
elite, will it gradually spread to the rest of society. The “doorstep conditions” to 
transition towards the “Weberian” open access order cover impersonalisation and the 
applicability of the rule of law at the level of elite first. To sum up, North et al. show in 
their thorough analysis why the neo-Weberian inspired “good governance” reforms have 
got it wrong by promoting open access order characteristics as a prerequisite of growth. 
The “Weberian” open access order can evolve gradually as LAOs mature by balancing 
the need for political stability and economic growth. 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s framework of dividing the world into countries who have 
inclusive political and economic institutions and those who do not is problematic. They, 
however, raise some relevant issues regarding the need for centralisation and having 
checks and balances. They also discuss the role of political elite when they feel secure in 
their hold of power and allow some degree of growth of inclusive economic institution 
that does not threaten their hold directly15. Yet, their overall emphasis that nations fail 
                                                          
15
 This point is somewhat similar to the “elite bargains” discussed by North et al. 
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because they do not have inclusive political and economic institutions is limited. 
Inclusive political and economic institutions are the symptoms of much larger structural 
processes. Acemoglu and Robinson only focus on the outcome rather than the processes 
themselves. The world cannot be divided into the binary categories of inclusive and 
extractive institutions or “virtuous” and “vicious” cycles. They explain the long 
historical processes through vague terms like “institutional drift” interacting with 
“critical junctures”.  
Acemoglu and Robinson declare that broad political participation and democracy is 
largely a prerequisite of open competition and end of monopolies by the tiny extractive 
elite. They make the same mistake as neo-Weberians that we have discussed earlier. The 
structuralist approach states that the way neo-Weberians link democracy to capitalism is 
not part of the original Weberian analysis. The authors make the same mistake of linking 
democracy to capitalism.  
Evolution of capitalism is the long historical process which is marked by the ugly and 
often violent processes of the appropriation of resources by the proto capitalists. We 
have already discussed the Marxian “Enclosures Movement”. Marx famously said 
“...capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt” (Marx, 
1976, p. 926). Historically, the states have transferred property rights to their emergent 
capitalists in violation of formal laws. It led to dynamic capitalism in the instances when 
the transferred property rights were used productively. Growth of inclusive economic 
institutions and open competition is not a neat and clean process that can be necessarily 
induced through broad political participation and democracy. To link the ugly process of 
the evolution of capitalism with democracy or with the “Weberian” notions of the rule of 
law, sanctity of contract and a level playing field points to a theoretical confusion. This is 
a major weakness of Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis.   
As discussed in the literature review, the structural features of the developing countries 
remain intact whether it is democracy or authoritarian rule. To assume that broad 
political participation and democracy will lead to more accountability, transparency and 
checks and balances is generally not true. We have discussed in detail in the literature 
review that the underlying structural features of the advanced countries are different 
from the developing countries. The redistributive agendas are open and transparent in the 
“Weberian” sense because they are set by broad-based organisations who are 
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representative of large number of people of similar regions or classes or sector. 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis fits the description of political economy of the 
advanced countries. In contrast, the way rents are generated in the developing countries 
by mobilising patron-client relationships (who mobilise political activities and earn 
economic payoffs largely through illegal means) and through the politics of patronage 
point to a weakness in Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. Democracy or broad political 
participation does not necessarily lead to accountability, transparency, end of 
monopolies, open competition and the rule of law. Democracy in developing countries 
often works through the politics of patronage. To mix the rule of law with democracy 
and broad political participation is misleading.  
Coming back to the overall literature review, there is some difference in the emphasis 
about whether it is the elite or the middle classes that make all the difference in 
developing countries. Acemoglu and Robinson are entirely focused on the role of tiny 
elite blocking reforms and development of inclusive political/economic institutions 
because they have fewer constraints and do not have effective checks and balances. 
North et al. also conceptualise their limited access order as part of “elite bargains” 
whereby rent creation takes place and limits violence and allow economic activities. 
Mushtaq Khan in his earlier writings (2004, 2005) gives prominence to the role of the 
intermediate classes. Lieven also discusses the kinship-based patronage politics in 
Pakistan trickling down to the wider sections of the society. For Mushtaq Khan, 
“political entrepreneurs” from the non-capitalist intermediate classes form the patron-
client relationships to build up organisational and political power and earn economic 
payoffs as a reward. However, Mushtaq Khan in his later writing (2013) has also focused 
on the role of elite. In his earlier writings, Mushtaq Khan emphasized a viable capitalist 
transformation as opposed to the “good governance” inspired service delivery model. In 
his later writing (2013), he has also discussed “live and let live agreement” for the elite 
in LAOs rather than emphasizing a full-fledged capitalist transformation. 
It may be worth considering how some of the issues identified in the literature can be 
extended further. The literature discusses in detail how the feedback mechanisms are 
weak between the capitalist class and the non-capitalist intermediate classes. It is 
applicable in most of the cases. It may, however, be worth pondering how in certain 
instances the interests of the capitalist sector and the middle classes can be aligned with 
each other. The suppliers, vendors, traders, wholesalers, and retailers as part of the 
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middle classes and they can be partners of the capitalists as they indulge in redistributive 
politics to claim the state’s resources through legal as well as illegal ways. The capitalist 
sector and certain sections of the middle classes can also be partners in rule-violating 
behaviour. As Harriss-White (2003) points out that the interests of small businesses and 
traders can also be aligned with the industrial classes. Industrialists have vertical 
networks with whole-sale suppliers, subcontractors, merchants. They are based on both 
“modern” and traditional relations of family, beradari (partilineal lineage), clan, and 
caste. The interactions between the industrialists and their suppliers are also “socially 
embedded” (Nadvi, 2002). Giving an example from empirical data, in Chapter 3 we 
discuss the case of Bhutto regime in the 1970s in Pakistan. Certain sections of the middle 
classes were antogonised by nationalising the small-scale industries as part of the wider 
nationalisation policy. The antagonised middle classes (largely associated with the 
capitalist sector) whose patronage was taken away were instrumental in participating in 
the mass agitation against the Bhutto regime. It may, therefore, be worth exploring the 
nature of feedback mechanisms between the capitalist class and the middle classes, 
directly or indirectly linked with the capitalist sector.      
The literature also links the concept of political stability to either the threat of violence or 
actual violence. It makes ample sense doing so given the missing link of violence in the 
development debate. It is, therefore, understandable to link political stability to violence. 
Given the reality in most of the developing countries where the threat of violence is 
looming large, the emphasis on the role of violence is a major contribution. It is, 
however, worth pointing out that political stability cannot be, however, reduced to the 
threat of violence or actual violence. In case of the government functions being better 
developed in the developing countries, political instability can also be induced through 
constitutional and legal crises. The governments can be prematurely dismissed or 
brought down and it can lead to political instability even without use of violence. It may 
be worthwhile to broaden the concept of political (in)stability to the constitutional and 
legal crises in the developing countries where government functions are better 
developed. Again to give an example from Pakistan, the political governments were 
dismissed repeatedly from 1988 till 1996 through the operationalisation of constitutional 
clauses and it led to immense political instability even without the direct threat of 
violence. 
63 
 
Kinship is indeed a strong theoretical concept. Harriss-White (2003) has discussed the 
role of caste along with other categories of the “social structures of accumulation”. We 
have found the role of two prominent castes dominant even in the formal textiles sector 
in Pakistan. We, therefore, wholly agree that kinship-based networks are strong in 
Pakistan. Yet, kinship is not a monolith category. There are factions even within the 
same kinship groups. While doing the fieldwork for Shahrukh Khan et al. (2007), we 
found that there were faction-based subdivisions (even within the same kinship groups) 
based on how clan members voted or how they took sides in important court cases. There 
are, therefore, divisions and fissures within kinship groups. The fact that kinship is not a 
monolith category needs to be taken into account while discussing the dominant role of 
the kinship networks. However, we fully agree with the overall structural analysis that 
the state is weak and social groups are strong in Pakistan. We also agree that the social 
groups largely settle their matters outside the ambit of law.  
To conclude, transition to a “Weberian” modern state with the rule of law and 
impersonalisation is desirable for everyone. Neo-Weberians promote replicating the 
characteristics of the institutions of the advanced countries in the developing countries as 
part of the transition. The structural analysis largely inspired by the Marxist political 
economy focuses on the underlying distribution of power in the developing countries by 
emphasizing its compatibility with the institutional capabilities in the developing 
countries. The structural analysis explains why rents are created outside the ambit of 
formal laws. It also explains why some forms of rents are essential to maintain political 
stability. Rents are the necessary costs that have to be paid to balance the needs of 
political stability and economic development, which the mainstream pro-market analysis 
fails to take into account of. 
The transition to a “Weberian” state is a worthwhile end of the long, difficult and 
negotiated process. The structural analysis forewarns against over-simplification of such 
a complex process. Most of the literature reviewed above discusses the challenges of 
transition to the “Weberian” rule of law and impersonalisation. These challenges are 
linked to the empirical focus of the thesis where various forms of rule-violating 
behaviour are discussed. The resistance to taxation measures and corporate governance 
elucidates various facets of the rule-violating behaviour. Such resistance needs to be 
contextualised in terms of challenges of transition to a modern “Weberian” state. The 
structural analysis helps to explain why rents were created in the form of bank loans as 
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part of the politics of patronage. The weak capacity of the state discussed in the literature 
review sheds light on the weakness of the state institutions to recover the defaulted loans 
or collect taxes. Rents distributed through default of bank loans might have been 
necessary to earn legitimacy and maintain political stability for various governments in 
contemporary Pakistan. Moreover, the specific phenomenon of caste capitalism in the 
textiles sector reflects the challenge of achieving the “Weberian” impersonalisation. The 
literature reviewed in this chapter is appropriate to focus on the various forms of rule-
violating behaviour and the lack of impersonalisation discussed in the case study 
chapters of the thesis. The challenges of the transition to a modern “Weberian” state in 
theory are illustrated by the empirical case studies in the thesis.   
The literature makes distinction the between growth-enhancing rents and growth-
retarding rents.  Similar to the approach taken in the literature, we also describe the rule-
violating behaviour of the case study chapters that had a differential impact on 
accumulation. In some cases, the rule-violating behaviour and rents earned led to theft of 
resources. In other instances, the rents created as a result of the rule-violating behaviour 
led to value-enhancing activities. Also, in other instances, the rule-violating behaviour 
had no significant impact on accumulation. The point to emphasize is that the rule-
violating had varied impact on accumulation ranging from aiding capitalist accumulation 
to leading to assets destruction. In the Conclusion of the thesis these different forms of 
the rule-violating behaviour are analysed with reference to the examples from the case 
study chapters. 
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Chapter 3. Background to the Political Economy of Pakistan  
The chapter discusses Pakistan’s history by looking at the state policies and their 
interaction with economy, industry and social groups. This chapter, overall, looks at the 
state’s policies and social groups in Pakistan in the context of the relationship between 
development and patronage. The chapter uses secondary sources along with the 
Government of Pakistan’s primary documents (Economic Survey of Pakistan series). The 
chapter provides a background for the empirical analysis of the thesis done in the case 
study chapters. Although, the thesis does not focus on the role of the landowning class, 
this chapter discusses it briefly towards the end as part of the background to political 
economy. 
 
Growth rates from the 1960s to 2003-04 are given below in Table 3.1: 
Table 3.1: Growth Rates for Pakistan16 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-01 2001-
02 
2002-
03 
2003/4 
Growth Rate (%) (Constant factor cost) 
GDP 6.8 4.8 6.5 4.6 1.8 3.1 5.1 6.4 
Agriculture 5.1 2.4 5.4 4.4 -2.2 0.1 4.1 2.6 
Manufacturing 9.9 5.5 8.2 4.8 9.3 4.5 6.9 13.4 
Commodity 
Producing 
Sector17  
6.8 3.9 6.5 4.6 0.5 1.3 4.9 7.7 
Services Sector 6.7 6.3 6.7 4.6 3.1 4.8 5.3 5.2 
As % of GDP         
Public 
Investment 
-- 10.3 9.2 7.5 5.7 4.2 3.6 4.6 
Private -- 5.6 7.8 9.1 10.2 11.3 11.2 11.7 
                                                          
16
 Annual average for decades from 1960s to 1990s given in the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2003-04. 
17
 It includes agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
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Investment 
Source: Government of Pakistan. Pakistan Economic Survey 2003-04. Statistical 
Appendix, pp. 2-3 
Table 3.1 shows that GDP growth during 1960s grew close to 7 per cent and overall 
manufacturing close to 10 per cent. All growth indicators fell in the 1970s with GDP 
growth being close to 5 per cent and manufacturing growth being just above 5 per cent. 
There was turnaround in the 1980s, largely due to the exogenous factors as discussed 
later in the chapter. The GDP growth was over 6 percent and manufacturing growth over 
8 per cent. The growth indicators again fell in the 1990s with both GDP growth and 
manufacturing going below 5 per cent. In the 2000-2004 period, the first two years 
witnessed abysmal GDP growth and the economy picked up in post-September 2001 
period, as discussed later in the chapter. 
3.1. Political Economy of Pakistan: Politics of Patronage and the Industrial 
Sector 
Going back to the earlier period of industrialisation in Pakistan, it is worthwhile to link it 
with the politics of patronage (as discussed in the Literature Review). The role of 
patronage and rents has been important in the industrial development in Pakistan from 
the 1950s onwards. The role of the state institutions in distributing patronage started with 
the distribution of the evacuee trust property after the partition. It spread to the patronage 
of the emergent capitalist class through various policy instruments in the 1950s and 
1960s. Industrialization was considered imperative for the survival of the country given 
that Pakistan started with virtually no industrial base. Industrialists were given subsidies 
as part of the industrial policy and they received rents. Politics of patronage has been 
fairly entrenched in the industrial development of Pakistan since its initial decades. 
Pakistan quickly moved towards an import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) strategy. 
The government had fixed prices of agricultural produce below world prices, the 
merchant class made a profit selling them abroad. After the boom in the prices of raw 
materials burst due to the Korean War, the government imposed controls to discourage 
the imports of consumer goods in order to create incentives for domestic 
industrialization. Since high profits were no longer possible in trading, the merchant 
class turned to (mostly agro-based) industrialization. Due to the government’s policy, 
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they were able to buy raw material on fixed prices, import machinery on lower rates and 
sell their manufactured commodities at high prices in the domestic market. Import-
substitution policy was pursued due to the differential tariffs for consumer, intermediate 
and capital goods. The import licensing rationed the foreign exchange and government 
pursued the policy of allocation of credit (Ahmed and Amjad, 1984; Amjad, 1974; 
Sayeed, 1995; Zaidi, 2005; Khan, Mushtaq, 2000a; Papanek, 1991).  
The interaction amongst the state institutions and the emergent capitalist class led to 
overt and covert resource transfers and created rents. Overtly the state institutions used 
various instruments such as the Bonus Voucher Scheme, granting of import licenses, 
making foreign exchange available and providing credit to transfer resources. Covertly, 
the industrialists were inducted on the boards of credit disbursing institutions, so there 
was an inter-locking of interests. Details of the state institutions’ transfers during 1950s 
and 1960s are discussed below. 
In the 1950s, the government used a policy called the Bonus Voucher Scheme or Export 
Bonus Scheme. It was a subsidy given by the government allowing import liberalization 
by using some of market mechanisms. This subsidy was provided by using a 
combination of direct transfers from the government and indirectly helping to procure 
transfers by selling Bonus Vouchers in the import market at a premium (Zaidi, 2005). It 
shows a policy instrument being used to provide subsidy to the privileged emergent 
industrial elite. 
The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was set up as an autonomous 
organization in 1950. From 1950 to 1962, PIDC established fifty five projects on its own 
and in collaboration with the private sector. Five of these projects were in cotton textile 
mills and woollen mills. Along with these formal projects in the textiles, PIDC also 
provided the finance to fund six “model” ginning factories in partnership with the private 
sector. This was active state interventionist planning and PIDC kept a “balance between 
consumer goods industries and durable goods industries” (Government of Pakistan, 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 1961-62, p. 40).  PIDC established projects and then 
disinvested them to the risk-averse industrialists at attractive prices. The infant industries 
received the “learning rents” and it led to rapid industrialisation. These rents were 
distributed as subsidies to the small number of industrial houses (Khan, Mushtaq, 2013).  
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Both the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) and the PIDC 
were largely funded by US Aid. There was also close interaction between the emergent 
capitalist class and the bureaucracy. The PIDC was used to promote the interests of 
large-scale manufacturers. It was able to achieve the objective of industrialization 
without the government setting up a big public sector owned industrial enterprises. The 
initial high-tide of industrialization, however, slowed down in mid-1950s. Exhaustion of 
domestic market, rising population with the absorption of over eight million refugees, 
lack of an efficient agricultural sector to provide food for the rising population and a 
substantial expenditure on food imports led to stagnation of the first phase of 
industrialization. Food shortage also led to black marketing and hoarding. 
Industrialization led by migrant merchants slowed down. Also, further industrialization 
required greater risks in terms of sectoral allocations and this required strong government 
intervention (Ahmed and Amjad, 1984; Amjad, 1974; Khan, Mushtaq, 2000; Rizvi, 
2000).  
The most significant feature of the government’s strategy in the 1960s was the full-
throttled promotion of the interests of urban industrial capitalists. In this second phase of 
industrialization, the government relatively widened the net of industrial houses from 
migrants-only industrial houses (with the exception of one landed family of the NWFP) 
to allow new large landowner-turned-industrialist entrants from Punjab primarily; a few 
Sindhi large landowners also joined in. However, the industrial capitalists were still 
dominated by the migrants18 (Amjad, 1974; Papanek, 1991). The access to rents was 
(still) limited to only small number of industrialists19 (Khan, Mushtaq, 2013).     
During the 1960s, the planned industrial development was promoted through instruments 
such as the “Industrial Investment Schedule” which set the targets for each industry and 
micro-managed “individual projects” by providing finance for it. As part of the policy, 
31 industries that met the criteria of export performance were provided licenses. Bonus 
vouchers as part of the Export Bonus Scheme were used to buy raw material and spare 
parts by the industrialists (Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey of Pakistan 1961-
                                                          
18
 The huge number of population that migrated from India to Pakistan (about 7 million in the West 
Pakistan) were naturalized and are citizens of Pakistan (living mainly in urban Sindh, i.e. Karachi and 
Hyderabad), yet they were commonly called “mohajir” (literally meaning “migrants”). These “migrants” 
adopted this term to define their identity.  
19 The web of the emergent capitalists largely consisted of small number industrialists from the West 
Pakistan. The East Pakistani capitalist class was not developed on the lines of the West Pakistan. 
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62). It shows the rents creation as an instrument of industrial policy for the privileged 
industrial elite. 
Other measures of the state-directed transfers included setting up of a National 
Investment Trust to guide private investment towards industrial projects, establishing 
technical institutes to train skilled labour, tariff protection for chosen industries, 
provision of infrastructure and facilities like electricity, land and water by setting up 
industrial estates (Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 1965-66). The 
Investment Promotion Bureau set up in 1959 provided investment for private and public 
sector industrial development (Government of Pakistan, Pakistan, Economic Survey 
1967-68). The Economic Survey clearly states that private sector in Pakistan was 
provided “liberal facilities by the Government” (Government of Pakistan, Pakistan 
Economic Survey 1965-66, p. xix).  These “liberal facilities” provided by the government 
are the various forms of subsidies provided to push industrialisation through a small 
number of industrial houses.  
Import controls were relaxed in the first half of 1960s. Imports of consumer goods were 
substituted by intermediate and capital goods. Also, “domestic demand and absorption” 
were key factors in the 1960s, which saw a high increase in imports, production, and 
investment. The industry responded well to the liberalisation of imports and 
manufacturing sector grew. Large-scale manufacturing grew from 8 per cent per year 
from 1955 - 1960 to 17 per cent from 1960 - 1965. However, foreign aid was curtailed in 
1965 due to the Indo-Pak war and import controls were put up again to bolster foreign 
currency reserves. While growth rate fell after 1965, it was still high. Subsidy given to 
exporters in the form of Export Bonus Scheme and loans and disinvestments from 
development financial institutions worked (Zaidi, 2005, pp. 98-100). It again shows the 
creation of rents in terms of Export Bonus Scheme and disinvestments from the financial 
institutions. 
Government started to loosen control on private sector investment during the 1965-70 
period. Industrial projects using local machinery no longer needed the permission of the 
government according to the new Investment Schedule. For projects needing imported 
machinery, the power to sanction projects was transferred to financial institutions such as 
PICIC and Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP). The policy shift was to 
move away from “direct to indirect control of private sector investment” (Government of 
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Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 1967-68, p. 36). It also liberalized a restrictive 
import policy by taking off over 90 percent imports from the restrictive government list 
(Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 1967-68).  
The Economic Survey 1968-69 notes the achievements of the government’s industrial 
policy: 
“…within a short period of two decades, the country is now undergoing an 
economic transformation—from an agricultural economy to an industrial one—
and though the features peculiar to the pre-industrial society still preponderate, 
the characteristics typical of modern industrialism are also asserting themselves 
(Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 1968-69, p. 34). 
The industrial policy from 1965-70 aimed to extend ISI, diversify into exports based 
industries and branch out into the intermediate industries. The overall model was 
basically private-public partnership. The Third Plan allocated twice as much for the 
private sector compared to the public sector (Government of Pakistan, Pakistan 
Economic Survey 1969-70). Since the foreign exchange became scarce after the 1965 
Indo-Pakistan war, only a few of the loans sanctioned were disbursed after 1965. 
 Pursuing the “Doctrine of Functional Inequality” under the tutelage of the so-called 
Harvard Advisory Group meant that capital was diverted towards the industrial sector as 
it was presumed to have a high proclivity to grow at the cost of agriculture, labour and 
urban consumers. This policy, however, had more specific consequences within the 
industrial sector. It promoted crony capitalism. The families who had established a firm 
control over the industry also had a firm grip over banking and insurance. There were no 
formal rules to forbid interlocking directorates within the industries. Family banks were 
giving loans to the companies owned by their own families (Zaidi, 2005).  
Zaidi quoting Rashid Ajmad’s pioneering work on industrial concentration says:  
“a dominant small group of monopoly houses had begun to emerge in the 1950s 
in the industrial sector, a trend which was accentuated in the 1960s. In 1970, 
there were 44 monopoly houses, which controlled about 77 per cent of gross 
fixed assets of all manufacturing companies listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange. These firms controlled about 35 per cent of all assets of the entire 
large-scale manufacturing sector and at the same time had close links with the 
71 
 
financial sector. Seven of the seventeen Pakistani banks were under the direct 
control of the monopoly houses, accounting for 60 per cent of total deposits and 
50 per cent of loans and advances. They had an extended network of interlocking 
directorates, where the board of directors of one company sat on the board of 
directors of others. Moreover, there were strong links between private industry 
and government financial institutions: between 1958 and 1970, 65 per cent of 
total loans disbursed by PICIC went to thirty-seven monopoly houses, with the 
largest thirteen of these accounting for about 70 per cent of these loans” (Zaidi, 
2005, p. 102). 
The massive concentration of wealth shows how the small number of industrial houses 
were able to receive rents in the form of various policy instruments. The erstwhile traders 
received subsidies, which enabled them to build industrial houses through inter-locking 
their interests with the financial sector, along with other benefits such as an overvalued 
exchange rate, availability of foreign exchange and imposition of import controls (some 
of these subsidies are also discussed by Mushtaq Khan, 2013). 
Foreign loans and credits for the industrial sector have been mentioned in various 
Government of Pakistan documents. These documents also mention the role of foreign 
capital in bolstering economic and industrial development in the 1960s. The largest 
investment in the industrial sector during 1965-70 came from the USA (Rs. 681. 60 
million) and it was followed by Britain (Rs 115.30 million) and Japan (Rs 405.30 
million) (Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey of Pakistan 1969-70). 
We have discussed in detail how rents were created as part of instruments of the 
industrial policy which benefited the privileged industrial elite. Mushtaq Khan considers 
that these rents were not managed effectively as political organisers had become 
powerful and they were able to protect the inefficient industrialists. The state’s capacity 
to manage these subsidies was quite limited. Due to the limited capacity of the state, the 
investments could not lead to speedy productive growth to ensure the viability of these 
investments (Khan, Mushtaq, 2013). 
The 1965-70 period industrial policy could not achieve its target of 13 percent growth in 
the large scale manufacturing sector; it only managed 8 percent. This was attributed to 
the war with India in 1965, cut in foreign aid and harsher terms of loans and political 
unrest. The civil agitation during the end years of the Plan had a bad impact on 
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economic, industrial and exports growth and led to “widespread dislocation of economic 
activity” (Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1969-70). 
Agitation against the Ayub regime in late 1960s was led by the middle classes, which 
play an important role in the politics of the Indian Subcontinent. The resistance of 
“emerging middle classes” started in West Pakistan and spread to the East Pakistan. 
Even Ayub regime’s suppression measures failed against the strength and organizational 
power of the middle classes. The imbalance of development between the West and East 
Pakistan turned into a political slogan. Ironically, mobilization started in the East 
Pakistan when for the first time the resources and particularly foreign inflows, were 
being transferred to the East Pakistan. The distribution started in 1967 and it was 
substantial to the point that it slowed down industrialization in West Pakistan. Yet, it was 
perhaps “too little too late”. This once again underlies the need to devise an economic 
strategy that is compatible with the social structures, otherwise the social structures 
hamper the implementation of economic policies (Khan, Mushtaq, 2000a). 
As stated earlier, people at the forefronts of the anti-government agitation in the late 
1960s were from the middle classes in small towns. Developments in agriculture led to 
differentiated dispossession of small and medium peasants in 1960s. They joined in the 
protests. Later on lawyers, government servants, and other professional classes also 
joined in. The legitimacy of the government policies was lost because the industrial class 
did not enjoy a base in the rural areas. Also it did not have an indigenous political base. 
Whatever economic prosperity was achieved slowed down due to the 1965 war and the 
consequent thinning of foreign aid. The avowed purpose of the government planning was 
“creation of ‘surplus value’” had backfired. The doctrine of “functional inequality” 
turned into the slogan of “22 families” looting the country (Sayeed, 1995; Burki, 1991; 
Khan, Mushtaq, 2000a). 
The real failure of the praetorian policies of the government was to excessively limit the 
access to rents creation to small number of emergent industrial houses. The authoritarian 
government relied on suppression measures to exclude the political organisers from 
accessing rents. The suppression measures worked initially but they failed as the 
excluded groups launched powerful opposition. The authoritarian regime failed to ensure 
the long-term political stability by excluding the wider elite from accessing rents. It led 
to the collapse of social order and eruption of massive violence (Khan, Mushtaq, 2013). 
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As the Chapter 2 states that the underlying distribution of power needs to be compatible 
with institutional capabilities for social transformation. In this case the underlying power 
structures were not compatible with the limited capabilities of the government to main 
political stability, constrain the political organisers or discipline the industrialists in the 
long run. 
The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in West Pakistan and the Awami League in East 
Pakistan provided the political platform for the disgruntled middle and lower-middle 
classes. Awami League led by East Pakistani leaders won the majority in the first 
elections held in 1970 on the basis of adult franchise. The West Pakistani elite were not 
willing to transfer power to Awami League led by Mujeeb-ur-Rahman without them 
accepting laid out conditions. The mobilization got violent, particularly in the East 
Pakistan where it turned into a civil war (Khan, Mushtaq, 2000a). Army action in the 
East Pakistan led to massive loss of citizens’ lives and liberties. It prompted India to 
militarily intervene in 1971 and defeat the Pakistan army in a full- fledged war, and as a 
result the East Pakistan became a new country - Bangladesh. 
The 1970s was an era of populism and the rise of middle classes in the new Pakistan 
after its separation from the East Pakistan in 1971. Since concentration of wealth in the 
hands of a tiny industrial class was one of key criticisms against the Ayub government 
during the agitation, the opposition led by Bhutto declared the policy of nationalization 
of industries and financial services after coming to power. Nationalisation did not prove 
to be an overall economic success for Bhutto’s government. There were other “bad luck” 
factors for the Bhutto government due to floods and other natural disasters. This era also 
strengthened the state’s role in rent-seeking practices as the state institutions and 
nationalized industries were used to dole out jobs to the regime’s loyalists as reward for 
their struggle against the Ayub regime (Zaidi, 2005). This changed the entire nature of 
the politics of patronage in Pakistan as discussed in Chapter 7. 
Bhutto first nationalised the capital and intermediate goods. In 1972, insurance 
companies were nationalised and the State Bank tightened control over scheduled banks 
to redirect credit. Rice and cotton trading was nationalised in 1973 and so were vegetable 
oil, petroleum marketing and shipping. The banking sector was nationalised in 1974. 
This broke the back of the industrial sector.  In 1976, Bhutto government nationalized 
the small scale cotton ginning, rice husking and flour milling. Pakistani rupee was 
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devalued by 131 per cent in 1972 and prices of agricultural products increased by 100 
per cent between 1972-77. A prime source of subsidy in the form of Export Bonus 
Scheme of 1960s was done away with. Measures were taken to end of overvalued 
exchange rate through devaluation, make “a deliberate attempt to alter the pro-industry 
anti-agriculture bias of the previous growth strategy” and cut down direct and indirect 
subsidies to the manufacturing sector (Zaidi, 2005, p. 105). It shows how the subsidies 
and rents of the emergent industrial class were taken away by the Bhutto regime. 
In Bhutto’s regime of the 1970s, the middle classes were given space in the state 
apparatus with the induction of left-leaning people. Getting jobs and being part of the 
government was valuable for the members of rural middle classes. It of course remained 
a necessity for urban workers and middle classes. This was because of the gradual 
reduction of opportunities in the agrarian sector. The populist regime was overwhelmed 
by demand for jobs. A major damper on the economy was the nationalization of 
industries, made worse by the emergent industrial class shifting its profits abroad. This 
led to loss of confidence, economic activity and employment creation in the country. The 
economic and social problems started to unravel. Although Bhutto regime started to send 
people abroad for employment, it took some time before remittance began to influence 
the economy. The government had strained beyond its capacity (Sayeed, 1995).  
The measure that turned out to be the most harmful for the Bhutto government was the 
nationalization of small industry. It antagonized traders, merchants and brokers (Sayeed, 
1995). Whereas nationalization appeased some sections of the middles classes through 
expansion in the public sector industries and employment creation, it antagonized others. 
Some sections of the middle classes were appeased by Bhutto regime at the cost of 
others. Those who lost out mobilized against the government. The policies pursued to 
absorb the interests of some sections of middle classes through public sector employment 
contributed to the alienation and antagonism of the other sections of the middle classes. 
The Bhutto regime’s populist policies failed and led to its downfall. 
There was not enough patronage to be distributed too widely to all the potential political 
organizers. Rents were taken away from the industrial elite and also from the middle 
classes associated with the capitalist class. This antagonized the industrial elite and the 
certain sections of the middle classes. The middle classes are not a monolith category as 
Chapter 2 discusses. Bhutto’s nationalization of small industries had a negative impact 
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on small traders and merchants and they provided the cannon fodder for anti-Bhutto 
mobilisation by late 1970s.   
Through nationalization of industries and particularly small industries, the Bhutto’s 
government antagonized the vast majority of trading classes across the country. The 
economic concerns were expressed in the ideological idiom of a re-asserted Islamic 
identity. Such an Islamic identity was projected to be under threat due to the liberal and 
progressive cultural image of the Bhutto government. The trading classes along with 
other disgruntled groups got mobilized and launched the Pakistan National Alliance 
(PNA) movement to overthrow the Bhutto government in 1977. The army decided to 
overthrow the Bhutto government.  
Thereafter the military government decided to let the private sector play the main role in 
1980s. It started with the denationalisation of small units such as cotton ginning, rice 
husking and flour milling in late 1977. The government also denationalised some small 
engineering units. Cement and chemical units were made available to the private sector. 
In 1978, the private sector was also given tax holidays to promote industry in less 
developed areas. The industrial sector also got export rebates and interest rates were 
brought down. Regulations and the process of getting private sector investment were 
made less stringent. Target for growth of large-scale manufacturing at 12 per cent per 
annum was achieved in the period from 1978-82.  Even though there was no major 
reversal to denationalisation, public sector investment fell from 72 per cent in 1978-79 to 
below 18 per cent in 1987-88 (Zaidi, 2005). 
The military government took a number of measures in the 1980s to boost industrial 
production. The government provided duty free access for the import of machinery, 
facilitated credit through the export finance scheme, and applied “compensatory rebate” 
on exportable items. It also liberalized the imports and exports. Liberalisation of imports 
was done to increase industrial output. To give boost to  exports, the provision of raw 
materials and intermediate goods was facilitated. The government also set up two export 
processing zones in Lahore and Karachi respectively (Government of Pakistan, 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 1982-83, p. 44). The government also provided incentives 
such as the Exports Rebate Scheme, Exports Finance Scheme, Export Credit Guarantee 
Scheme and Export Processing Zones. Other incentives also included relaxing some of 
the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission 1971. Industries were also 
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exempted from getting “prior sanction”, excluding a few cases (Government of Pakistan, 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 1982-83). It shows that the military government provided 
subsidies as instruments of its industrial policy and distributed rents through liberal bank 
loans. Unlike the 1960s, the recipients were not only the small number of industrial 
houses. Patronage was distributed more widely in the 1980s and its nature was more 
diffused (Cheema, 2003).  
A detailed industrial policy was designed and implemented from 1978-88 period. The 
government put an end to further nationalization and encouraged the private sector. 
Manufacturing continued both in public and private sectors in a “mixed” economy. The 
government moved slowly to denationalize state-owned industries and financial 
institutions. The over-riding objective of the regime was to survive and prolong its rule. 
The government, therefore, did not control the smuggling, gun-running and other black 
economy-oriented activities. The government pursued the policy of “purposeful neglect” 
(Burki, 1991; Sayeed, 2002; Belokrenitsky, 1991). 
There was a burst of growth in the 1980s and the rate of industrial growth reached 9.6 
per cent, but this was largely due to exogenous factors. The disparity between high 
growth and low productivity arose due to lack of productive allocative capacities. Over 
80 percent of  contribution to growth came from “large capital input.” These capital 
inputs were from “exogenous sources”: foreign-remittances, economic and military aid, 
and loans from multilateral financial institutions. A certain portion of exogenous capital 
input was given by the state owned banks as loans to industrialists and private sector. A 
considerable percentage of these loans ended up being declared bad loans and were  
written off. This was because they were given without adequate precautions. The real 
purpose was not to promote industrial development per se but to pursue patronage 
politics by doling out the state’s resources. The loan recipients kept rescheduling their 
loans. They were, in the meanwhile, able to receive new loans. Without having the 
capacity to impose discipline to pay back loans, it became easier to earn quick money 
through getting loans sanctioned from the public financial sector and then defaulting. It 
led to “sickening” of the industrial sector. The rot in the manufacturing sector in 1990s 
sprang from dire credit distribution policies of public banks in the 1980s (Sayeed, 2002; 
Belokrenitsky, 1991). It shows how rents were created and transfers were made in the 
form of bank loans by pursuing the politics of patronage. As discussed in Chapter 8, 
political motivation was one of the key reasons behind bank loans default. 
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The new intermediate classes’ best way forward was to become part of the state 
apparatus and redirect rents to themselves. The state capture through local body elections 
(and later on through the provincial and national politics) was an effective way to 
redistribute property rights. In the 1980s, the entrepreneurial class realized that the best 
way to safeguard its business interests was to get directly involved in politics. They 
realized that direct involvement in politics was necessary to earn rents (Zaidi, 1999; 
Sayeed, 1995). 
Industrial-politician Nawaz Sharif became active in the national politics in the 1980s and 
ended up leading a political party- Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). He twice became 
the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the 1990s. Another industrialist Chaudhry Shujaat also 
became quite prominent in the 1980s and later founded his own faction of the centre-
right party – Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid). The rise of Sharif and Chaudhry families 
in the 1980s and 1990s is an archetypical example of businessmen getting involved in 
politics. The industrial/financial strength of the industrial-politicians increased manifold 
after joining  politics. The state machinery, credit provisions, under-taxation measures 
and other instruments were used to accumulate rents.  
In the 1990s, Pakistan’s economy grew at only 4 per cent compared with 6 per cent in 
the previous four decades. The economic conditions worsened at the end of the Afghan 
war and the consequent drying up of foreign aid. The country’s budget was partly 
financed by borrowing from international monetary institutions. The Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) worsened the human development as poverty increased. 
Clientelist policies of governments continued. The era of liberalization led to a downturn 
in the economy. New policies of interest and exchange rate liberalization, tariff 
reduction, narrowing the budgetary deficit and privatization had adverse effects on 
industrial development to the extent that over 4000 industries were declared sick by 
1998. The process of default and “sickening” of industries whose foundations were laid 
in the 1980s easy credit policy had almost became a reality given manufacturing projects 
were not sustainable with the high interest rates. There were more incentives to spend the 
money on short-term high return activities. Even if loans were spent on manufacturing, 
the chances of collapse of such projects were quite high. Excessive devaluation did not 
boost exports and led to inflation. Privatization was carried out on a large scale in the 
first half of 1990s; about 80 percent of public sector industries were privatized. The 
industrial class did not resist liberalization because this enabled it to transfer industrial 
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capital into finance capital (stock exchange, real estate, foreign currency deposits in the 
country or abroad) without taking the risks of industrial capital. This also made it 
possible for the industrial class and other accumulators from the “shadow” economy to 
whiten their money. The fact that the power of industrial class has not necessarily 
declined is reflected in the fact that the government has not been able to force them to 
return “bad debts” to public financial institutions. In spite of poor growth figures in the 
large scale manufacturing, government continued to pursue a policy of liberalization. 
The liberalization policies were accepted under the pressure of the international financial 
institutions (Sayeed, 2002; Zaidi, 1999; Khan, Mushtaq, 2000a).  
Pakistan’s export performance declined over the decades. For example, in 1972, 
Pakistan’s export of manufactured goods matched that of the four Southeast Asian 
countries put together. But both Thailand and Indonesia exported “more than three 
times” compared to Pakistan in 1990 (Papanek, 1991, p. 2). Exports performance 
improved somewhat in the period of structural adjustment, yet it still lagged behind the 
average of “low income countries”. Intermediate goods sector had been hit the worst. 
The overall scenario pointed towards a trend of “de-industrialization” as a consequence 
of structural adjustment and the regime of liberalization (Khan, Shahrukh, 1999). 
External debts proved to be a drain on the economy in 1990s. During the structural 
adjustment period, the debt to GDP ratio increased compared to the previous decades. 
Since aid and concessional grants stopped and the terms of debt got worst, the debt-trap 
coupled with Pakistan’s nuclear tests pushed the country to the brink of default (Khan, 
Shahrukh, 1999; Naseem, 2002; Burki, 1991). 
Growth rate for the overall manufacturing sector was only 4.8 per cent in the 1990s 
compared to 8.2 per cent of the 1980s. Compared with the 1960s figures, the 
performance of the manufacturing sector was abysmal under the SAP in the 1990s. The 
industrial sector witnessed negative growth rate in 1996-97 as it fell to minus 0.1 per 
cent and it was barely 1.5 per cent in 1999-2000. The rise in post 2001 figures was due to 
exogenous factors. Fixed investment as percentage of GDP fell from 19 per cent in 1990-
91 to 13.1 per cent  in 2002-03, public investment almost halved from 8.5 per cent in 
1990-91 to 4.5 per cent in 2002-03, while private investment fell from 10 per cent of 
GDP in 1992-93 to 8 per cent in the post 1998-99 era (Zaidi, 2005, pp. 122-124). 
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The interest rates rose due to financial liberalization under SAP badly affecting the 
industrial sector. Whereas in the 1990, the interest rate was on the average 12 percent, it 
increased to 20-23 percent on average for “long term industrial investment” and 25-30 
percent for the working capital in 1997. The utility prices similarly went up on the 
principle of market principles. From 1991 to 2001, electricity cost went up by 14.7 
percent and the price of gas increased by 10 percent. Increase in utilities and upping of 
interest rates had an adverse impact on the industrial sector. Tariff rates fell 
tremendously from the maximum of 225 per cent in 1986-87 to 25 per cent in late 1990s. 
Reduction in the tariff rates made imported supplies chapter. It is therefore, “...not 
surprising that more than 4,000 industrial units have been declared ‘sick’” (Zaidi, 2005, 
pp. 123-24). The cost of doing business was much higher in Pakistan compared to its 
neighbours in South Asia (Bari, 2006).  
The military, led by General Musharraf, again took over power in 1999. Musharraf era 
can be clearly divided into two phases: 1) 1999 to pre-September 11, 2001 era; 2) post 
September 2001 to 2008 era. Musharraf government was internationally isolated before 
the September 2001 attacks and the low economic growth figures of 1990s continued 
well into 2001. With the turnaround in Pakistan’s stated policy on the Taliban under US 
pressure, the international community welcomed the government with enthusiasm. 
Pakistan got generous aid by the US, easy loans from the IFIs, and large foreign inflows 
as remittances from overseas Pakistanis.  
Pakistan’s macroeconomic performance improved from 2000 to 2004. As the Table 3.1 
points out, in the financial year 2003-04, the economy grew at 6.4 per cent against the 
projected growth of 5.3 per cent. Overall manufacturing grew by 13.4 per cent against 
the target of 7.8 per cent with the automobile group growing at 52.7 per cent as a trail-
blazer. Electricals and pharmaceuticals grew at 45.8 per cent and 21.1 per cent 
respectively. Inflation remained under 4 per cent and external debts payment decreased 
substantially as a percentage of the annual budget. Foreign reserves reached $12 billion 
(Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 2003-04). This was largely due to 
the exogenous factors as discussed above. 
Consumer financing and consumerism sums up the economic performance of the 
Musharraf era. Due to the financial sector liberalization, private banks and leasing 
companies opened in large numbers and they instituted consumer financing. This led to 
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the sale of consumer items, ranging from automobiles to cellular phones. The financial 
sector liberalization which started in the early 1990s, got consolidated in the Musharraf 
era. Interest rates also came down from 18-20 percent to 6-8 percent as part of policy to 
expand financing. The government privatised the United Bank in 2002 and Habib Bank 
in 2004. Overall, the issue of privatization of state owned banks and allowing more 
private and foreign banks to be set up was intricately linked with the high portfolio of 
non-performing loans in the state owned banks. The changes in the financial sector 
liberalisation fuelled the consumer financing to the expanding middle classes (Bari, 
2006).  
3.2. The Landowning Class and the Politics of Patronage: 
The politics of patronage and clientelism discussed in Section 3.1 is not limited to the 
capitalist sector. It is spread over the wider sections of society. The landowning class, the 
capitalist class and the intermediate classes are all part of it. The thesis does not focus on 
the role of the landowning class. We briefly discuss it below as part of the background to 
the political economy of Pakistan. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses in detail the linkage between the distribution of power in the society 
and the institutional capabilities needed for transformation in developing countries. 
Patron-client relationships are “modern” in the sense that they are not only based on 
traditional concepts of loyalty only but on the economic payoffs that patrons bestow on 
their clients through redistributing the state’s resources in exchange for the 
organisational power of the intermediate classes (Khan, Mushtaq, 2004; 2005). Kinship-
based patronage is widespread in the Pakistani society and is structured around the 
concept of “collective defence” where the power of the state institutions is negotiated 
through the clan networks (Lieven, 2011).   
 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 shows that contrary to the prescriptions of the ‘good 
governance’ model, there may not be much difference in democracy or authoritarianism 
rule in developing countries. The prevalent power structures remain the same. 
Democracy also works through patron-client relationships and the politics of patronage. 
Accessing the power of the state institutions is one of the effective strategies in rents 
generation and its redistribution to clients. We state that the landowning class, the 
capitalist class and the intermediate classes have all benefited from the politics of 
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patronage. We discuss the role of the capitalist class and the middle classes in the case 
study chapters (6, 7, 8, 9) in detail. We briefly discuss below the role of the landed class 
in the historical context.  
 
Lieven is of the view that Pakistan does not have “feudals” along the lines of medieval 
Europe. “Feudals” in the Pakistani discourse are landowners. As much as 500 acres is 
considered a “big estate” in the country. The “feudal” families, particularly in northern 
Punjab, have risen due to their (state-centred) corruption or through ownership of urban 
property and not due to income from land-owning sources. The power of the so-called 
“feudals” in Pakistan is not due to their land-holdings but due to them being heads of big 
clans/tribes and kinship networks which augment their hold. Even in the case of 
migration to the urban areas, the kinship patterns remain entrenched going back to the 
rural backgrounds. Kinship networks help the members of a clan to negotiate with the 
state institutions even after their migration to the urban areas (Lieven, 2011).  
Going back in Pakistan’s history, the Green Revolution of the 1960s initiated a process 
of change in the rural areas. It changed the economic, social and technological relations 
in the country. Green Revolution introduced new seeds, fertilizers, mechanization 
through tube-wells and tractors. It provided incentives to the large landowners to 
mechanize and to small landowners to economize. It let to the displacement of landless 
labour and small farmers. The economically displaced sections of the population 
migrated to nearby towns and provided the essential services for the agricultural change. 
In this way, the process of urbanization was strengthened. This urbanization process led 
to the growth of urban middle classes in Pakistan. These small towns provided the 
services required for the agricultural change (Zaidi, 1999; Khan, Mahmood, 1981; Raj, 
2002). In the urban areas, the state institutions successfully created incentives to turn the 
merchant/trading class into proto-capitalists as discussed in Section 3.1. The agricultural 
sector paid the “tribute” to the urban industrial sector due to fixed pricing of agricultural 
products and displacement of small peasants, tenants and the landless due to the Green 
Revolution (Raj, 2002).  
There are reasons behind the state institutions’ focus on industrialisation and 
perpetuation of the “urban bias” in their policies in the earlier decades of Pakistan. The 
vision to industrialise was part of policy of modernization. The overall trend in the 
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developing countries at that time was an economic policy focused on import-
substitution-industrialization (Amjad, 1974). Mushtaq Khan (2013) referring to Ayesha 
Jalal’s work points out that the military government that took power in 1958 needed a 
viable economy. The country’s survival was perceived to be dependent on its military 
strength. To finance the military’s power, there was a need for a viable economy. This 
argument provides another strong explanation for focus on industrialisation that 
translated into the “urban bias”.  
Despite, the so-called “urban bias”, the landed class was largely able to maintain its 
status-quo (Khan, Mahmood, 1981). Another view looks at the phenomenon of “urban 
bias” differently. According to this view, the landed elite was in “money illusion” as it 
did not see its income decreasing and failed to understand a change in real income with 
the rise of industrial capitalists (Amjad, 1974). The Land Reforms of 1959 were effective 
in weakening the landed interests in the country and the Ayub regime was able to push 
these reforms due to its authoritarian character.  
The other salient feature of the Ayub era was the introduction of the system of Basic 
Democracy (BD) in 1959. This BD system elected 80,000 basic democrats20 from the 
West and the East Pakistan. They were elected to be members of union councils in rural 
areas and union committees in urban areas. It was an effort to build a political 
constituency for the Ayub government. Though the BD members did not enjoy much 
power, they got money from the state for the developmental work in their respective 
areas under the banner of the “Rural Works Programme.” This was clearly a way for the 
authoritarian regime to create support for itself in the rural areas21. It also undermined the 
power of national political leadership and big landowners (Sayeed, 1995; Rizvi, 2000). 
The distributive politics of the BD system was the continuation of patron-client 
relationship that the state institutions had established with social groups. Earlier, it was 
exercised through the state institutions’ monopoly over the distribution of evacuee trust 
property. The BD system was a sophisticated way of doling out state resources through 
                                                          
20
 Commonly known as BD members. 
21
 According to Mushtaq Khan, the policy of distributing patronage through the ‘basic democrats’ proved 
to be “self-defeating”. It might have worked in the short-while to bypass the national political leadership 
through decentralization. However, ultimately, the rural basic democrats became more ambitious and they 
threw their weight behind the political organizers in the urban areas against the Ayub government. The 
coalition of the economically excluded became powerful enough to topple the Ayub government (Khan, 
Mushtaq, 2013).  
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elected representatives. This became an institutionalized practice that Bhutto continued 
in the 1970s by pursuing the policy of nationalization, job creation and politically 
motivated inductions. Zia-ul-Haq practiced it more blatantly in 1980s through the 
distribution of bank loans and  development funds (Sayeed, 1995; Zaidi, 2005). Politics 
of patronage got further strengthened in the 1990s when the two main political parties 
kept alternating in power before the military took over power in 1999. 
Getting access to the power and resources of state institutions plays an important part in 
the web of patronage. Adnan Adil (2000) has done an interesting study on the key 
players in the Punjab’s politics from 1970-1997 on the basis of tabulating the National 
Assembly seats won by the different social groups. The landed class22 got almost half of 
the seats from the Punjab in the National Assembly from over this period. The other key 
finding of Adil’s study (which corroborates the fieldwork findings discussed in Chapter 
8) is the rise of businessmen in politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Businessmen won only 
6% of seats for the National Assembly in the Punjab in the 1970 elections. Their share 
started going up since the non-party-based elections in 1985 and went upto 20 percent in 
the 1997 elections. Businessmen displaced the professionals and other middle classes 
who had won in the 1970 elections. Another interesting finding is that the landed class, 
which has been winning almost half the National Assembly seats from the largest 
province, Punjab, had fairly established links with the business sector. Members of the 
landed class had business interests in manufacturing, transport, trade and urban real 
estate. One explanation for the convergence of land-owning interests with business 
interests could be the low income from the agricultural sector only. Hence, the 
landowners-politicians needed to venture into the business to supplement their incomes 
and contest electoral battles. The industrialists had also been buying up land (Adil, 
2000).  
The landed class - including the big land-owners and “rich/middle” farmers - winning 
almost half the National Assembly seats from the largest23 province, Punjab, points to the 
landowning class having been as much part of the patronage politics as other powerful 
groups. The landowning class has been venturing into business and the capitalists are 
investing in the lands. Continuing with the BD tradition of the Ayub era, various 
governments allocated considerable development funds through the elected 
                                                          
22 Adil (2000) includes both the big landowners and “rich/middle farmers” amongst the landed class. 
23
 In terms of population. 
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representatives from 1980s onwards. It formalised the role of politicians (with a 
considerable representation of the landowning class) in the politics of patronage in their 
respective constituencies. The landowning class is also powerful enough not to let the 
income tax be applied to the agricultural income.  
To sum up, the power of the landed class was negatively affected due the urban 
industrial bias of the state institutions’ policies in the 1950s and 1960s. The landed class 
re-asserted itself since the 1970s. As stated above, the landed class has won half the 
National Assembly seats from the Punjab from 1970 till end of the 1990s. It has been an 
essential part of the politics of patronage distributed through the developmental funds 
and other ways of earning rents through its capture of the state institutions. The 
landowning class, the capitalist class and the intermediate classes have all been part of 
the patronage politics and clientelism depending on their relative configuration of power 
in the structures of society. 
  
85 
 
Chapter 4. Methodology Chapter  
The dissertation has used the qualitative research methodology to investigate the 
relationship between political economy and the rule of law in contemporary Pakistan. 
Qualitative research methodology is better at capturing the complexity of the 
phenomenon than other methods. Hence, the dissertation offers a rather unique view of 
the nexus of the political economy and the rule of law issues using only qualitative 
research methodology. 
It was decided to use the qualitative research methods on the basis of the past experience 
as well. For pre-PhD research work on the people’s perceptions regarding justice system 
and law and order at the local level, my co-author - an economist - and I came to the 
conclusion that semi-structured interviews and other semi-anthropological qualitative 
methods work better than sophisticated questionnaire-based quantitative methods. 
Of course, qualitative research methodology has its limitations too, but it does have the 
ability to point to the certain patterns very clearly which makes the analysis rich. Hence, 
purely qualitative research methods have been used. The thesis uses a number of 
different qualitative methods ranging from a critical reading of primary documents and 
making inferences on the basis of the documents to conducting key informant interviews. 
It has used the quasi-anthropological methodology of conducting in-depth key informant 
interviews and using case studies and quotes from those interviews in the thesis. Of 
course, the secondary literature has been used wherever possible. Primary documents and 
interviews have been used interactively. Documents have been read in the context of 
interviews and interviews have been conducted keeping the primary documents in the 
background. A check-list for the interviews was used and is in the appendix of the thesis. 
Participant observation was also used while waiting for logistics to be sorted out in the 
government offices and textile manufacturers’ offices and it has offered some interesting 
insights as well. 
Having chosen a qualitative approach, the next step was to decide what the specific focus 
of the research should be. As outlined in Chapter 1, the Introduction; I chose a dual focus 
on institutional reforms and a productive sector. 
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4.1.Choice of IFIs Reforms in Pakistan: 
Case studies of the General Sales Tax (GST) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) were chosen for studying the IFIs institutional 
governance reforms. The question is why these were chosen for case studies and why not 
other reforms such as privatisation of the banking sector, default of bank loans, 
privatisation, accountability, augmenting of accounting methods and accountability / 
transparency.  
Initially an attempt was made to work on default of bank loans. Through concerted 
effort, confidential lists of top loan takers in the textiles sector from 1999 till 2004 was 
received from the State Bank of Pakistan’s well-guarded internal database. The idea was 
to compare them with the lists of top exporters and the top companies trading on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange to gauge if the bank loans were going to productive 
entrepreneurs in the textiles sector or not. From the point of value-enhancement, bank 
loans case study would have been illuminating and very relevant. It would have been 
able to show whether the value-enhancement was still taking place in the banking sector 
and also throw light on whether resources were going to productive versus unproductive 
capitalists. Other than receiving the confidential lists of top borrowers in the textiles 
sector, a lot of effort was also made to collect the company reports of the top loan takers 
from the Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad stock exchanges to assess company 
performance. However, after having invested quite a bit of time and effort, it was 
concluded that the kind of time and material resources needed to do this kind of analysis 
were not available and hence this case study was aborted. Hence, default of bank loans 
data proved to be a cold trail.  
Reforms in the accounting methods were not chosen due to lack of expertise. Relevant 
data was not available for a case study of the privatisation. Hence, I conducted the two 
case studies of the GST and the SECP. 
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4.2. Choice of the Textiles Sector: 
As discussed in the Introduction (Chapter 1), it was considered necessary to study a 
productive sector along with the chosen IFIs institutional governance reforms to look at 
interplay of the taxation, regulation and the rule of law issues in a productive sector. The 
textiles sector was therefore chosen by eliminating other sectoral choices such as the 
sugar, iron & steel and cement.  Textiles sector’s contribution to the economy in Pakistan 
was phenomenal. At the time of the fieldwork, it contributed 60% to total exports, 46% 
to total manufacturing and 27% of industrial value addition. It also contributed 8.5% of 
total GDP and 38% of total employment and consumed 31% of total investment 
(Government of Pakistan, “Textiles Vision 2005”). Here is how the key government 
economic document mentions textiles: 
“Its share in the economy, in terms of GDP, exports, employment, foreign 
exchange earnings, investment and contribution to the value added in industry; 
makes it the single largest determinant of the growth in overall manufacturing 
activity… Pakistan has emerged as one of the major cotton textile product 
suppliers in the world market and its share in world yarn trade is about 30 percent 
while its share in cotton cloth trade is about 8 percent…The value addition in the 
sector account for 9 percent of GDP and it employs 38 percent of industrial 
workers” (Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey of Pakistan 2002-03). 
In a study on the rule-based governance, if there is one single sector that cannot be 
ignored, it is the textiles. Moreover, the primary reason for choosing the largest 
manufacturing sector in Pakistan was that if the rule-based governance and mature 
capitalism is not prevalent in the largest manufacturing sector, then there would be even 
less chances of it taking place in less critical sectors. 
4.3. The fieldwork 
The main fieldwork for the thesis was conducted from May 2004 to April 2005. The 
overall focus of the thesis at the time of the fieldwork was the role of IFIs, the rule of 
law, the textiles sector and the rule-based governance. The review of the literature of the 
theoretical background and the political economy of Pakistan was done in the Upgrade 
document before the commencement of the fieldwork.  Its finalised versions are in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The first few weeks of the fieldwork were spent on getting the 
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background documents from the World Bank, IMF and government of Pakistan offices. 
A large amount of time was, however, spent on collecting primary documents from the 
Ministry of Finance and Pakistan Law Commission in Islamabad.  
In the pre-PhD programme period, I was associated with a local NGO-cum-research 
think tank in Islamabad.  This was since 1997, and I worked in various capacities 
including research positions. When I returned to Pakistan, this research think-tank 
offered me a position of Visiting Research Associate during the time of fieldwork. It 
used to work on development, environment and gender issues amongst others.  It enjoyed 
a good reputation in the country’s policy circles and was well-known at that time. It 
played the role of a gate-opener for my fieldwork. The research think-tank provided 
office space, facilities and an intellectual environment which facilitated the design of the 
fieldwork. 
4.3.1. Stakeholders Interviews 
After the first phase of collecting basic documents on the role of IFIs, institutional 
governance reforms, and the textiles sector; various stakeholder interviews were 
conducted starting from June 2004.  
Interviews of 27 stakeholders were conducted. The initial interviewed were conducted to 
get ‘sense of the scene’. These interviews were mostly conducted in Islamabad with 
representatives of the IFIs, government officials and academics in Islamabad. Interviews 
with the IFIs representatives were focused on the institutional governance reforms, those 
with government officials on the IFIs role and government policies. These stakeholders 
were also asked their perceptions about the textiles sector. The next leg of the fieldwork 
was the conducting of the interviews of the textiles manufacturers. An academic in a 
stakeholder interview was not hopeful of getting much out of textiles manufacturers’ 
interviews. His experience of working on political economy issues with textiles 
manufacturers showed them unwilling to be available for researchers and their queries. 
Before discussing the textiles manufacturers’ interviews, the tactic used to gain 
appointments with the members of IFIs, government officials and with other 
stakeholders is described. A brief statement of the research objectives of the thesis were 
written as part of individualised letters on the NGO’s letterpad indicating my 
associations both with the local research think-tank and SOAS.  These letters were sent 
to the heads of respective organisations followed by the phone calls. This strategy proved 
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to be extremely useful in general (excluding the textiles sector). This strategy also 
worked really well with the Central Board of Revenue in Islamabad later. The head of 
the organisations generally designated one or more officials to make time available for 
meetings and interviews. 
 
4.3.2. The Textiles Sector Fieldwork 
A textiles sector study doing an overview from the perspective of political economy and 
rule of law has essentially to focus on capital. Mezzadri (2009) has used a similar 
approach to study labour through the perceptions of capital. This thesis focuses on 
capital and its interaction with the state. Hence, it is very relevant to interview the 
owners of the textiles companies.  
Another reason for doing so relates to the need for analysing the backgrounds and 
dynamics of the families which started the textiles business.  For this leading 
manufacturers had to be interviewed.  A few employees of the textiles companies were 
also interviewed.  Representatives of various textiles associations were also interviewed.  
The interview process begun by meeting the All Pakistan Textiles Mills Association 
(APTMA) representatives.  This is the largest association representing this sector. Their 
views were very important in designing the sampling process - they were considered in 
detail along with other criterion. An effort was made to interview the companies which 
were not large per se but were important for other considerations. For example, during 
the sampling process it became important to investigate textiles companies which were 
loan defaulters. This was to provide a valuable perspective on the relationship of textiles 
with the rule of law.  Three known defaulter companies were identified. Further, a 
balance was needed between companies listed on stock exchange and those which are 
private and unlisted.  
Overall, a complicated sampling strategy was evolved so that the entire range of 
complexities within the large and small manufacturers could be covered while keeping 
the focus on large manufacturers. For the same reason the representative of a multi-
national company which makes polyester fibre was interviewed just to get their 
perspective of the sector.  Representatives of the garments association and also garments 
manufacturers were also interviewed but only to get an idea about how chain of value 
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addition leads from the textiles to garments. A visit to a power loom in Faisalabad gave a 
good sense of how the process of subcontracting for making grieg cloth works.  
The three cities where textile manufacturing takes places are: Faisalabad and Lahore (in 
Punjab province) and Karachi (in Sindh province). That is where interviews were 
conducted.  
 
Key informant interview was conducted on the phone with the Textiles Commissioner in 
Karachi (which was later followed by an interview in person in February 2005). There 
was insignificant help from APTMA in obtaining appointments with manufacturers. 
APTMA representatives themselves were however willing to meet.  It seemed that the 
warning of the Islamabad-based academic mentioned earlier was coming true. The 
textiles sector was proving to be virtually inaccessible.  Discussion with a fellow 
researcher, Dr Karin Siegmann however helped to open doors. Her friend, Mr Azam 
Muhammad, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan proved an 
invaluable contact.  
 
The regional Export Promotion offices in the Punjab and Sindh were under the control of 
Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad. Azam Muhammad was the high ranking officer there 
and agreed to help out. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was nearing 
phasing out in October 2004.24 In the ATC regime, the Export Promotion Bureaus 
(EPBs), which are under the Ministry of Commerce, regulated the export quota. It meant 
that the textiles manufacturers had to work closely with the EPBs. Hence, on Azam 
Muhammad’s request, the regional EPBs arranged my interviews with the textiles 
manufacturers. The plan finally worked out. 
 
I was aware that this plan has its limitations. As a researcher recommended by a Ministry 
meant that the textiles manufacturers may not be frank with me or may not appear 
critical of the government etc.  But this was the only way for a researcher to access these 
very busy people in the textiles sector.  
 
Effort was made to overcome the limitation by building trust. This was done by generally 
starting the interviews with asking them about their family history and how they got 
                                                          
24
 The ATC expired on 31st December 2004. 
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initiated into the textiles sector. It helped to break the ice. Of course no government 
representative accompanied me to the interviews. So it was clear that while a 
government office was used to gain access, the government was not part of the research 
process in any way. To my pleasant surprise, quite a few textiles manufacturers were not 
hesitant about being critical of the government or the policies of its various institutions. 
What they voiced was often criticisms of the government which they had earlier 
expressed in various official meetings as well.  Some of them shared their presentations 
during the interview process.  
 
Of special interest was to learn the process of how the textiles companies of how they 
develop and how they interact with the government.  What were their views on General 
Sales Tax/Value Added Tax? How did they perceive the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan as a regulatory body? Given that I was interested in their 
perceptions of how things worked, they opened up generally.  
 
An able research assistant, Ms Rabia Malik, assisted me during the interviews by taking 
notes.  A backup tape-recorder was used. Textiles manufacturers interviews lasted from 
November 2004 to February 2005 and we covered Lahore, Faisalabad and Karachi25 in 
that period (with breaks). After the interviews Rabia and I typed out our handwritten 
hurried notes. Clarifications were later added.  
 
The textiles chapter is based on 64 key informant interviews conducted of the leading 
textile manufacturers, employees, textile and garments associations and textiles related 
government officials. Forty four (44) textiles manufacturers, 10 senior employees of the 
companies, 6 representatives of textiles and garments associations and 4 textiles-related 
government officials have been interviewed. Textiles manufacturers were interviewed 
from 40 textiles companies/groups.  
 
Companies have been chosen on the basis of purposive snowball sampling keeping in 
mind the feedback of APTMA and other textiles ‘knowledgeable’ in the government and 
textiles sector.  Their views have been matched with the lists of Karachi Stock Exchange, 
APTMA membership and ranking of “major exporters” of the Export Promotion Bureau 
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 Rabia did not go to Karachi due to air ticket being expensive. 
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(EPB). Prominent manufacturers were also consulted about other companies/groups. 
Amongst the textile spinning, textile weaving and textile composite categories of 
Karachi Stock Exchange (excluding silk, rayon and woven garments), roughly 10% of 
listed textiles companies were selected through purposive sampling, while being aware 
of the preferences of APTMA members and other stakeholders.  
 
The 19 companies selected from Karachi Stock Exchange were further triangulated by 
choosing 5% of APTMA members. APTMA, the most prominent textiles association of 
spinners, weavers and composite units, has 394 members. Twenty- one of APTMA 
members were selected keeping in mind the choice made earlier of the Karachi Stock 
Exchange Members. The aim to triangulate was to also include private limited 
companies in the sample. This selection was further strengthened by reviewing list of 
“major exporters” of bed linen, cotton fabric and cotton yarn composed by the EPB 
(Government of Pakistan, Export Promotion Bureau, 2004).  
 
Total of 49 companies were listed by EPB as major exporters of bed linen, cotton fabric 
and cotton yarn. Out of those 49 companies, 33% of companies (16) were selected 
keeping in mind the membership of the Karachi Stock Exchange and APTMA. In 
selecting major exporters, there was a bias towards the selection of more value addition 
and composite units compared to less value addition and only spinning units. The 
purpose to choose 33% of major exporters in bed linen, cotton fabric and cotton yarn was 
to select the key players in the textiles sector. Also, other than the APTMA 
representatives and other stakeholders feedback and the lists to measure the yardsticks of 
performance, another practical criteria was of course to choose the “leading lights” who 
agree to meet and been recommended by the Export Promotion Bureau.  
 
As stated earlier, some garments manufacturers were also interviewed. Two big garments 
manufacturers were interviewed. Others were small garments manufacturers. Similarly, 
Pakistan Readymade Garments Association representatives were also interviewed. Power 
loom workers in one power loom in Faisalabad were also interviewed to get an idea of 
the process. Some medium26 and small textiles companies were also interviewed to get 
an idea of the picture across the spectrum. As stated earlier, three defaulter companies, 
                                                          
26 All companies less than 100 million USD of assets were considered medium. 
93 
 
one defunct textiles group of the 1960s, and a polyester fiber making multinational group 
were also interviewed.  
 
Roughly, half the companies interviewed were public companies and others were private 
companies. Owners of private companies were generally not forthcoming regarding their 
company’s assets etc.  
As a Pakistani woman working on political economy and the rule of law issues related to 
the textile sector, my experience resulted in problems free fieldwork. The fact that there 
were no barriers in conversing in Urdu, Punjabi and English helped.  
One leading garments manufacturer that I interviewed in Faisalabad gave a very 
enthusiastic interview and at the end offered me to teach in the College of Fashion 
Design that they were setting up in Faisalabad. The interview revealed the massive 
shortage of skilled human resources in the garments sector and it sometimes needed to 
get female garments makers from Sri Lanka and Philippines. Some other textiles 
manufacturers advised me to get into international trade law once I finish my PhD, so 
that I can help Pakistan’s case in the European Union when they had to deal with anti-
dumping duties etc.  
Preference was for quasi-anthropological in-depth key informant interviews as opposed 
to focus group discussions. However, sometimes in the textiles association meetings with 
half a dozen textiles representatives being around, the discussions turned out to be 
something akin to focus group discussions. An attempt was made to have ‘informal’ 
discussions once the formal interview process was over and the tape recorder was off. 
Some interesting insights came out of these ‘informal’ discussions. Often one was 
interested in one textiles manufacturer views about another and about digging out the 
reasons for companies’ loan default etc. Some textiles manufacturers were of the view 
that one of the companies that defaulted in Lahore did so because its owner kept a very 
tight control over the company and did not delegate anything to his employees. The 
owner-manufacturer micro-managed the company and it led him to default. Others talked 
openly about another defunct textiles company’s owner committing fraud and making a 
fool of all the lenders.  
The following few paragraphs are meant to give a feeling of the range of respondents’ 
reactions and attitudes. 
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There were some leading textiles manufacturers who spoke at length and indulged in the 
process of the interview to a great extent. Others thought they needed to get over with it 
as soon as possible and get back to their work. The obvious corollary would be that the 
busier the person was or the most important the person was, the less time he27 would 
have had for the interview. For example, an owner of the leading textile company in 
Karachi had very little time for the interview. He gave very brief answers and went for 
his coat as I was asking the last question. However, his cousin who is an owner of 
another successful textile company took great pride in describing his achievements of 
getting a new textiles mill running. One owner of a large public textiles mill in 
Faisalabad also gave a very brief interview. However, the owners of two large sister 
companies in Lahore which belong to the Shaikh family took lots of time not only to 
narrate their own stories but to also connect it with the wider issues of political economy. 
So, the link between a ‘big group’ and ‘less interview time’ is not that straightforward.  
Two owners of defaulter companies in Lahore spoke candidly about why their 
companies had to default. However, there were other defaulters in the list as well who 
did not mention that their companies have defaulted since I did not know about it. I 
found out their default information from the State bank of Pakistan’s confidential 
database afterwards using the local research think-tank’s high-powered professional 
connections. 
The owners of the large textile mills were often part of large business groups. Such 
groups generally had businesses other than textiles such as the cement or banking or 
chemicals. They often spoke on the behalf of the group rather than just being the textiles 
manufacturers and they had to be brought back to focus on the textiles sector. 
The owner of a large textiles company in Karachi spoke very eloquently about the threats 
he had to face because he refused to pay the extortion money to the ethnic parties in the 
mid-1990s. These ethnic parties control the city. Hence, his company had to default for 
two years.  
The son of the owner of the largest textile mill in Pakistan spoke very openly about the 
hostility of the Pakistan People’s Party government towards his business group. While, 
an informed seasoned journalist in Islamabad told me how the owner of the largest 
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 Textiles manufacturers are all men. There was one woman who had taken up the family business after 
her father passed away suddenly but she was not available for the interview.  
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textiles mill was given a bank as part of the privatisation process by Pakistan Muslim 
League (Nawaz)’s government in 1991 despite the fact that he was not the highest 
bidder. Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) were bitter 
political rivals in the 1990s.  
4.3.3. General Sales Tax (in VAT mode) Fieldwork: 
The General Sales Tax (GST)/Value Added Tax (VAT) fieldwork was the most fruitful 
fieldwork in terms of the thesis despite its brevity. It was done in March-April 2005. To 
facilitate the meetings a letter was written to the Chairman of the Central Board of 
Revenue (CBR), which is a very powerful position in the government bureaucracy. Due 
to General Musharraf’s overall policy of hiring technocrats to head various departments, 
Abdullah Yusuf, the Chairman, was a professional. He forwarded my fax to three wings 
within the CBR: Research Wing, Tax Reform Wing and Sales Tax Wing (VAT). These 
wings replied saying that they would be happy to help out with the research, and then 
interviews with representatives of the three wings followed. Two senior members of the 
Sales Tax Wing gave very candid interviews highlighting the high level of resistance put 
up by the capitalists and the intermediate classes to the taxation efforts via GST/VAT.  
These interviews provided significant insights for the research.  
Various CBR Wings gave me their taxation reports etc which were meant for public 
sharing. The Sales Tax (VAT) Wing was requested to provide their internal documents 
from 1999 to 2004 that could throw light on how various measures were being taken and 
what justifications were being given within the department. I knew I was pushing my 
luck. The Pakistani bureaucracy is very protective of its internal reports which are never 
officially shared with the public. I wanted to study some primary documents and must 
have been persuasive. Luckily they agreed to share their internal memos and files on how 
decision were internally made and justified! 
Chapter 6 on GST/VAT is relatively short, yet it is very informative. Studying the rule-
violating behaviour is not at all easy anywhere or in Pakistan. Those indulging in under 
the table transfers and rents resist making them public.  There was no easy way to 
document the rule-violating behaviour. During the textiles manufacturers’ interviews in 
Faisalabad before the GST/VAT fieldwork, candid discussions with some textiles 
manufacturers revealed information about the ‘fake and flying’ invoices that were used 
to claim fraudulent refunds from the GST/VAT authorities. This information was given 
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by the manufacturers who themselves claimed not to be involved in receiving fake 
refunds but were upset that their competitors got them. Hence, they candidly talked to 
me about it. I was briefed about them before I went to the CBR office. I had understood 
that the Pakistani capitalists were resisting attempts to tax them or regulate them and 
were sabotaging them through various measures.  
I wanted to get internal CBR files to see how the manufacturers’ attempts at evasion 
made the tax authorities change its course of action. This was made clear by the Sales 
Tax officials.  I also got the internal files which I read in the light of CBR and textiles 
manufacturers interviews. This was the big breakthrough for the thesis. 
4.3.3. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’s Fieldwork: 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan came into being to regulate the capital 
sector and non-banking institutions in 1999 through a large ADB fund. The ‘success’ in 
getting the CBR documents could not be repeated with the SECP. I repeated my request 
for access to internal SECP documents that could throw light on the level of success of 
the SECP’s attempts to regulate the capital market. The SECP refused. They only gave 
their annual reports which have been used in Chapter 7.  
 
Hence, the level of evidence is less in comparison to the GST/VAT Chapter 6. To 
supplement the SECP case study the thesis considers the listings and delisting of the 
public companies in the Stock Exchange reports. Since the SECP came into power, the 
public listed companies started to delist themselves as they were not happy being 
regulated. This is a crucial empirical finding. I have also conducted in-depth key 
informant interview with someone who was formerly in a very high-up position in the 
SECP. This interview threw light on the SECP’s ‘failures’ which no report could have 
revealed.  He was very knowledgeable and very open source of information, so I have 
used finding from this interview extensively. I also used my interviews with the textiles 
manufacturers regarding corporate governance in Chapter 7. 
 
From within the IFIs, the ADB was most unwilling to share information. The ADB 
funded both the SECP and the Access to Justice Programme (AJP). Repeated requests to 
the ADB, even through informal channels did not yield much. One ADB official was 
however interviewed; however, he did not deal either with the SECP or the AJP. Even 
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after the formal fieldwork, I made repeated requests to the ADB for access to documents 
but never got a response.  
Of the IFIs, the World Bank was most cooperative. Access to their public documents was 
easy and various officials working for the World Bank made themselves available for 
interviews. The IMF has a very small presence within Pakistan despite their funding the 
government. Yet, the IMF was accessible and their public documents were available on 
the internet. Due to lack of cooperation on the behalf of the ADB and the SECP, the 
SECP case study is not as strong as it could have been. Similarly, I could not do a case 
study on the ADB’s judicial reforms due to data not being made available despite many 
attempts. This despite the fact that I had written up the background on judicial reforms 
efforts before the ADB intervention.  
5. General Note about Anonymous Sources: 
Total 91 key informant interviews were conducted for the thesis: 64 from the textiles 
sector and 27 of other stakeholders and government officials. I have kept the names of 
textiles manufacturers, government officials, the IFIs representatives and other 
stakeholders anonymous to follow the research protocols. 
The list of interviews is given at the end of bibliography. 
6. Opertionalisation of terms: the “rule of law” and “caste capitalism” 
 It is important to state how terms such as the “rule of law” and “caste capitalism” are 
being used in the thesis and how they need to be contextualised and the methodological 
difficulties regarding the use of such terms.  
The thesis is looking at the interrelationship between political economy and the rule of 
law in the context of IFIs institutional governance reforms and the textiles sector. It is 
trying to assess how IFIs institutional governance reforms meant to push for the “rule of 
law” in Pakistan are being resisted by the Pakistani capitalists and intermediate classes. 
The thesis labels this resistance as rule-violating behaviour. Such behaviour is part of the 
process of transition of a traditional society to a modern “Weberian” state.  
An obvious criticism of such an approach to contextualise the rule-violating behaviour 
could be to box such an approach in binary constructions of ‘South’ versus ‘North’. In 
other words, a criticism of such an approach could be levelled as follows: the thesis 
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implies that the rule of law is weak in Pakistan and efforts to supplement the rule of law 
by IFIs and to rule-based governance is being resisted by Pakistan capital as if it only 
happens in Pakistan or in the ‘South’ and not in the developed ‘North’? In other words, 
the obvious criticism is that the “rule of law” is resisted and subverted everywhere be it 
‘South’ or ‘North’. Rule-violating behaviour is taking place in the ‘North’ in terms of 
criminality etc; rule-based governance is resisted everywhere and “caste capitalism” or 
accumulation through “social structures of accumulation” (Harriss-White, 2003) takes 
place everywhere be it Pakistan or ‘North’. So what is the specific case that the thesis is 
trying to build for Pakistan? Is it to say that Pakistani capitalists and intermediate classes 
are “bad” and the IFIs are trying to do “good” for Pakistan in a paternalistic manner? It is 
a very serious criticism and needs to be addressed. 
The thesis deals with it by not juxtaposing it as a ‘South’ versus ‘North’ or ‘East’ versus 
‘West’ phenomenon. While, the impersonalised Weberian state being pushed by the IFIs 
possibly does not exist anywhere in the “ideal” form. Yet, it is a historical fact that the 
rule-based governance is established in the ‘North’ as close to the “ideal” type as 
possible. However, it does not mean that rule-violating behaviour, rents generation, 
patronage does not exist in the ‘North’ in some limited form. It also does not mean that 
‘caste capitalism’ is not present in the transnational corporations in the ‘North’. It may 
well be. It is, however, not a concern for the thesis for the reasons listed below: 
1) The thesis is not posed as the ‘North’ versus ‘South’ comparison. It is not making 
an ethical or moral judgement that illegal transfer of property rights and rents 
generation is bad in the ‘South’ while the ‘Northern’ countries work according to 
the rule of law. The thesis makes a clear statement about Pakistan as it is a case 
study of Pakistan. Such a concern will be an issue of methodology for any 
comparative study; 
2) The degree of intensity is also quite relevant here. Even if the rule-violating 
behaviour exists in the ‘North’; even if ‘caste capitalism’ exists in the corporate 
sector of the ‘North’; even if the rule-based governance is being resisted in the 
pockets of the ‘North’; the real issue is the prevalence and degree of intensity. 
Pakistan is amongst the worst tax earners amongst the middle income countries 
of the world. Pakistan’s largest formal manufacturing sector i.e. the textiles is 
dominated by the two castes of Memons and Chiniotis. It is a fact. Not analysing 
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it and not contextualising it in its proper historical specificity is not an option 
either. The thesis looks at Pakistan in the category of group of countries who are 
in the phase of transition towards a modern “Weberian” state. The thesis focuses 
on Pakistan and grapples with the question how is it transitioning towards a 
modern state. It is a valid question to ask. The attempts of Pakistani capitalists 
and intermediate classes to resist and subvert the IFIs ‘reforms’ pushing for the 
rule-based governance is actually an effort to de-intensify legal relations rather 
than intensify legal relations. The level of comparability and congruity with 
similar level or different levels of intensification of legal relations is really a work 
of comparative analysis; something that this thesis does not claim to be carrying 
out. 
Having said that it is still important to qualify how thesis is using the terms like the 
“rule of law” or the “rule-based governance”. The thesis infers these terms on the 
basis of interpretation of the IFIs documents on contemporary Pakistan. IFI 
documents call for ‘government effectiveness’, accountability, transparency, 
increased revenues, justice system reforms, automation of procedures be they 
property records or refunds procedures in General Sales Tax (GST)/Value Added 
Tax (VAT), better accounting methods, well-regulated capital sector and civil service 
reforms. These reforms are meant to establish the “rule of law” essentially for intra-
capital relations, for capital’s relation with the state and better accounting methods 
within the government. They are the institutional governance extension of IFI’s 
larger pro-market neo-liberal agenda. Hence, when the thesis uses the “rule of law”; 
it essentially means the “rule of law” for intra-capital relations and for capital’s 
relationship with the state where there is level playing field for the capital. IFIs’ 
vision of the “rule of law” does not include labour or other dispossessed. There is no 
mention of the enforcement of labour laws or supervision of programmes meant for 
the welfare of labour or extending the formalisation of labour. Though, the justice 
system reforms are meant for everyone particularly when reforms are targeting the 
subordinate judiciary in Pakistan. There is the lip service to poverty reduction and 
growth strategy and the poor being able to get justice or the poor being able to have 
secure property rights. However, the essence of the need for a well-functioning 
justice system lies in where contracts are honoured, so that capitalist relations can 
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prosper and the rule-based governance can take place. It is a specific notion of the 
rule of law. 
The “rule-based governance” is, again, derived from the IFIs documents. It means 
conformity to the “Weberian” notions of a modern state as discussed in Chapter 2. It 
also means that the state and society work according to the rules and regulations by 
providing a level playing field. The rules work in the realm of formality and as a 
phenomenon contribute to the intensification of legal relations and Weberian 
impersonalisation.  
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Chapter 5. Impact of the Structural Adjustment Policies of the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on the Economic and 
Institutional Governance Structures in Pakistan 
This chapter focuses on the role of IFIs and the structural adjustment policies in 
economic management and evolution of institutional and legal structures in Pakistan. Its 
first section reviews key IFIs-driven structural adjustment policies in the realm of 
economy from 1988 onwards. Section two discusses the legal and institutional issues. 
The chapter gives an overview of the economic and institutional governance reforms IFIs 
advocated in Pakistan from 1988 to 2004 in the context of the relationship between the 
political economy and the rule of law. The chapter draws on secondary material and 
primary IFIs documents. The detailed case studies start from the next Chapter 6. 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The structural adjustment programme is essentially a sequence of reforms inspired by the 
neo-liberal school of thinking. Structural adjustment is based on an economic philosophy 
whose main elements are “liberalization, deregulation and privatization” of the economy. 
Structural adjustment policies were first implemented in the industrialized countries in 
the post-1973 oil crisis period to check inflation, tighten monetary and fiscal balance and 
liberalise trade. After their implementation in parts of the developed world, similar 
prescriptions were made for the developing countries. In the 1980s, they were “exported” 
to the developing countries as a panacea for economic problems. These policies had huge 
impact on the economy and politics of developing countries, including Pakistan. They 
aimed to replace the state led economic management with market driven forces (Ghai, 
1992). Therefore, the basic tenet of the structural adjustment programme is a shift of 
focus from government controlled to private sector run economy to reduce fiscal deficit. 
Economic structures in trade, financial, fiscal, monetary sectors underwent a 
liberalization transformation during the structural adjustment (SA) reforms.28 
Foreign aid, particularly from the US, has always played a crucial role in the economic 
development of Pakistan. As mentioned in the Introduction, the liberal industrial credits 
in the 1950s and 1960s and also in the 1980s were bankrolled by US aid. Pakistan’s 
                                                          
28
 These general points are mentioned in most of the literature on SA reforms. 
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impressive growth since the late 1950s would not have been possible without foreign aid. 
This greatly boosted the private sector and import substitution industrialisation: 
“Pakistan’s growth in the 1960s, and the policies pursued were contingent upon the 
country receiving a substantial amount of foreign aid. Once the aid stopped, so did 
growth in the economy” (Zaidi, 2005, pp. 100-101). 
Foreign aid and strategic factors were also important in the political economy of the Zia 
regime (1977-88). During this period, Pakistan earned remittances, particularly from the 
Gulf States, through employment policy started by Bhutto’s government (1972-77). 
Substantial military and economic aid was given by the US due to Pakistan’s role as the 
front-line state in the war in Afghanistan. The aid helped to keep inflation low in the 
1980s and largely kept the middle classes away from joining anti-government political 
alliance (Zaidi, 2005; Sayeed, 1995; Sayeed, 2002; Rizvi, 2000). Foreign aid again 
played an important role in the consumerism-driven economy of the Musharraf regime 
(1999-2008). It was US aid, soft terms of the IFIs lending, and increased foreign 
remittances in the Musharraf era that led to economic growth discussed in Chapter 3. 
The influence of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) needs to be seen in the 
above mentioned context. IFIs, particularly the IMF and the World Bank, dominated 
Pakistan’s economic policy since 1988 under the guise of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes. The core of the structural adjustment regime has been that the IMF 
provides the necessary balance of payments support to Pakistan while imposing strict 
conditionalities on its loans. The IMF’s influence on Pakistan’s economy began in 1980 
through its Extended Fund Facility programme, closely propped by sectoral and 
structural adjustment loans by the World Bank. A more intense Structural Adjustment 
Programme started in 1988. This programme had various requirements for the industrial 
sector: de-regulate decision-making in business, divest public sector corporations’ share 
to the private sector, increase efficiency in the public sector through corporate 
rationalisation, improve incentives to exports, decrease protection to the industrial sector, 
and reduce import barriers and tariffs (Zaidi, 2005). 
The reliance of Pakistan on the World Bank has been quite strong since the 1960s. The 
Bank mediated the negotiations of the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan. 
Similarly, the ADB has long been working with Pakistan on various projects concerning 
infrastructure development. 
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In the 1980s, the economic relationship was broadened between Pakistan and the IFIs in 
the form of structural adjustment reforms due to the fiscal deficit and initiation of 
denationalisation. The stated objectives were to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation, 
privatization, revenue-generation, and tariff reduction. Structural adjustment policies 
advocated measures such as revenue generation through the General Sales Tax (GST), 
exports competitiveness, removal of pricing distortion, and institutional reforms for 
agricultural production (World Bank, Pakistan and the World Bank29). 
The extensive phase of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) can be roughly divided 
into four phases. The first phase (1989-91) steamrolled reforms such as the imposition of 
General Sales Tax (GST), liberalization of exchange rate, imports and share prices, cut in 
government subsidies, regulation of financial institutions, improvement in financial 
reporting, trade liberalization through a cut down in non-tariff barriers and privatisation. 
Most of these policies were implemented in 1991. The second phase (1994-97) 
emphasized revenue generation measures, tightening of government expenditure, 
elimination of tax exemptions, levying income tax on agricultural income, further 
reductions in tariffs, increase in the scope of GST in the Value Added Tax (VAT) mode, 
surge in utility prices and strengthening the regulatory role of the State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP), devaluation and privatisation. The third phase (1997-1999) included the “second 
generation” reforms such as the autonomy of the SBP, enactment of the Banking 
Companies Act for recovery of loans, further reduction in tariffs and devaluation. 
Pakistan tested its nuclear device in 1998, froze foreign currency accounts and lost out 
on the economic front. The fourth phase (1999-2004) further strengthened the SBP’s 
autonomy by making it a part of the constitution. It also focused on the Central Board of 
Revenue (CBR) reforms. Anti-corruption measures through the National Accountability 
Bureau (NAB) were also part of it. There was also collaboration with the Asian 
Development Bank on Access to Justice Programme (AJP). The government also 
participated in a World Bank’s project to improve the government’s audit and accounts 
functions (Zaidi, 1999; World Bank, 2002). 
The SA credit was initially earmarked for short periods i.e. from one to three years and 
the extensions would follow suit. Usually, Pakistan was unable to meet the credit 
conditions and was given only half or less of the sanctioned money by the IMF. In some 
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 The year of publication is not mentioned in this booklet. However, a look inside the book reveals that it 
was published around the mid-1980s. 
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cases, it got close to two-thirds of the sanctioned amount and in others much less than 
even half of it. However, in no instances before 2000, it was able to draw all the 
sanctioned money. So the SA phase that was initially supposed to last for a short period 
to undertake drastic and surgical changes in Pakistan’s economy lasted for fifteen years 
till 2004. The Musharraf government announced non-renewal of the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (PRGF) with the IMF after its expiry in December 2004 
(International Monetary Fund, 2002a). 
 
5.2. Analysis of Structural Adjustment Policies 
Analyses of SA policies are highly loaded. Pro-SA reforms viewpoint that reforms 
should have been carried out a decade earlier in 1980s while the critical SA positions 
also vary from questioning “sequencing of reforms” to substantial criticism.  
 
The SA reforms’ underlying theory is that high fiscal deficit is the cause of most ills of 
the economy. High fiscal deficits were experienced as a result of expansion in the public 
sector since 1970s and it continued till 1990s. Fiscal deficit was financed by bank 
borrowings and it led to high levels of inflation that in turn discouraged “private 
investment” and economic growth suffered. Had governments managed the 
macroeconomic balances better by controlling fiscal deficits, it would have led to higher 
growth levels (Haque and Montiel, 1997). A rather strong pro-SA reforms view is that 
had the financial sector reforms taken place a decade earlier in 1980s rather than in 
1990s, it would have led to financial deepening. Pakistan missed about 5 per cent added 
real output every year by delaying structural adjustment reforms (Hasan and Khan, 
1996).  
Another analysis testing the relationship between SA lending and Pakistan’s 
macroeconomic variables suggests that increase in inflation and lessening of productivity 
had virtually no impact on exports. On the other hand, capital formation and 
government’s “current consumption” increased due to the SA lending (Iqbal, 1994). The 
last point is interesting because the SA lending is directed at decreasing government 
expenditure. However, substantial resources are needed to undertake “structural” 
reforms, so that government consumption increases invariably. 
105 
 
The critical view is that SA policies led Pakistan to an era of “poverty, low growth, low 
savings, and low investment”. One of the prescriptions of SA policies was to liberalise 
interest rates in order to boost savings and narrow the savings-investment gap. Another 
recommendation was to devalue the currency to boost exports. Both these hypotheses did 
not produce the expected results. Shahrukh Khan found no evidence of a link between 
interest rate liberalization and increase in savings, investment and growth. On the other 
hand, apprehensions are that high interest rates might have crippled the small industry by 
increasing the price of capital and making industrial investment unsustainable, 
particularly for the small industries. Moreover, there was no significant increase in 
exports either (Khan, Shahrukh, 1999; Khan, Shahrukh, 1999a; Ahmad, 1999).  
Another strong criticism of SA policies is that the conditions laid out by IFIs 
contradicted each other. High debt servicing ratio and decrease in the revenue was 
compounded by the liberalization measures taken by the government. Doing away of the 
trade and exchange controls cut on the government’s prospects of raising the tax 
revenues. Though, fiscal deficit philosophy focused on reduction of the government’s 
current expenditure and raising revenues (Haque and Montiel, 1997; Ghayur, 2001). It 
seems to have the opposite effect. 
Contradictions in structural adjustment reforms are borne at by the fact that the primary 
IMF condition of cutting down the fiscal deficit conflicts with another IMF condition of 
generating more revenues. Fiscal deficit is cut by tightening government expenditure, 
including government’s expenditure on infrastructure development. Whereas, 
infrastructure investment is critical to push productivity. Tightening government 
expenditure generally results in decreased spending on infrastructural and social 
development. Therefore, cut in the government expenditure brings down the level of 
economic productivity. A decrease in the productivity means that there is less income 
available to tax. Decrease in government expenditure and revenue generation are 
contradictory conditions, at least in the short run (Khan, Shahrukh, 1999; Khan, 
Shahrukh, 1999a; Ahmad, 1999). 
Another SA condition suggested cutting down tariff rates and abolishing non-tariff 
barriers. Again, this condition clashed with the objective of increasing revenue 
collection. Decrease in revenue due to tariff liberalization and cut in import duties had to 
be financed through some other means. It led to generating revenue through indirect 
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taxation. One better way of sequencing SA policies could have been to first reform the 
tax administration and expand its capacity to raise more direct taxes and then cut down 
tariffs and import duties. Similarly, interest rate liberalization had adverse impact on the 
manufacturing sector (Khan, Shahrukh, 1999; Khan, Shahrukh, 1999a; Ahmad, 1999). It 
is interesting to read the admission of mess-up of SA policies in an IMF report: 
“The repeated attempts to stabilize the economy without following through with 
structural reforms pushed the economy in a mire of vicious circles. In particular, 
increased taxation on a shrinking tax base has led to further shrinkage in the tax 
base due to tax evasion and the expansion of the underground economy, calling 
for further hikes in taxation. Sluggish budgetary revenues have led to cuts in 
public investment and production and reinforcing the weakness in revenues. Low 
employment generation by the private sector has been partly compensated for by 
overstaffing in the public sector, which has further depressed its efficiency. 
Double-digit inflation has created the need for nominal depreciation, which has 
fed back into inflation. Declining profitability in the banking system has 
depressed the rate of return on bank deposits, leading to intermediation which in 
turn has led to a further decline in bank profitability. More broadly, the Pakistani 
economy has continued to be trapped in the vicious circle of poverty, low growth, 
low savings, and low investment, which further hampers growth and poverty 
alleviation (emphasis added). Moreover, these structural problems have eroded 
the institutional fabric of the society and contributed to a deterioration in 
governance and in security conditions” (International Monetary Fund, 1997, p. 
5). 
This is by far the most critical comment in the IFI report. The general feedback in IFI 
reports is that the fault lies in the implementation. For example, it is noted that tax 
collection has been spoiled by various concessions and exemptions given by the 
government through Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs). The underlying message is 
that had it not been for these concessions given by the government against the spirit of 
SA policies, the government would have been close to meeting its revenue targets. A 
political economy analysis explaining the rationale for granting SROs-led special 
concessions is missing from the IFIs analysis. 
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It is yet to be determined if these mutually contradictory reforms could have been 
sequenced better. According to a key informant interview, “IFIs were too well aware of 
the contradictions of SA policies… They had come to the conclusion that the only way 
the government is going to reform and put its house in order is if it does not have any  
financing alternatives left” (Interview with an ADB official on June 25, 2004). It partly 
explains why IMF kept on negotiating new Structural Adjustment Facility, Extended 
Structural Adjustment Facility, and Stand-by Arrangement loans. IFIs might have known 
too well that these strict SA conditions cannot be fully implemented. They might have 
wanted to keep the pressure on the government to restructure towards market-oriented 
reforms while not opening the purse strings too generously and making the government 
to make hard choices to fit the bill. 
SA prescribed macroeconomic stabilization and reduction in the fiscal deficit translated 
into cut in the development expenditure, unemployment, movement of labour from the 
formal to the informal and home-based sectors, a substantial reduction in (food, 
agricultural and utilities) subsidies, imposition of recessionary taxes and hike in 
petroleum prices. These measures had a huge impact on the prevalence of poverty. The 
structural adjustment policies hit the poor and labour the most. Removal of subsidies on 
grains and utilities directly affected the poor and curtailed increase in wages. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that poverty increased considerably in the decade of 1990s. It 
increased from 25 per cent of people living below the poverty line in mid-1980s to 39 
per cent people living below the poverty line by end 1990s. The gini-coefficient that 
measures the level of inequality in a country30 went up from 0.34 to 0.41. The poor and 
lower middle classes bore the brunt of hard choices due to the government’s decision to 
drastically cut down the development expenditure. The defence expenditure, though, was 
merely frozen in real terms during the difficult years in the SA phase (Khan, Shahrukh, 
1999; Khan, Shahrukh, 1999a, Kemal, 1994). 
5.3. IFIs and the Institutional Legal Structures 
The SAP has a complex relationship with the legal structures and development of 
capitalism. The IFIs do not favour an import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) policy in 
developing countries. Their main focus is on belt-tightening fiscal and monetary reforms. 
                                                          
30
 The values of gini co-efficient vary from 0.0 to 1.0. The higher the gini coefficient i.e. the more it is 
close to 1.0, the higher the level of inequality in the country.  
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Conditions imposed by SA loans and technical assistance nudge countries towards 
macroeconomic stabilization rather than spending resources on protection of capital and 
intermediate goods industries. Therefore, it is the promotion of well-accounted, well-
managed and fiscally-stable structures that IFIs would like to see established in Pakistan. 
It is a fundamental point to note when looking at the relationship between IFIs and the 
legal structures in Pakistan. The concept of “government effectiveness” in essence 
translates into minimization of government’s role as an effective regulator of 
macroeconomic stabilization and market economy growth policies.  
The World Bank’s 2003-05 31  Pakistan Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 32  gives 
extensive details of the economic-legal structures in Pakistan. The focus is on 
governance issues and strengthening of legal structures. CAS’s section on “Restoring the 
Integrity and Accountability of State Institutions” gives details of the governance related 
reforms undertaken by Pakistan for improving its effectiveness. The primary economic 
governance institutions listed in CAS are the Central Board of Revenue (CBR), the 
Central Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the Auditor General and Comptroller of Accounts, the 
judicial system, police and the civil service. The performance of these institutes is judged 
by their ability in “public financial management, accountability, and increased 
transparency and information” (World Bank, 2002, p. 9). Privatization is also linked to 
governance issues in terms of its ability to check rent-seeking and corruption. Similarly, 
the ADB’s Country Strategy and Program focuses on the governance issues, tax 
reforms, civil service reforms and support for the devolution programme (World Bank, 
2002; Asian Development Bank, 2003a). 
The IFIs documents set the parameters for the “second generation reforms”. These 
reforms essentially focus on the state’s ability to earn its revenues through reforms in the 
tax structures, enable the Central Bank to monitor government’s borrowing 
independently, and improve its accounting capabilities. They also call for the devolution 
of power at the local level, and passage of Freedom of Information Act to improve 
transparency. The ADB attempted to implement an extensive Access to Justice 
Program 33 . The overall focus shifted to soft and sophisticated issues of economic 
                                                          
31
 Though, it was published in 2002. 
32 IFIs documents do not give details of their conditionalities attached in IMF and World Bank agreements. 
They only discuss the developments that take place in the member country in the context of their interests.  
33 It largely failed to reach its objectives. 
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governance from financial tight-belting centred first generation SA reforms. However, 
the focus on tax collection is common in the first and second generation reforms.  
The relationship between legal structures34 and economic institutions is quite complex in 
the context of structural adjustment policies of the IFIs. Although, the overarching 
ideology is the minimisation of state’s role and maximization of the market regulated 
economy, yet two dialectical trends are discernible regarding the IFI’s relationship with 
the emergence of the legal structures: 
1) The IFIs advocate legal structures that enhance an authentic recording, 
documentation, compilation, and dissemination of data on economic interactions. 
They also promote autonomy and independence of institutes that can play the role 
of a watch-dog. They support enactment of legislation and the “rule of law” to 
ensure “government effectiveness” regarding revenue generation and improved 
taxation, modernized audit and accounts institution, regulation of government 
borrowing, supervision of prudential regulations of banks through an autonomous 
central bank, oversight of the public and private companies by a securities 
regulatory body, accountability through a permanent national bureau and access 
to information through enactment of the Freedom of Information Ordinance; 
2) On the other hand, IFIs prescribe reduction, minimization and possible 
elimination of legal structures that were introduced by the state in its central 
planning phase of economic management. They wanted to end the government’s 
role in levying import and custom duties, granting import licenses, issuing tax 
and other exemptions, concessions, and holidays through Statutory Regulatory 
                                                          
34 The World Bank’s priorities for “Government Effectiveness” are also listed in the formulation of its 
Millennium Development Goals in which the “effectiveness” is linked with “macro stability, fiscal reform, 
governance reform and devolution” and Business Climate is linked to “political/macro stability, 
incentive/regulatory regime for power, oil, gas and ICT (Information and Communication Technology), 
financial services, infrastructure services, manufacturing and services, agriculture and water” and pro-poor 
growth is linked with “education reform, health reform, rural development, gender equity and social 
protection.” In terms of strategizing itself in various categories, the Bank identifies its various priorities 
along the contours of its level of “engagement”. Taking the lead from the government’s commitment and 
policies, the “Areas of Deep Engagement” are “economic management and financial governance, 
including technical and financial assistance to the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the Comptroller General 
of Accounts (CGA), the Auditor General’s Office (AG), support for the reforms of the Central Board of 
Revenue, the civil service, investment climate (including support to reform the governance and regulatory 
environment for power, gas, oil, financial sector, pricing and tariff reforms, and privatization), provincial 
and district governments reforms, education, health, water management and rural development, district 
services, and community infrastructure. Among “Reformed” and “High” on the list are “financial public 
goods” (World Bank, 2002, pp. 13-19). 
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Ordinances (SROs),  recording foreign exchange movement etc. IFIs advocated 
dismantling of those rules and laws that augment the powers of government 
whether discretionary or otherwise. They justified it on the grounds of reducing 
rent-seeking, checking abuse of government’s discretionary powers, promoting 
effective governance and transparency. 
 
It is important to understand these dialectical trends in the IFIs policies regarding the role 
of law in economy. These trends are not mutually exclusive. They often co-exist. The 
thesis contends, as stated earlier, that IFIs want the “rule of law” for intra-capital 
relations on the one hand and for capital’s relation with the state on the other. Their 
conception of the “rule of law” and “government effectiveness” is based on the 
conceptions of the rule-based governance where capital operates on the principle of 
playing level playing field based on rules and where there is sanctity of contract.  
It is worthwhile to look at the government’s viewpoint on the relationship between law 
and economic structures. The significance of the legal structures for economic growth 
was strongly emphasized in an article on “Legal Framework for Economic Development 
in Pakistan” posted on the government’s website:,  
“Economic development does not take place in a vacuum. It requires an enabling 
environment, which includes a proper legal and regulatory framework (emphasis 
added). The Government plans to lay down such an orderly framework for 
carrying out its economic reforms... the Government has… formulated an 
extensive legislative agenda cutting across various sectors of the economy, 
including the banking and financial sectors, commerce and industry sectors, 
energy sector, information technology sector, social sector, and last but not the 
least the administrative and judicial system” (Hassan, 2000, p. 1).  
The government’s vision of the legal structure needed for economic reforms is similar to 
the need of “government effectiveness” drummed by IFIs in their reports. It reflects a 
clear alignment of the government’s position with the IFIs or the latter’s influence on the 
former, at least in terms of the stated policies. 
Just like the above quote from the government’s source, the emphasis in the World 
Bank’s report is on “government effectiveness” through transparency and fair play. It 
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recommends improvement in the CBR functional operations, introduction of fiscal 
framework, reactivation of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), institutionalization of 
the accountability process through a permanent accountability bureau, a comprehensive 
financial accountability of the processes of budget making, reforms in financial 
reporting, accounting, auditing, corporate governance and civil service (World Bank, 
2002).  
As stated earlier, the issues identified in the World Bank document are the same as by 
the government. The difference is in the emphasis. For example, the government has 
followed the re-activation of PAC. The IFIs good governance recommendations had to 
negotiate through the ground realities during the process of implementation. For 
example, the PAC banned entry of journalists in its meeting in July 2004. The political 
governments since 1988 did not take PAC seriously and according to one estimate 
around “550 audit reports containing 28000 audit paras against those governments are 
still pending with the PAC since 1988” (Klasra, 2004). These pending reports concern 
politicians from both the treasury and opposition benches (Klasra, 2004). The IFIs much-
trumpeted transparency cannot be ensured through memorandums of understanding 
signed by the government only. The IFIs prescriptions do not take into account the 
prevalent power structures, the distribution and configuration of power, hence, they do 
not properly analyse the active and passive resistance to their reforms.  
In the Bank’s vision, the role of government is to act as a regulator only and not 
intervene or plan the economy. This vision is not in consonance with the state-led 
planning and industrialization model that was pursued in Pakistan in the 1960s. While, 
there was little mention of growth in large-scale manufacturing in the World Bank 
documents, the emphasis was on regulations. The structural adjustment rationale of the 
IFIs advocates monetary and fiscal balance as the panacea. They also advocate the legal 
and regulatory framework for economic management. They do not focus on the 
industrial productivity and transition to dynamic capitalism. Instead, their emphasis is on 
fiscal management, government effectiveness, and financial accountability. 
The IFIs’ vision in the realm of law is on documentation, recoding, accounting of 
economic activities. This is to change the nature of the informal economy to a formal one 
by bringing it on record. Recommended measures such as financial regulation and 
accountability, documentation of economy, limiting state’s discretionary powers point to 
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a framework where the government is deprived of its discretionary powers to distribute 
patronage. IFIs advocate an economic management and “good governance” paradigm. 
IFIs formulated rule-based reforms do not focus on the need to balance between the 
political and economic structures that can allow growth to take place.  
Conclusion 
The IFIs promoted structural adjustment policies that focused on fiscal, monetary, 
exchange, and trade sectors, particularly from 1988 onwards. The main thrust of the 
reforms has been stabilization, i.e. cut the fiscal deficit, generate revenues and tighten 
government’s expenditure. These policies called for reducing the government’s role in 
running the economy and promoting the market-led alternative. The salient features of 
the reforms were tariffs, foreign exchange, and interest rate liberalization, cut in 
subsidies, increase revenue generation and reduction in the fiscal deficit.  
The IFIs focus shifted from macroeconomic stabilization (the hallmark of the initial 
structural adjustment period) to issues of economic and financial governance by the mid-
1990s. The legal structures advocated by IFIs went hand in glove with the first 
generation of economic reforms, some of which were still in the process of 
implementation. Deregulation and privatization were mentioned time and again in 
governance reforms. The rationale was that it would decrease the potential for rent-
seeking and boost market-oriented private investment. 
Other measures of second generation reforms were the autonomy of the State Bank of 
Pakistan; establishment of regulatory bodies in the vital sectors of economy; setting up of 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan; enactment of laws and ordinances 
related to accountability; improvement in the audits and accounts. This regulatory 
paraphernalia was needed to steer the stabilization and economic reforms. 
The SA policies have been criticized for bad “sequencing” of reforms which caused an 
adverse impact on the poor and lower middle class groups. The SA reforms were often 
contradictory. Devaluations and low interest rates did not lead to growth of exports. Cut 
in government expenditure did not decrease the budget deficit or avert foreign exchange 
crises. Cut in tariffs did not increase the government’s revenues. Implementation of the 
SA policies is as much an ideological issue as an economic or political one.  
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The main problem with economic management and governance model is that it is being 
superimposed on the socio-economic and political structures that are not in harmony 
with it. It explains the resistance being put up to almost the IFIs prescribed reforms 
ranging from audit and accounting, taxation, civil service to eliminating exemptions. The 
IFIs reports interpret such resistance as an expression of political clout of certain interest 
groups who benefit from the status-quo. Resistance is equated with bad politics as 
opposed to the clean implementation of the rule-based management. Such resistance is 
certainly political and it does favour certain groups and factions at the cost of others. It 
is, however, rooted in the socio-economic and political structures of developing countries 
like Pakistan. Therefore, it is important to understand those underlying power structures, 
the distribution of power in the society, politics of patronage and the processes of rent 
creation as discussed in Chapter 2. 
The contestation between the forces who indulge in the rule-violating behaviour and the 
regime of rule-based governance is explored in the case study chapters to follow. 
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Chapter 6. General Sales Tax in Pakistan: Resistance to 
Implementation 
 
The chapter begins with a brief global overview of the Value-Added Tax. It is followed 
by a discussion on the General Sales Tax (GST) in a Value-Added Mode (VAT) in 
Pakistan. Refunds system and resistance to it is discussed thereafter. It is followed by an 
analysis of the tax administration’s internal documents. The scale and extent of the tax 
evasion is discussed towards the end.  
 
The General Sales Tax (GST) was enforced in a Value-Added Tax (VAT) mode in 
Pakistan in 1990 to fulfil an important conditionality of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment 
Loan. To study the relationship between the political economy and the rule of law, a case 
study of the General Sales Tax (in a Value-Added Tax mode) is an apt pointer to 
understand the contemporary taxation measures in Pakistan. Harriss-White (2003) calls 
tax evasion a form of subsidy. We analyse IMF’s proposed General Sales Tax 
(GST)/Value-Added Tax (VAT) in terms of contestation over fiscal space between the 
forces who promote the rule-based governance and those who resist it. This chapter is 
based on primary documents, tax officials’ and textile manufacturers’ interviews, and 
secondary material. The chapter reviews the GST/VAT since 1990 with a particular 
focus on the 1999 to 2004 period.  
 
How does VAT work? Output tax minus Input tax. Only value addition is taxed. Section 
7 of the Sales Tax Act in Pakistan discusses in detail how VAT is supposed to work. 
Sales tax “be levied and collected on the difference between the value of supply for 
which the goods are acquired and the value of supply for which the goods are supplied”. 
It is levied on “taxable supplies” by deducting input tax from output tax (Central Board 
of Revenue, 2005, Sales Tax Act 1990).  
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Table 6.1: Function of VAT 
 
Here is an example of Comprehensive VAT: 
Stage of 
Production 
and 
Distribution 
(A) 
Value of 
Sales 
(Rs/Unit) 
(B) Cost of 
Intermediate 
Goods 
(Rs/unit) 
(C) 
Value 
Added 
(A-B) 
(D) VAT 
(10% of 
C) 
(Rs/unit) 
(E) Sales 
Tax (10% 
of A) 
(Rs/unit) 
(F) Tax 
Credit for 
VAT paid 
on 
Intermediate 
Good 
(Rs/unit) 
(G) Total 
VAT 
payable 
(E-F) 
(Rs/unit) 
Cotton 24 0 24 2.4 2.4 0 2.4 
Ginning 33 24 9 0.9 3.3 2.4 0.9 
Spinning 60 33 27 2.7 6.0 3.3 2.7 
Cloth 90 60 30 3.0 9.0 6.0 3.0 
Retail 100 90 10 1.0 10.0 9.0 1.0 
Total   100 10.0 30.7 20.7 10.0 
 
Source: Lahore University of Management Sciences, 1990. 
 
6.1. Brief Global Overview 
It is worthwhile to briefly review the global picture on VAT before focusing on Pakistan. 
VAT has been in place for over 50 years in the world. It was first implemented in France 
in 1954 and it is being levied in more than 66 countries particularly since 1990 (Bird and 
Gendron, 2007; Fathi and Esmaeilian, 2012). 
 
VAT was first introduced in the European Union (EU). The “real” operational VAT is 
closer to the EU model. The role of the IMF has been crucial in the in the adoption of 
VAT by many developing and transition economies (Bird and Gendron, 2007).  
 
For developing and transitional economies, it is better to have a high threshold of VAT. 
For small firms, the compliance cost is high. Other problems with VAT are refunds 
fraud, fragile registration procedure and inadequate audit. It is considered better to start 
with a fresh VAT rather than overhauling an existing one. New VAT machinery can be 
established, from the scratch, in three years (Bird and Gendron, 2007). 
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The “self-controlling” feature of VAT is distinguishing where “payers of each successive 
way of VAT are claimants of paying other levels of tax” (Fathi and Esmaelian, 2012, p. 
2). However, when the trade is happening between registered and non-registered 
suppliers, such “self-controlling” mechanisms do not work too well. Data of 17 OECD 
countries from 1987 suggests that more expenditure on tax administration, low rate of 
VAT, extended period for VAT implementation and less “non-zero rates” improve 
collection of VAT overall. Data from 44 countries from 1970 to 1999 suggests that 
political factors such as stability and political participation have an influence on the 
efficiency of VAT (Fathi and Esmaeilian, 2012).  
 
In Egypt, VAT was introduced in 1991. Initially, it only applied to importers and 
manufacturers. Egypt later tried to expand VAT to the retail trade and wholesale. This 
led to too many small firms getting registered without a corresponding increase in the 
revenues thereby putting burden on the VAT administration (Bird and Gendron, 2007). 
 
Fraud and tax evasion of VAT has increased in the recent years. It is not easy to find a 
direct relationship between the rate of VAT and tax evasion as Spain, Italy and Greece 
have more than 20 percent tax evasion, one of the highest in the European Union while 
Denmark, Netherlands and Britain have only 5 percent tax evasion which is the lowest in 
the European Union. However, Denmark has the highest rate of VAT. Hence, the 
relationship between tax rate and tax evasion is not “decisive and definite” (Fathi and 
Esmaeilian, 2012, pp.3-4). 
 
VAT was introduced in Greece in 1987 to regulate its indirect taxation after it joined the 
European Economic Council in early 1980s. Agapitos is of the view that the VAT 
evasion is more than 45 per cent in Greece. He also states that “less organized 
economies” have more tax evasion. By “less organized” Agapitos probably means less 
documented economies or economies where the rule of law is weak. He also explores the 
relationship between the direct and indirect taxation. According to him, the chances of 
tax evasion are higher in direct taxation rather than indirect taxation such as the VAT 
where authorities can detect tax evasion (Agapitos, 1999).  
 
Agapitos mentions quite a few reasons for VAT tax evasion. However, other than the 
significant number of self-employed tax-payers and the nature of small businesses, none 
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of the other is really specific to VAT.  Reasons such as lack of good public services, 
incompetence of tax authorities, high tax rates, excessive regulations, lack of automation, 
obscure rules etc are generally applicable to taxation in general and need not be specific 
to VAT (Agapitos, 1999).  
 
Another critical issue for the implementation of VAT is to minimize the exemptions and 
“zero-rating”. Zero-rating means where you get refunds on your input tax and the output 
tax is zero. While imports are taxed and exports are generally zero-rated. Again, there are 
great variations. In Ireland, zero-rating is applicable to 12 percent of goods and services 
while in the UK, zero-rating applies to one-fifth of all transactions. Jamaican VAT, 
introduced in 1991, initially functioned with quite a few exemptions. Later on, Jamaica 
minimized them in the comprehensive reforms in 2003 (Bird and Gendron, 2007). 
 
A major advantage of the VAT is the “self-enforcing” mechanism where each level of 
production and distribution gets documented by adjusting for output tax against the input 
tax. Since the transaction is between a seller and buyer, there is, therefore, more in-built 
check in the system as fraud requires both parties to be involved. In the case of VAT 
evasion, a “shell” company can be created that sells to itself and creates fraudulent 
invoices. Moreover, in fraudulent invoices, the value of exports could be increased 
through fraud. Exports that might not have taken place are falsely accounted for. Fake 
invoices is not only a refunds issue, it points to a deeper problem with the tax 
administration itself (Bird and Gendron, 2007). 
 
6.2. The General Sales Tax in Pakistan 
Sales tax has been operating in the country in non-VAT mode since 1948. The roots of 
the GST go back to the Government of India Act 1935 where the states/provinces had the 
right to levy sales tax on goods and the federal government on services. The Constituent 
Assembly of Pakistan reversed this order in 1948 and made the federal government 
responsible for a turnover style sales tax. In 1948, minimum turnover tax was set greater 
than Rs 5,000 and there were protests against this tax. A correction was made in 1951 
and the Sales Tax Act was made applicable to consumption only. Taxation of Goods 
Order 1960 applied the sales tax to goods trading and manufacturing as well (Ahmad, 
Ehtisham, 2010; Ahmad, Shahid,  2004; Pasha, 1995; Lahore University of Management 
Sciences, 1990).  
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The federal government was made responsible for the sales tax on goods and the 
provinces were given the power to implement sales tax on services in the 1973 
Constitution. Earlier, the income tax department was also responsible for administering 
the sales tax. However, General Zia’s government made amendments in the sales tax in 
1981 and 1982 and made the central excise department responsible for the sales tax. 
There were, however, massive exemptions granted till the Sales tax was changed into 
VAT mode in 1990. The extent of exemptions in pre-VAT mode were such the National 
Tax Reform Commission in its report in 1986 reported that had it not been for 
exemptions, tax receipts of Rs 4.6 billion would have been Rs 40 billion. Government of 
Pakistan signed the structural adjustment programme with the IMF in November 1988 
and agreed to replace the prevalent sales tax with General Sales Tax in a VAT mode. 
IMF sense of “compulsion” was used for the implementation of VAT. In 1990, for the 
first time, a VAT style General Sales Tax was enacted. In 1993, Pakistan agreed with the 
IMF to broaden the base of sales tax and income tax and cutting down tariffs. It led to 
confrontation with traders of the country and business community. It was levied at goods 
at the manufacturing stage and on imports. Manufacturing goods had many exemptions 
given. GST was changed into a proper VAT in 1995-96. It was levied on imports in 1997 
and on wholesale and retail in 1998 and on services in 2000 (Ahmad, Ehtisham, 2010; 
Ahmad, Shahid, 2004; Pasha, 1995; Lahore University of Management Sciences, 1990).  
 
GST was levied at the rate of 12.5 percent in 1990 but was later increased to 15 percent. 
Tax was defined as follows “...there shall be charged, levied and paid a tax known as 
sales tax at the rate of fifteen per cent... Taxable supplies made by a registered person in 
the course or furtherance of any taxable activity carried on by him; and goods imported 
into Pakistan” (Central Board of Revenue, 2005, Section 1, Sales Tax Act 1990). 
 
Registration is a requirement according to the Section 14 of the Sales Tax Act. Any 
manufacturer whose annual turnover is more than Rs two and half million and any 
retailer whose supplies are more than Rs one million is required to register with the Sales 
Tax authorities. Other than importers, wholesale dealers and distributors are also 
required to register. Registered persons are required to file monthly returns according to 
Section 26. There is also a provision for retail tax return. Book keeping and invoicing 
requirements are mentioned in Sections 22 and 23. Keeping records of goods purchased 
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and supplied is needed at registered offices, including records of zero-rated and 
exempted supplies. Similarly, details of tax invoices are also required to be maintained. 
Tax invoice has details of the person to whom the invoice is issued (Central Board of 
Revenue, 2005, Sales Tax Act 1990).   
 
The tax is zero-rated on exports as per Section 4 of the Act. To discourage fake invoices 
of exports it clearly states that “nothing in this section shall apply in respect of a supply 
of goods which have been entered for export under Section 131 of the Customs Act, 
1969 (IV of 1969), but are not exported” (Central Board of Revenue, 2005, Sales Tax Act 
1990). This emphasis in the law could not deter fake or flying invoices, discussed in 
detail later in this chapter. 
 
Certain rules were used to increase the documentation and registration compliance for 
the Sales Tax. According to Section 7, a distinction was made between taxable and non-
taxable activities: “If a registered person deals in taxable and non-taxable supplies, he 
can reclaim only such proportion of the input tax as is attributable to taxable supplies”. 
Other than that a condition was laid out that only a registered person shall be able to 
claim input tax: “No person other than a registered person shall make any deduction or 
reclaim input tax in respect of taxable supplies made or to be made by him” (Central 
Board of Revenue, 2005, Sales Tax Act 1990).  
 
Section 21 (2) of the Sales Tax Act blacklists a registered person or suspends his 
registration if he is found to be indulgent in fake invoices or tax evasion and/or fraud. 
However, it seems as if drafters of Sales Tax Act were aware of problems they were 
likely going to face in its compliance. Section 26AA states: “Notwithstanding the 
penalties prescribed in section 33, if a registered retailer wishes to file a revised return 
voluntarily along with deposit of the amount of tax short paid or amount of tax evaded 
along with additional tax, whenever it comes to his notice, before receipt of notice of 
audit, no penalty shall be recovered from him” (Central Board of Revenue, 2005, Sales 
Tax Act 1990). It seems as if the drafters of the Act  were desperately trying to encourage 
a compliance with the Sales Tax Act by taking into the account the challenges they were 
likely to face. 
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The secondary literature on VAT is categorical about it being imposed to replace the 
revenue lost due to trade liberalisation in developing countries (Bird and Gendron, 2007; 
Ahmad, Ehtisham, 2010). The same scenario fits the Pakistan since 1990. Tariffs were 
brought down from 125 per cent in 1990-9135 to 25 per cent in the late 1990s under the 
Structural Adjustment Programme that Pakistan signed with the IMF. International trade 
taxes were a major source of revenue in the form of customs duty. Tariffs came down to 
80 per cent in 1993-94, 65 per cent in 1995-96. By end 1990s, there were four slabs of 5 
per cent, 10 per cent, 20 per cent and 25 per cent applicable with maximum rate being 25 
per cent. With decrease in tariffs, there was a need for another revenue source to 
compensate the revenue lost. VAT styled Sales Tax was designed to fill that gap (Central 
Board of Revenue, 2004; Pasha, 1995; Central Board of Revenue, 2003a; Central Board 
of Revenue, 2001).  
Table 6.2: Tax/GDP Ratio Direct Taxes 
 
Year Income Tax Other Direct Taxes Total Direct Taxes 
1998-99 3.5% 0.24%  3.75% 
1999-00 3.35%  0.24% 3.59% 
2000-01 3.43% 0.21% 3.64% 
2001-02 3.76% 0.16% 3.93% 
2002-03 3.62% 0.16% 3.78% 
Source: Central Board of Revenue, 2004, CBR Yearbook 2002-03 
 
Table 6.3: Tax/GDP Ratio Indirect Taxes 
 
Year Customs Central Excise Sales Tax Total Indirect 
Taxes 
1998-99 2.22% 2.07%  2.45% 6.75% 
1999-00 1.96%  1.77% 3.71% 7.44% 
2000-01 1.90% 1.43% 4.49% 7.82% 
2001-02 1.32% 1.30% 4.59% 7.21% 
2002-03 1.71% 1.11% 4.86% 7.68% 
                                                          
35
 In mid-1980s, tariffs were as high as 225 per cent. They were brought down to 125 per cent in 1990-91 
and then reduced further. 
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Source: Central Board of Revenue, 2004, CBR Yearbook 2002-03 
 
GST replaced import tariffs. High tariffs protected the domestic manufacturer. The share 
of import duties decreased from being 40.8 per cent of total taxes in 1991 to 15.9 per 
cent in 2001. It was replaced with the GST whose share in total taxes rose from 16.6 per 
cent to 38.3 per cent during the same period. Import duties to GDP ratio decreased from 
4.82 per cent to 1.86 per cent from 1991 to 2001 while sales tax to GDP ratio increased 
from 1.96 per cent to 4.49 per cent during the same period. The tax drive effort made 
during the 1990s can be seen as offsetting the impact of cutting down of import duties 
rather than raising the overall tax to GDP ratio significantly (Fatima and Ahmed, 2001).  
 
Pasha illustrates the role of IMF in imposing the GST in Pakistan: 
“... it appears that the pace of implementation of the reform has been artificially 
increased by the presence of IMF conditionalities. Consequently, the broad-
basing is taking place without adequate strengthening of the tax department, 
proper survey, registration and education of tax payers and printing and 
circulation of forms” (Pasha, 1995, p. 20). 
 
The World Bank followed the taxation cue from the IMF by launching $120 million 
large loan by late 1990s to reform the taxation system and establish an integrated 
revenue collection mechanism. The World Bank programme on tax reforms was for eight 
years and it was meant to institute an automated refunds system (Ahmad, Ehtisham, 
2010; World Bank, 2008). It had, however, only limited success.  
 
With decrease in the high tariffs, domestic manufacturers were double exposed to 
challenges: 1) through facing international competition with low duties, 2) by 
maintaining registration requirements due to imposition of the GST. It had adverse 
effects on domestic industrial production as domestic producers had to face the 
competition from imported goods and they also had to pay sales tax and withholding tax 
(Fatima and Ahmed, 2001). Although GST was passed on to consumers, it still required 
registration, monthly returns, book-keeping and tax invoicing details which could enable 
tax authorities to assess income level of manufacturer and/or retailer and thereby help 
them to impose a more accurate income tax on them. Hence, there was resistance from 
manufacturers, traders and retailers to the GST. 
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Pasha (1995) and Ehtisham Ahmad (2010) make an interesting point. According to them, 
GST is a tax on consumption where all the input tax paid is adjusted against the output 
tax. Hence, it actually favours manufacturers in the formal sector as their inputs are paid 
back. This is based on the assumption that their final products are sold in the formal 
sector where GST is levied. Both Pasha and Ahmad are of the opinion that GST is 
resisted by the manufacturers, traders and retailers as it documents the economy by 
mapping the audit trail which in turn could show their true income and make them liable 
to a proper income tax. Despite the fact that GST taxes the consumption, manufacturers 
and wholesalers/retailers opposed it. Another reason for opposition to the GST is the 
compliance cost. Due to self-policing mechanism of the sales tax, compliance cost for 
the manufacturers and wholesalers/retailers is high because they have to maintain proper 
records (Pasha, 1995; Ahmad, Ehtisham, 2010). This is a powerful argument not fully 
explored in the literature on VAT. For this reason, Pakistani manufacturers prefer 
exemptions (where there is no paper trail) over zero-rating (where there is paper trail) 
despite the fact that the latter is more beneficial to them.  
 
Resistance by manufacturers, traders and retailers to the documentation of economy by 
GST is actually a resistance to the regime of rule-based governance. Despite the fact that 
they do not need to pay out of their own pockets, they still resisted VAT tooth and nail. 
They did not want documentation that comes with the VAT package. A proper 
documentation would show true scale of their businesses and they might be asked to pay 
income tax as per their real income level. That would in turn take away the hidden 
subsidy of under-taxation. It could cut into the massive income tax evasion. Resistance to 
GST is actually a resistance to IFI’s rule-based governance reforms. 
 
Pasha (1995) states that the resistance to GST could be seen in terms of the contestation 
between the winners and losers of the reforms. The losers had organisational power to 
form a coalition to resist the imposition of the GST:  
“The experience with reforms of the GST demonstrates how an effective 
coalition of potential losers can be organized in the presence of weak support for 
the reform from potential gainers due primarily to the dispersed, uncertain nature 
and uneven distribution of gains and of agents of state who have demonstrated 
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some lack of vision, commitment and preparedness of the reform” (Pasha, 1995, 
p. 20). 
 
Ehtisham Ahmad (2010) also mentions the role of “interest groups” who resist the GST. 
In Ahmad’s view, the tax administration resists reforms because it cuts their rents while 
the “interest groups” resist it because they want to avoid documentation. The thesis is of 
the view that “interest groups” is somewhat of a misnomer in the case of the GST. It is 
better to call a spade a spade. Pakistani manufacturers, exporters, retailers, wholesalers 
and traders resist the GST. In other words, both the capitalist class and intermediate 
classes resist rule-based governance and revenue generation. In the case of the GST, they 
not only dodge the GST but also resist documentation of economy that could in turn 
make them liable for a proper income tax evaluation.  
 
6.3. Resistance to GST through Subverting the Refunds 
Preceding the discussion on how the process of refunds actually worked in Pakistan and 
resisted, we briefly review the textile manufacturers’ views about the refunds process. 
These tie in with the broader picture of the resistance to the GST implementation. 
 
Textiles manufacturers’ interviews show that a majority of them were opposed to their 
funds getting stuck in the refunds process. They were of the view that since textiles 
sector exports and exports are zero-rated. There is little rationale in paying an input tax 
and getting their funds stuck in the refunds process. They stated that it led to them facing 
the liquidity crunch. Hence, there is no reason to pay input tax in the first place36.  
 
G, an owner of the medium textiles mill in Faisalabad complained about the time and 
energy of the staff spent in dealing with formalities of laws such as the GST (G, Textiles 
Mill, Interview). Another point made by an owner of a small textiles mill in Faisalabad 
was that GST implementation is difficult since the retail sector is largely unregistered for 
the tax. According to him, there is a need to get the entire retail sector registered. 
Governments have tried this but with little success. The manufacturers do not need to 
hide their account books, if the end user is registered (S, Textiles Mill, Interview). Non-
                                                          
36 This refunds reimbursement and its impact on business finances and refunds fraud is also mentioned by 
Bird and Gendron (2007) in the literature that came after the fieldwork.  
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registration of local suppliers needed to pay the tax echoed in the interview with the chief 
financial officer of a large company in Lahore (N, Weaving Mill, Interview).  
 
As the Methodology Chapter states, it was possible to get access to some internal CBR 
documents entitled “Explanatory Circulars 1998-2004” (Central Board of Revenue, 
1998-2004). An internal summary of the Sales Tax Wing in the Central Board of 
Revenue (CBR) showed that government earned only Rs 4.4 billion as the net sales tax 
from the textile sector in 2003-04. Total collection was 44.5 billion while refund paid to 
the textile sector was Rs 40.182 billion. Key informant interviews with Sales Tax 
officials revealed that the government was actually losing out in sales tax refunds. The 
officials’ statements were more serious than what the documents37 showed. As a result, 
the CBR decided to declare ginned cotton as zero-rated in 2004 and was actively 
considering to declare yarn to be zero-rated. It was done on the basis that the government 
was actually losing out money through its payment for refunds. Many fake and “flying” 
invoices were submitted to the CBR. They were invoices of exports which either never 
took place or their value was inflated38. Though, Ehtisham Ahmad (2010) and the World 
Bank report on taxation (2008) link it to the “dummy” companies being set up just to 
claim the fraudulent refunds. On the basis of the fieldwork, we are of the view that fake 
and “flying” invoices were not only submitted by the “dummy” companies but that the 
genuine companies were also inflating the value of their exporters.  
 
Here is an illustration of how fake invoices work. Business A claims having exported 
printed cloth worth Rs 5 million and claiming input tax of Rs 450,000 at the rate of 15 
per cent on 3 million of grieg cloth that he purchased from B. In reality, A did not 
purchase the stated grieg cloth from B. Neither was there an export of the stated printed 
cloth. It is possible that A actually purchased grieg cloth of only Rs 1 million and 
exported printed cloth of worth Rs 2.5 million. In both instances, A created fake invoices 
to prove the claim for the input adjustment. Unless the Sales Tax Directorate was able to 
actually trace having received the claimed input tax, it lost revenue by refunding more 
money than it received:  
 
                                                          
37
 Though later in the Chapter, another internal written document also states that the government is losing 
out more money in refunds than earning in tax receipts. 
38 It is also mentioned by Bird and Gendron (2007). 
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“These people are quite evil genius. So they started thinking about how to exploit 
the loophole to make money for themselves. They registered themselves for the 
sales tax and showed that they were registered and made a fake sales receipt. 
Some exporters set up fake company names and make their yarn purchase 
invoices out of these fake companies to claim refund” (G, Textiles Mill, 
Interview). 
 
Linked to the phenomenon of the fake and “flying” invoices is the issue of manufacturer-
exporter versus the commercial exporter as it was discovered during the fieldwork of the 
textiles sector. Manufacturers export their own products while the commercial exporters 
process orders for others. In the textiles sector, commercial exporters often do not have 
their own set up. Customers place orders for the processing of grieg cloth against the 
payment (O, Silk Company, Interview).  
 
“Commercial exporter is like a trader; he gets an order, picks up yarn from 
somewhere, gets cloth made at a third place, gets it printed or dyed at the fourth 
place and then exports it. The phenomenon of fake or flying invoices of the Sales 
Tax is linked with commercial exporters. Since commercial exporters do not have 
a regular premises, they can get fake invoices against the number of containers to 
be exported and reclaim sales tax without having actually exported the goods 
claimed” (G, Textiles Mill, Interview).  
 
In vertically integrated textiles units, it is not easy to hide purchases and sales, whereas 
commercial exporters can hide their sales figures (S, Textiles Mill, Interview).  
 
“The trading companies can fold up their business and go somewhere else. The 
commercial exporters often do not have a permanent address; they can also easily 
manipulate the sales tax law. They can send empty containers abroad and fill out 
fake invoices and claim sales tax refunds” (G, Textiles Mill, Interview).  
 
It again shows, as pointed out in the literature (Bird and Gendron, 2007), that VAT 
works better with the formal sector. The more formal and established the sector is, the 
more manageable is to apply VAT. As stated earlier, a well functioning VAT with 
minimal exemptions discourages the informal sector. 
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Refunds fraud is a classic VAT problem (Bird and Gendron, 2007). A few textile 
manufacturers openly admitted that refunds fraud takes place in collusion with the Sales 
Tax authorities. A textile manufacturer B belonging to a textile mills association was of 
the opinion that the Sales Tax Directorate in collusion with businesses allow the setting 
up of dummy companies and entertain fake refunds (B, All Pakistan Textile Mills 
Association, Interview). The fieldwork was conducted in 2004 but this view of the CBR 
being part of the tax evasion was later also confirmed by Ehtisham Ahmad (2010). He 
argues that FBR39 (new name for CBR) does not want taxation reforms to succeed as it 
would cut down their rents.  
 
Those textiles manufacturers who were not part of the fake refunds racket suffered. Their 
competitors were able to under-price their products due to the extra income received 
through the fake refunds. C, an owner of a large textiles mill in Karachi was of the view 
that the factories take more refunds and then sell their goods at lower than market prices. 
It leads to the importing of anti-dumping duty on the whole industry; “for 5 per cent of 
black sheep, the whole country suffers” (C, Textiles Mill, Interview).  
 
Efforts were made to plug the hole in the GST refunds and to stop the phenomenon of 
fake/flying invoices. This meant making refunds only after an input tax has been 
verified. Electronic data bases such as STARR (Sales Tax Automated Refund 
Repository) and STREAMS (Sales Tax Risk Evaluation and Management System) were 
set up funded by large World Bank’s loan. It had, however, no discernible impact on the 
extent and prevalence of the fake and flying invoices (Business Recorder, October 8, 
2007).  
A CBR official in his document explained the refunds issue and its link to fake and 
“flying” invoices as follows: 
“... problematic area in the implementation of VAT has been refund payments. 
Since VAT is primarily a tax based on value addition at source and exports are 
zero-rated on the destination principle, there is an in-built need for the 
documentation of transactions involved in the entire supply chain in the export 
                                                          
39
 Federal Board of Revenue. 
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business.  However, the system is marred by the element of fake invoices creating 
difficulties for its smooth functioning.  While textiles cater for the major 
exportable commodities of Pakistan, various intermediary manufacturing and 
processing activities are largely carried out in the unorganized and undocumented 
sector. This gap is filled by invoicing malpractices to inflate refund and suppress 
local supplies. Thus the refund issue in the textile sector has assumed staggering 
dimensions posing challenges for the VAT administration in Pakistan” (Ahmad, 
Shahid, 2004). 
The refunds fraud became so serious that the government declared the entire top five 
export sectors zero-rated. In 2005, the government declared textile products, carpets, 
leather goods, surgical goods and sports goods as zero-rated (World Bank et al., 2008). 
The signs of the government’s defeat in imposing a VAT styled GST were obvious at the 
time of the fieldwork in 2004.  
Another internal CBR document lists the relief measures taken in the budget 2004-05. 
One of the “relief measures” taken by the CBR was to declare ginned cotton as zero-
rated. Earlier, the ginned cotton supply was charged at the rate of 15 per cent. This 
measure meant that no output tax would be levied on the purchase of ginned cotton. The 
internal CBR document justified this measure as follows: “as the sales tax collected on 
ginned cotton was adjusted or refunded at subsequent stages of production by the 
spinning sector, the supply of ginned cotton has been zero-rated. This measure will not 
only remove cash-flow problems for the spinning sector, but also expedite payment to 
the ginners and growers of cotton and considerably reduce export-related refunds” 
(Central Board of Revenue, 2004e, CBR Internal Document: “Relief Measures for the 
budget 2004-05”).  
Similar logic was extended to “zero-rate” (actually exempt) manufacturers of all the five 
major exporting sectors in 2005. GST with a prime emphasis on the documentation of 
economy and a detailed VAT that adjusts output tax against input tax by paying refunds 
was defeated due to the high costs imposed by manufacturers and the intermediate 
classes who resisted the tax. According to the tax officials interviewed during the 
fieldwork, “Government wants to get rid of documentation”. “It (sales tax in the context 
of refunds) defeats the purpose” (Tax Officials Interviews).  
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The GST being defeated by the manufacturers and the intermediate classes came through 
vividly during the fieldwork. One forthright and socially aware owner of the large 
textiles mill in Karachi further threw light on the government’s defeat in its failure to 
implement GST:  
“I have no problems with the sales tax as a tax. It takes 3-4 months to get refunds. 
I have problems with its procedure, with its refund mechanism. On the whole 
there is corruption, there are these floating invoices providing tremendous 
incentive for the corrupt to under-price. Government needs to take action against 
its own officers. The point is that the government is accepting defeat when it says 
we would exempt this sector and that sector. The government is accepting defeat 
that it cannot manage. I want to know what the hell can government manage in 
this country?” (GT, Textiles Mill, Interview) 
This is a clear representation of the rule-violating behaviour having succeeded in 
defeating the regime of rule-based governance. GST is resisted by the manufacturers, 
retailers and traders to the point that they imposed a heavy cost on the government by 
making it pay back more money in refunds than it actually received in tax receipts. The 
government’s capacity is so weak that it could not match refund payments to their actual 
receipts. This is despite the World Bank’s large loan for taxation reforms. One of the 
large components of the Bank’s loan was automation of the refunds procedure. To 
minimize the losses, the CBR thought it expedient to do away with the refunds altogether 
rather than receiving them first and then remitting them in the case of the export sector. 
As Ehtisham Ahmad (2010) mentions that the CBR has the power to alter tax rules 
without referring it to the Parliament and it fully utilizes this rule to benefit certain 
“interest groups”. In this case, the government did away with the refunds which 
translated into the sales of the major five exporting sectors in the local market also 
getting exempted. 
In the post fieldwork literature, Ehtisham Ahmad (2010) states that not only government 
zero-rated the five major exporting sectors but it actually exempted them. This does not 
make sense if one looks at it at a cursory level. As discussed in the literature (Bird and 
Gendron, 2007), zero-rating is better for the manufacturers than exemption. If certain 
sectors are zero-rated, it means that those sectors can still get the value of their inputs 
refunded while their final produce is exported. It is financially beneficial for the 
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manufacturers to be zero-rated than exempted. Why then did the CBR-manufacturers 
collusion opted for exemption option rather than zero-rating? Officially, they say exports 
are zero-rated. However, actually they are exempted as no tax papers are filed.  
Exemption is better for the industrialists than zero-rating since it leaves no “paper trail” – 
there is no documentation. The whole emphasis of the rule-based governance reforms 
promoting the documentation of the economy is defeated. If there is a proper 
documentation, it could mean that the tax authorities would be able to assess the true 
level of income the manufacturers and the intermediate classes are making and it could 
make them liable to proper income tax. As discussed above referring to Pasha (1995) and 
Ehtisham Ahmad (2010), doing away with documentation mean no proper income tax 
liabilities. The  manufacturers and the intermediate classes actually bear some financial 
loss and do not even claim the value of inputs through zero-rating. No refunds are 
claimed and documentation is done away with. It is obvious that the income tax they 
would become liable to with proper documentation is more than the refunds they would 
receive for the value added to the inputs. The exemption of the five sectors is a 
commentary on the colossal level of overall tax evasion and rule-violating behaviour.  
6.4. Reading of CBR Internal Documents and the Extent of Tax Evasion: 
CBR internal documents show the pressure exerted by the manufacturers and the 
intermediate classes that resulted in changing of the CBR decisions. CBR officials were 
also interviewed. These internal CBR documents provide evidence in addition to the 
interviews and the secondary literature. 
A relief measure taken by the 2004-05 budget zero-rated import and supply of all plant, 
machinery and equipment. In VAT, exports are zero-rated and not the imports. Actually, 
imports are a significant source for GST revenue (World Bank et al., 2008). It is counter-
intuitive for CBR to zero-rate imports for 2004-05. This CBR measure meant no output 
tax was levied on the import of machinery via SRO 500(I)/2004 dated 12th June 2004. 
The key difference being that earlier, this zero-rating was only applicable on “import of 
plant and machinery used or intended to be used for manufacturing of taxable goods, 
under SRO 987(1)/99 dated 30.08.1999”. This exemption was given to the import and 
supply of all machinery “to give a major impetus to capital investment and increase in 
GDP growth, import & supply of all plant, machinery and equipment, on which either 
the statutory rate of customs duty is 5 per cent or attracts concessionary rate of customs 
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duty under any customs notification has been zero-rated”. Earlier, the emphasis was on 
manufacturing and taxable goods, later that clause was done away with. The earlier SRO 
987(1)/99 was clearly in favour of manufacturing and taxable goods, hence it was for 
industrial development. It was done away with. Revenue impact of this measure was 
estimated to be a loss of Rs 1.6 billion (Central Board of Revenue, 2004e, CBR Internal 
Document: “Relief Measures Taken in the Budget FY 2004-05”).  
There is a similar clause under Section 3 (1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 which was 
done away with by the CBR. The clause was to charge a further tax at the rate of 3 per 
cent to supplies made to unregistered persons. This was levied to “increase compliance 
cost of informal sector and to provide partial protection to the registered/organized 
sector” (Central Board of Revenue, 2004e, CBR Internal Document: “Relief Measures 
Taken in the Budget FY 2004-05”). This measure was drafted to discourage supplies 
made to unregistered dealers, and to discourage the informal sector. Doing away with the 
clause took away that encouragement of registered dealers and documented business. 
Revenue impact of this measure was a loss of Rs 7.5 billion. The rationale given by the 
CBR document for doing away of the further tax is as follows: 
“Businesses have generally claimed that further tax was a regressive levy, 
encourages the phenomenon of flying invoices with the result that the 
government ends-up paying more refunds, against such flying invoice, than the 
actual collection from this levy. Therefore, to remove all trade distorting practices 
with a view to reduce menace of fake/flying invoices and to prevent inadmissible 
refund payments, the levy of ‘further tax’ has been completely abolished” 
(emphasis added) (Central Board of Revenue, 2004e, CBR Internal Document: 
“Relief Measures Taken in the Budget FY 2004-05”). 
This indicates the cost imposed by the manufacturing and traders on tax revenue. The 
cost of collecting the sales tax is so high in terms of refunds being higher than actual 
collection that the sales tax authorities decided to do away with the further tax.  
Fake/flying invoices have also been cited as one of the key reasons for doing away with 
the further tax clause. The rationale is that since registered dealers are preferred over 
unregistered ones, businesses have an incentive in producing fake/flying invoices to 
show that transaction has taken place with a registered dealer even if it was actually done 
with an unregistered one. Doing away with the further tax of 3 per cent abolished the 
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possibility of such a distortion. It is not clear how the tax authorities would deal with 
fake/flying invoices issued by unregistered dealers. The fact that fake and flying invoices 
are produced by non-registered dealers was not discussed. 
Another measure dealt with the retail sector. A simplified tax regime was suggested for 
the retail sector. The retail sector continued to be difficult as far as implementation of 
sales tax is concerned. There was massive resistance to retailers’ registration. The 
registered retailers were only liable to pay sales tax if their turnover was Rs 5 million or 
above. Relief Measures document says that over 77 per cent of registered retailers 
declared their income to be below Rs 5 million. They paid no tax. The CBR allowed 
retailers having turnover of more than Rs 5 million to pay sales tax at the rate of 10 per 
cent addition to value. It was estimated that this measure would earn CBR Rs 600 
million (Central Board of Revenue, 2004e, CBR Internal Document: “Relief Measures 
Taken in the Budget FY 2004-05”). Close to 80 percent retailers not filing for GST 
returns due to them being below the threshold level of Rs 5 million is another example of 
tax evasion.  
Another internal CBR document states that for 2002-03, a bigger chunk of GST i.e. 54 
per cent was collected in lieu of imported goods and rest on domestic goods. CBR 
Yearbook 2002-03 also notes an increase in Sales Tax domestic. GST increased from Rs 
29 million in 1998-99 to Rs 89 million in 2002-03. It increased the share of the sales tax 
(domestic) in total tax receipts from 9.4 per cent to 19.4 per cent during this period 
(Central Board of Revenue, 2004, CBR Yearbook 2002-03). The increase in the GST 
figures from late 1990s to early 2000s is explained by the increase in the coverage of the 
GST as it was imposed on the whole/retail and service sectors. However, post 2002-03 
figures point to a trend in the opposite direction. According to the World Bank: 
“As percent of GDP, the GST revenue increased from 3.1 percent of GDP in 
1999/2000 to 4.1 percent of GDP in 2002/03, but then declined to 3.5 percent of 
GDP in 2007/0840. Since 2006/07, the GST share in FBR taxes has dropped 
below 40 percent and fallen behind the share of direct taxes. International 
comparisons confirm that GST collections in Pakistan are weak. For example, 
India and Sri Lanka collect around 1.5 to 2.5 percent of GDP more through GST 
                                                          
40
 A period that roughly corresponds to the five major export sectors being declared zero-rated or 
virtually exempted. 
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than Pakistan. The lower collection is not because of lower rates. Until 2007/08, 
Pakistan charged a standard GST rate of 15 percent on sales price inclusive of 
any federal excise duty and/or customs duty, the same rate as in Sri Lanka and 
higher than the 12.5 percent rate in India” (World Bank et al., 2008, p. 69). 
An international comparison of Pakistan’s GST productivity shows that it is not only 
lower than Sri Lanka and India but also to other middle-income countries such as Egypt, 
Turkey, South Africa and Thailand (World Bank et al., 2008, p. 75). Pakistan’s Tax to 
GDP ratio that was already low at 10.6 percent in 1999/2000 went up to 10.7 percent in 
2001/02 but since then has been declining. It went down to 9.8 percent in 2003/04 and 
further declined to 9.7 in 2004/05 (World Bank, 2008, p. 11). 
Giving details of tax evasion, the CBR Task Force on taxation reforms points toward 
political lobbying and certain influential groups being exempted from income tax. 
Agricultural income is not taxed and falls in this category. There is the other category of 
“vendors, small workshops, small shops, self-employed and similar inconspicuous 
categories of taxable individuals and trades” who fall within the tax bracket but they 
have been able to remain outside the tax net. Traders, small companies, and self-
proprietors are in the tax bracket but under-report their income (Central Board of 
Revenue, 2001, Report of the Task Force on Reform of Tax Administration, pp.7-8). 
One indication of evasion can be gauged from the fact that assets of Rs 120 billion were 
declared by the tax evaders when government announced a tax amnesty scheme in 2000. 
These assets were not declared earlier: “a tax at the rate of 10 percent on these assets 
raised Rs 12 billion in revenues. Assuming that 10 percent was a low tax rate and that 
under normal course of events a marginal tax rate of 20 percent would have applied, the 
extent of tax evasion could be taken as Rs 24 billion. If these assets had been created 
within the last 10 years, the annual tax evasion would amount to Rs 2.4 billion. This is 
about 2.27 percent of the income tax revenue raised in 1999-2000” (Central Board of 
Revenue, 2001, Report of the Task Force on Reform of Tax Administration, p. 8). It 
reflects the extent of tax evasion within the system. 
Giving details of tax evasion, the Task Force’s report says: 
“Within the tax administration, corruption takes the form of policy manipulation, 
whereby import duty structures are changed overnight by issuing SROs to favour 
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a single industry or firm at the cost of others, collusion between the tax officials 
and interest groups, and extortion, which is made possible by the immense 
discretionary powers of the tax officials. The most common form of corruption in 
the tax administration, however, is speed money” (Central Board of Revenue, 
2001, Report of the Task Force on Reform of Tax Administration, p. Xv). 
Policy manipulation is the most common form of legalised corruption where import duty 
structures are changed to favour one industry or firm over others. This is one form of 
under- the-table transfers. Duty structures were changed on the import of BMW luxury 
cars, steel items, and scrap metal through SRO. If the duty was something like Rs 5000 
per ton for scrap metal, it was changed to Rs 500 per ton. It would favour a particular 
firm or industry for the required period (Central Board of Revenue, 2001, Report of the 
Task Force on Reform of Tax Administration).  
The following table gives a rough idea of the extent of tax evasion by the three key 
departments: 
Table 6.4: Perceived Revenue Lost by Departments 
Organisation Revenue Earned Revenue Lost 
Income Tax 36% 64% 
Customs 52% 48% 
Sales Tax 55% 45% 
Source: (Central Board of Revenue, 2001, Report of the Task Force on Reform of Tax 
Administration, 2001). 
A detailed tax survey was undertaken by the military government in 2000. The purpose 
was to find out the expenditure of people and compare it with income declared. The 
exercise again faced swift resistance by business groups and the intermediate classes. 
According to the State Bank, only limited tax resources were generated through the Tax 
Survey drive (Fatima and Ahmed, 2001). The extent of tax evasion can be gauged from 
the fact that “less than 60 percent of imports actually pay duty” (Pasha, 1995, p.129). 
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In terms of costs enforced by the tax payers, the issue of thresholds is important. A 
system of multiple thresholds was introduced to take into account the requirements of 
various categories that were required to pay the GST. At the lower threshold, 
manufacturers with turnover of Rs 0.5 million and retailers with turnover of Rs 1 million 
were needed to pay a turnover tax at the rate of 2 per cent. A higher threshold of Rs 5 
million was fixed for both manufacturers and retailers to pay sales tax at the rate of 15 
per cent. There were so many complications in the function of multiple threshold system 
that government had to do away with it and stick with the single threshold for 
manufacturers and retailers at Rs 5 million and above. Problems included businesses 
registering in the wrong lower threshold categories, to avoid the due tax. Suppliers would 
appear in the sales tax records and then disappear  prompting the use of term “short-life” 
taxpayers. Given the fact that multiple thresholds  overloaded the Sales Tax Directorate 
with a wide but relatively unreliable taxpayer clientele.  The CBR shrunk the GST base 
by 26 per cent but stuck with more “complaint” taxpayers’ base and reduced the cost of 
tax administration (Ahmad, Shahid, Central Board of Revenue, 2004). Abolition of lower 
threshold of Rs 0.5 million for manufacturers and Rs 1 million for retailers reflects the 
cost imposed in terms of non-compliance by the middle and lower-middle classes who 
fall in the category of lower threshold or small businesses. 
An unpublished paper by a CBR official collected at the time of the fieldwork pointed 
out that VAT in Pakistan is being levied as an excise duty rather than a multi-stage tax 
on production and distribution with a proper “paper trail”. Pakistan quickly enacted Sales 
Tax Act 1990 under the IMF pressure. The necessary organizational inputs were not in 
place. GST was administered on the lines of excise duty with physical controls and many 
exemptions. Only half of the registered persons and businesses filed their monthly tax 
returns. Low compliance was due to at least two reasons: a) individuals and businesses 
did not register in the first place; b) when they registered, they did not file monthly tax 
returns (Ahmad, Shahid, Central Board of Revenue, 2004). Same point made later by 
Ehtisham Ahmad (2010) and World Bank et al. (2008) is that VAT is Pakistan is 
functioning as an excise duty rather than a properly functioning VAT.  
 
The World Bank et al. (2008) state that the industry pays more GST in terms of its 
contribution to GDP compared to agriculture and services. Agriculture’s contribution to 
the GDP is 20 percent whereas its share in the GST is just over 1 percent; and the 
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services’ contribution to the GDP is 58 percent while its share in the GST is only 22 
percent. The rest of the GST i.e. 77 per cent is paid by the industry. However, a close 
analysis shows that in industry, it is not the textiles sector whose share is below its GDP 
contribution. The industry’s share comes from petroleum products (over 21 times its 
share of GDP) and other consumer goods such as cigarettes, edible oil, automobiles etc. 
Even with these sectors, GST is often applied as an excise duty rather than as a multi-
stage tax on production and distribution with refunds working. This indirect excise duty 
on consumption such as petroleum and import duties fill the GST coffers largely as 
presumptive tax. Low VAT collection in the services sector is linked to the informal or 
“shadow” economy (World Bank, 2008). Hence, GST is working as a presumptive 
excise duty on final turnover rather than functioning as a fully operationalised VAT.   
 
Post fieldwork literature points out the extent of income tax evasion. It is significant in 
the formal manufacturing sector. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP) has 47,500 registered companies while the FBR has only 23,100 companies 
registered. It means that roughly more than half “active companies do not have a national 
taxpayer number”. Even out of those 23,100 companies, “less than half filed a tax 
return”. It means less than 11,000 companies filed tax return and out of these; “two-third 
declared either a negative or zero taxable income, and one-third positive taxable 
income”. It essentially means out of 47,500 companies registered with the SECP, about 
4,000 reported a taxable income. Even among these less, “only one-in-eight companies 
declared a taxable income in excess of Rs. 1 million”. It means only about 500 
companies pay tax worth more than Rs 1 million taxable income. Foreign companies did 
far worse in comparison with the local companies. Of 494 foreign companies, only 17 
filed a return (World Bank et al., 2008, p. 65). This massive tax evasion of income tax is 
directly linked to the GST. Since companies do not pay their income tax, they subvert the 
GST, preventing the economy from being documented. Their true incomes remain 
hidden.  
 
The extent of GST evasion is also pervasive. Post fieldwork World Bank et al. (2008) 
publication indicates that direct GST is earned of less than 2,000 large companies out of 
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130,71041 registered. Less than 2,000 businesses paying GST means less than 3 percent 
of the registered businesses pay the tax. In essence, the large companies with a turnover 
of Rs 300 million rupees or more paid nearly 90 percent of all GST collected. These 
large companies who paid the GST are the manufacturers, exporters and importers with 
high “visibility” due to the nature of their businesses (World Bank et al., 2008, p. 80). 
 
According to the 1973 constitution, the federal government is responsible for levying 
GST on goods and the provincial governments on services. During the Musharraf era, in 
2004, the federal government levied VAT on services on the behalf of the provinces and 
transferred proceeds to them. The provinces do not have the organizational capacity to 
impose GST on services and there are complicated issues relating to inter-provincial 
transfers. One of the provinces, Sindh, tried to impose GST on services later but did not 
succeed. The centralised FBR is considered not motivated to tax the difficult services 
sector considering that the proceeds to be transferred to the provinces (Ahmed, 
Ehtisham, 2010; World Bank et al., 2008). It further complicates the VAT compliance of 
the services sector. The consistent non-compliance by traders, wholesalers, retailers and 
the services sector shows that the intermediate classes are resisting the imposition of a 
proper GST. Even professionals such as lawyers, doctors and other self-employed 
categories do not pay the GST. The intermediate classes have played a significant role in 
resisting the GST along with the capitalist class. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The chapter discusses the limited implementation of the GST in a VAT mode. The tax 
was imposed to meet the IMF conditionality in 1990. There have been many 
amendments in the Sales Tax Law to do away with the exemptions and make it work 
closer to spirit of VAT. The World Bank gave a large loan for comprehensive taxation 
reforms in 1999 with a particular focus on the automation of the refunds system. GST 
has been able to replace the import tariffs in the revenue records. Yet, its overall 
implementation is far from what the VAT requires. It functions more like a presumptive 
excise duty imposed on turnovers.  
                                                          
41
 The difference in the figure of the SECP companies being the total of 47,500 and businesses registered 
for the GST purposes being 130,710 is that the latter also includes small businesses, wholesale and retail. 
While, the SECP figures are for companies. 
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One of the key reasons GST has been opposed by the manufacturers, retailers, traders 
and wholesalers is that it helps to document the economic activities and level of their 
incomes. This if done properly could make them liable to an increased income tax. 
Hence, GST has been opposed tooth and nail. The refunds system which is part and 
parcel of a well-functioning VAT has been subverted. The government’s tax department 
lacks the capacity to match refund requests with the actual tax receipts. A volley of fake 
invoices were produced to claim fraudulent refunds. The situation got so bad that the 
CBR admitted they were giving more money in refunds than the revenue they were 
earning. The CBR, therefore, practically exempted the five exporting sectors by 
declaring them as zero-rated. This meant that domestic produce of the five exporting 
sector is also exempted from GST.  
 
This chapter outlines way of interpreting and analyzing the rule-violating behaviour and 
the weak capacity of the state in Pakistan to enforce rule-based governance and revenue 
generation. If the capitalists and the intermediate classes were to pay their due share in 
taxes, it would transfer resources from them to the state. By resisting taxation reforms 
such as the GST, the capitalists and the intermediate classes indulged in the rule-
violating behaviour through their non-payment and subverted efforts towards 
documentation of economy. This chapter also shows how the IFIs institutional 
governance reforms were resisted in contemporary Pakistan. GST was imposed to meet a 
direct conditionality of the IMF in 1990 and has been amended and “reformed” as part of 
the IMF-World Bank loans but resisted on the ground by the capitalist and the 
intermediate classes in Pakistan. 
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Chapter 7. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan: ‘One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Backward’ of Corporate Governance 
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) was established in 1999 
as an independent body replacing the Corporate Law Authority (CLA) that had worked 
as a subsidiary organisation within the Ministry of Finance. The SECP was established 
as a result of the Asian Development Bank (ADB)’s programme loan. This chapter 
chooses to study one of the critical ADB’s reforms in the development of corporate 
governance through the setting up of the SECP as an autonomous institution. 
The SECP regulates the public listed companies and the financial sector in particular and 
supervises the corporate sector’s adherence to the Companies Ordinance in general. It 
regulates companies in the financial sector due to the public money being involved. It 
also regulates public listed companies. All other companies whether private, unlisted 
public, and not-for-profit are registered with the SECP under the Companies Ordinance, 
1984. The SECP’s mandate includes supervising the compliance of the private and other 
companies with the relevant provisions of the Companies Ordinance42 (I, ex-SECP top-
echelon official, Interview). 
Using the SECP’s annual reports from 1999-2004, Karachi Stock Exchange annual 
reports, and key-informant qualitative interviews, this chapter maps the relationship 
between regulation and the rule of law. The main purpose of the SECP was to regulate 
the securities market and promote a level playing field by introducing corporate 
governance reforms for  intra-capital relations as well as the capital’s relationship with 
the state.  
7.1. Background 
The chapter discusses the ADB’s programmatic focus after having contextualised the 
political economy of the SECP in Pakistan since the import-substitution-industrialization 
(ISI) phase of 1950s and 1960s. 
                                                          
42
 “For instance, details of directors, submission of accounts and clearance of the articles and memorandum 
of association. Any affected shareholder can lodge a complaint for dispute resolution even in private 
companies. Mostly the questions of beneficial ownership are raised after the death of a director or principal 
shareholder” (I, ex-SECP top-echelon official, Interview). 
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Chapter 3 discussed in detail how the ISI worked in the 1950s and 1960s. The interaction 
among the state institutions and the emergent capitalist class led to rents creation. It was 
crony capitalism, with a high level of concentration. Control over the industry was 
established by maintaining control over banking and insurance. The policies of the ISI 
resulted in the consolidation of 44 monopoly houses which accounted for “77 percent of 
gross fixed assets of all manufacturing companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange” 
(Zaidi, 2005, p. 102). These monopoly houses also controlled majority of the banks. 
Other than providing subsidies through schemes such as the Export Bonus Vouchers etc, 
the state also provided liberal credit facilities and made the scarce foreign exchange 
available for the capitalist class to buy machinery. Formal rules to stop interlocking 
directorates did not exist and family banks were used to give loans to their own family 
enterprises. Moreover, the industrialists were on the board of the government’s industrial 
development institutions such as Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation 
(PICIC) that in turn helped them to get access to the scarce permits and licenses (Zaidi, 
2005). Cheema et al. (2003) also discuss the concentration in the industrial sector and 
access to liberal credit. 
When the bubble of state-led industrialization burst due to the failure of Ayub 
government to earn legitimacy (in the Weberian sense) and maintain political stability, it 
led to the anti-cartelization movement in the country. Yahya Khan’s Martial Law was 
promulgated in March 1969 and the corresponding Economic Survey shows changes that 
led to the civil strife since 1968. The civil agitation against Ayub Khan was led against 
the industrial and banking monopolies and concentration of wealth. Two ordinances by 
the Yahya government in the form of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Ordinance, 1970 and Securities Exchange Ordinance 1969 tried to assuage public 
opinion against monopolies and cartelization. The former prohibited “undue 
concentration of economic power, unreasonable monopoly power and unreasonably 
restrictive trade practices” while the latter aimed to give “protection to investors and 
regulating markets and dealings in securities”. Securities Exchange Ordinance pushed 
the Stock Exchange towards registration. Issuers of securities were directed to submit 
their annual reports and statements to the government (Government of Pakistan, 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 1969-70, pp. 88-89). Hence, the roots of the SECP go as 
far back as 1969 to the Securities Exchange Ordinance. 
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The Monopoly Control Authority was established in 1971. Corporate governance went 
through a transformation in early 1980s when the Corporate Law Authority (CLA) was 
set up in 1981 and the Companies Ordinance, 1984 was introduced to replace the 
Companies Act, 1913. CLA consisted of two wings namely the Corporate Regulation 
Wing and the Monopoly Control Wing. The latter essentially replaced the Monopoly 
Control Authority of 1971. Monopoly Control Wing of the CLA made regulations and 
rules aimed to stop the monopolization of commercial and financial sector, whereas the 
Corporate Regulation Wing focused on the regulation of stock markets and 
implementation of the Company Law. CLA worked under the Ministry of Finance as 
said earlier. There was an affiliated office of the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI), also 
under the Ministry of Finance, that dealt with the regulation and approval of all equities 
and debt (Lahore University of Management Sciences, 1995). The Companies Ordinance 
198443 was amended in 1999 to replace CLA with the SECP. The Companies Ordinance, 
1984 is one of the main laws through which the SECP regulates the corporate 
governance. 
CLA was considered ineffective because it worked in a bureaucratic manner under the 
Ministry of Finance. It lacked professional staff. Rather than working on its own to 
impose fines etc, it relied on the slow courts system which did not work largely. Even the 
powers that CLA enjoyed under the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 and the 
Companies Ordinance 1984, were not often exercised so as not to upset the market 
functions. Management restructuring of the under-performing companies did not take 
place. Also, the various Stock Exchanges did not support CLA’s efforts to push 
companies to hold their annual general meetings and pay dividend. The CLA, however, 
took a stance on the holding of annual meetings and the payment of dividends. But the 
CLA did not focus on restructuring the management issues to bring the companies’ 
internal structures up to the standards of corporate governance (Lahore University of 
                                                          
43 The Companies Ordinance, 1984 defined jurisdiction of courts, defined the powers and function of 
corporate governance authority; set the procedures for the incorporation of companies and their 
memorandum of associations; discussed matters relating to the transfer of public companies into private 
companies and vice versa; set out details of “allotment, issue and transfer of shares”; provided details of 
functions of share capital; registered procedures to take into account mortgages; established parameters on 
members’ registration, meetings and proceedings, directors’ designation and role, chief executive 
designation and role, setting up of non-banking financial institutions, account keeping, payment of 
dividend, audit, mismanagement, arbitration, liquidation and winding up. It also contained various 
“miscellaneous provisions regarding investments, contracts, officers and shareholdings, trading and 
interests” (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, The Companies Ordinance, 1984). 
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Management Sciences, 1995). Hence, the idea of the SECP was conceived that could 
function as an autonomous organisation. 
The literature on corporate governance deals with another element in the formation of 
SECP. This has to do with liberal credit facilities provided to the corporate sector by the 
state (Asian Development Bank, 2003; Cheema et al., 2003). The liberal credit was 
provided since the ISI days. However, state direct credited reached a high level in the 
1980s and 1990s. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Zia regime did not privatize the state 
owned banks but used bank loans to distribute patronage. Also, the new political-cum-
industrial class that emerged in 1980s due to the local bodies’ elections used the loans to 
further their industrial interests (Sayeed, 1995).  
The liberalisation of entry into the industry and easy access to liberal bank credit led to a 
massive bank loans default in 1990s (Cheema et al., 2003). Non-performing loans were 
20 percent of gross advances (Bari, 2006). The State Bank of Pakistan has covered the 
loan default as part of its financial sector assessment. Non-performing loans were Rs 
66.1 billion in December 1990 and they increased to Rs 271.4 billion in December 2000. 
It is indicative of the politics of patronage and clientelism in 1990s despite the 
liberalization reforms. “However, their annual average rate of increase has come down 
from 17.4 percent during the first seven years of the decade to 10.1 percent during 
January 1998 to December 2000”  (State Bank of Pakistan, Pakistan: Financial Sector 
Assessment 1990-2000, p. 123). 
The Musharraf government passed the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) 
Ordinance in 2001 (State Bank of Pakistan). This Ordinance not only established 
banking courts in Pakistan, it also made rules for recovery of written-off loans and 
procedures for the sale of mortgaged property. Some of the banking issues are discussed 
in length by Cheema et al. (2003). As result of this Ordinance, a special autonomous 
organisation called Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation (CIRC) was set 
up to acquire the “bad” assets of state-owned banks, re-package them and sell them to 
the private sector to earn some proceeds against the hefty non-performing loans (O, 
CIRC, Interview). During the time of the fieldwork, CIRC had acquired assets of the six 
leading public sector banks and development financial institutions and re-sold them after 
“cleansing” them and transferred the proceeds to the government (O, CIRC, Interview). 
The details are given in Appendix 2 of the thesis. 
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The larger point in the literature is centred around bank loans (discussed above) for  
industrialization and the corporate sector being financed by credit. Due to this liberal 
credit, the corporate sector did not feel compelled to raise equity in the market. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the financial sector started to get privatized from the early 1990s. 
The privatisation process intensified during the latter half of the decade (Cheema et al., 
2003).  
A crucial aspect of corporate governance regarding the family-oriented nature of the 
textiles sector came through very strongly during the fieldwork. The literature on 
corporate governance also discusses it. Details are in the tables below: 
Table 7.1: Investor Composition in Listed Local Private Companies in Pakistan 
(percentage shares owned by an investor type) 
Investor Type Textile Non-Textile 
Direct Holding by Family 29.3 9.1 
Members   
NIT/ICP44 8.4 11.1 
Financial Institutions 5.1 8.2 
Foreign Investors 1.9 14.3 
Joint Stock Companies 23.2 16.9 
Associated Companies of 
the controlling family 
17.4 21.4 
Source: Cheema et al., 2003 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 NIT: National Investment Trust; ICP: Investment Corporation of Pakistan. 
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Table 7.2: Family Control in Asian Corporates 
(Percentage of the sample companies) 
% of 
family 
control 
Pakistan 
(Textiles) 
Pakistan 
(Non-
Textiles) 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Taiwan Thailand 
10% cut 
off 
92.9%45 88.9% 67.1% 67.9% 57.7% 65.6% 50.8% 
30%cut 
off 
85.8%46 55.5% 58.7% 20.1% 45.6% 18.4% 54.8% 
More 
than 
40% 
50.0%47 38.9% 35.4% 3.5% 14.7% 5.0% 38.9% 
Source: Cheema et al., 2003 
Table 7.3: Ownership Concentration in Asian Corporates 
 Concentration Ratio (%) 
Country Top Five Shareholders 
Pakistan 37.0%48 
Indonesia 67.5% 
Korea 38.5% 
Malaysia 58.8% 
                                                          
45
 “The figure implies than in 92.9% of our sample companies the family controls equal to or more than 
10% of the total share capital” (Cheema et al., 2003). 
46 “The figure implies than in 85.8% of our sample companies the family controls equal to or more than 
30% of the total share capital” (Cheema et al., 2003). 
47 “The figure implies than in 50% of our sample companies the family controls more than 40% of the total 
share capital” (Cheema et al., 2003). 
48 “Implies that the top five shareholders of an average company in Pakistan own 37% of the share capital” 
(Cheema et al., 2003). 
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Philippines 60.2% 
Thailand 56.6% 
Source: Cheema et al., 2003 
Table 7.1 shows that hold of family-oriented equity in the corporate sector. There is 
greater concentration in the textiles sector than other sectors. Yet, even in the non-
textiles sector, family equity contributes one-third of investment if one takes family held 
associated companies as well. In the case of the textiles sector, family controls half of the 
equity including its investment in the associated companies. The family control over the 
textiles sector is pretty obvious.  
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 compare the family control of equity in Pakistan with other Asian 
countries. The control over share capital in Pakistan is much greater than ownership49. 
This   means that there is a separation of control from ownership. It also means that the 
family- based management can use external investors’ and minority shareholders’ capital 
according to their own discretion. Given the poor auditing standards and weak 
disclosures, this contrast between control and ownership is compounded because it 
allows the family based management to use others’ money for its own private benefits; 
benefits such as expenditure on items of luxury personal consumption or political 
lobbying etc. Hence, the companies do not announce dividends and retain the profits. 
The SECP has been concerned with the low levels of payment of dividends. In 2002, 
over 59 per cent of companies did not declare dividends. It makes the argument for the 
company’s profits being used for “personal benefits” (Cheema et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 There is a need to be cautious in making estimates about the intensity of ownership on the basis of just 
the top five shareholders. A key informant interview with a top officer in the SECP revealed that top 
shareholders not only hold shares against their own names but also against their family members and other 
trusted associates’ names (I, Ex-SECP top echelon official, Interview). Hence, it may not to be right to 
infer too much on the less degree of concentration in the ownership of top five shareholders only. 
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Table 7.4: Annual Share Turnover in a Sample of Pakistan’s Listed Companies, 
2000 
Ownership Type Turnover in an Average Company (as a 
percentage of total annual turnover of the 
entire sample) 
Family-based 0.91% 
Government 4.6% 
MNCs 9.3% 
Source: Cheema et al., 2003 
Table 7.4 shows the nature of illiquid stock market in Pakistan. The share turnover is 
very low in family based companies, it is a little high in the government companies and 
gets higher in the case of multi-national companies. It shows that family controllers do 
not trade shares of their companies often, which in turn, contributes to stock market 
being illiquid. Family controllers do not risk the likelihood of loss of their control over 
the company by trading shares of the company.  Illiquid stocks decrease the possibilities 
of holding companies accountable for inefficiency. The cost of takeover of a company 
also increases due to an illiquid market. The family based controllers oppose reforms that 
could weaken their control and make them comply with shareholding patterns 
disclosures. It also explains why equity is not raised through capital markets because 
doing so will weaken the family controlled nature of the companies. Although 
discouragement of external investors and prevalence of “underdeveloped capital 
markets” is not in the larger interest of the corporate sector or the country’s economy, 
such larger interests are opposed in favour of family control (Cheema et al, 2003). 
7.2. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Corporate Governance 
The ADB funding for the setting up and operating of the SECP is part of the IFI’s pro 
market reforms. The ADB evaluation report of six countries’ “domestic capital market 
development” discusses Pakistan where pro-market reforms were promoted (Asian 
Development Bank, 2008). The ADB has provided programme loans for capital market 
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development since 1980s. Its efforts became quite vigorous after the Asian financial 
crisis of the mid-1990s. In 14 developing countries, the ADB provided 36 programme 
loans worth $9.2 billion aimed at financial sector projects. It also funded 109 Technical 
Assistance (TA) worth $59.9 million in twenty developing countries and these TAs were 
focused on capital market development either fully or partially. A substantial part, 68 per 
cent, of the ADB’s lending went to Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Viet Nam, Sri 
Lanka and Mongolia. More than one-third, 37 per cent of total programme lending went 
to capital market related loans (Asian Development Bank, 2008).   
The ADB has been involved in Pakistan’s financial sector since 1968. However, 
substantial involvement started in the mid-1980s. This started with a shift of focus by the 
ADB to the development of “long-term financial markets” rather than just providing 
credit. Development finance loan of $110 million was approved in 1983 and the 
government made a binding commitment to promote domestic mobilization. Following 
this, the ADB concentrated on the liberalization of the government’s monetary policies, 
credit allocation and interest rates. Yet another $200 million Industrial Sector Program 
was approved in 1988 to “develop the government bond market”. In 1989, a TA was 
approved to study Pakistan’s securities market (Asian Development Bank, 2003). 
The ADB has focused on capital market development in Pakistan particularly since 1995. 
It started off with technical assistance from the 1995-1997 period. The ADB evaluation 
report of 2003 focuses on six TAs in particular. First TA set the overall capital market 
development agenda. A programme loan of $250 million called capital market 
development programme funded the implementation of agenda identified by the first TA. 
Three TAs focused on reforming the insurance, mutual funds and pensions sectors 
respectively. The remaining two TA aimed for reform in capital market law and 
insurance law, and regulation of interest rates for the domestic national saving schemes 
(Asian Development Bank, 2003).  
The capital market development programme of the ADB was initiated in January 1998 
on the basis of the agenda identified by TAs, with the disbursement of a first tranche of 
$125 million. Disbursement of the second tranche of $125 million took place in June 
2000. The Loan ended with 10 months delay in October 2001 and the TA specifically 
focused on the SECP ended in July 2002 with 19 months of delay and four extensions 
(Asian Development Bank, 2005). Programme loans by the IFIs are given to the 
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government of Pakistan as part of its budget support and the government is expected to 
deliver on conditionalities set in the loan (I, Ex-SECP top-echelon official, Interview). 
Pursuit of the neo-liberal agenda to roll-back the ISI policies is obvious from the ADB 
documents: 
“...ADB strategy for the financial sector in Pakistan included a focus on assisting 
its structural transformation from directed to market-led operation (emphasis 
added). This transformation would address critical capital resource deficiencies, 
and place greater reliance on a dynamic private sector capable of generating 
foreign and domestic capital resources to finance industrial growth. This purpose 
was consistent with ADB’s country operational strategy, which called for greater 
private sector participation in the pursuit of economic growth” (Asian 
Development Bank, 2003, p. 18). 
Overall, the ADB seemed satisfied with the results of its capital market development 
programme. It provided “new regulatory framework for the capital market” against its 
objectives of “providing level playing field to the private sector” (Asian Development 
Bank, 2003, pp. vi, 16). CLA was transformed into the SECP with the introduction of 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1997. The ADB introduced settlement of 
exchange on the stock market within three days along with margin financing; minimum 
equity requirements for brokers were increased and redefined; Central Depository 
Company was established in the stock exchanges; the Code of Corporate Governance 
was agreed upon; stock brokers registration guidelines and rules were introduced; and a 
national clearing and settlement system was set up in the stock exchanges. The ADB also 
pushed for the privatisation of public sector mutual funds and reform in the mutual funds 
regulations. The mutual funds management was not running on the professional lines, 
hence there was poor performance on that front. With a lag of two years, new insurance 
rules were partially issued and also a new insurance law was put in place to replace the 
old one. National savings schemes’ interest rates were rationalized. Leasing industry was 
revamped and provided a new impetus. Management of the stock exchanges was given 
to more professionals and stock exchanges were modernized. “However, the market is 
still narrow and remains highly speculative, and the stock exchanges are still perceived 
to be manipulated by a few powerful brokers” (Asian Development Bank, 2003, p. vii). 
Moreover, “daily turnover remains concentrated in very few stocks that have large 
market capitalization” (Asian Development Bank, 2003, p. 7). 
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There is a question mark regarding the ADB’s “satisfaction” over its capital market 
development programme. There were achievements of the programme as discussed 
above (and also in the rest of the chapter). However, given the fact that ADB itself 
admits that a few powerful brokers manipulate the stock exchanges in Pakistan and there 
is very limited trading of shares leading to an illiquid market, there is a huge question 
mark over the overall success of the ADB’s objectives.  
7.3. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
The process to set up the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) 
started as a result of Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1997 that in itself was an 
offshoot of the ADB’s capital market development programme (discussed above). 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1997 sets the terms of establishment of the 
Commission, the board of governors, powers and functions of the Commission. In terms 
of powers, it sets out powers of enforcement and investigation by the Commission, 
powers of cognizance and prosecution of offences, and power to make rules and 
regulations (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act 1997). 
When Commission came into being in 1999, it was given the task of regulating the 
capital market and corporate sector. Later, non-banking finance, insurance and private 
pensions were also assigned to the Commission (Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan, 2004). 
SECP administers a number of laws under its purview. Companies Ordinance 1984 is the 
main architect of the structure by which the SECP governs as stated above. Other 
relevant laws are The Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 amongst others (Asian Development Bank, 
2005). 
The organisational structure of SECP is as follows: there is a Securities and Exchange 
Policy Board that guides the Commission on key policy decisions, and five 
Commissioners including the Chairman who oversee relevant areas of the Commission. 
There are six divisions under the Chairman each headed by an Executive Director. 
Chairman is the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission while Commissioners assist 
him in overall supervision. Each Executive Director heads a Division. Wings are headed 
by Directors while Sections are headed by Joint Directors. The main idea behind the 
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setting up of the Commission was to integrate coverage of securities market with the 
regulation of the Companies Ordinance and look after non-banking financial companies, 
given the linkage amongst these areas (Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan, 2000). The details of functions of divisions are as follows: 
Securities Division deals with securities market functions that include regulation of 
secondary market, market surveillance, licensing and coordination. Enforcement and 
Monitoring Division investigates compliance of laws, reviews listed companies’ 
accounts, oversees regulations’ compliance by the management and carries out 
prosecution. Specialized Companies Division deals with the leasing, modraba funds, 
mutual funds and other specialised companies. It also deals with compliance, licensing 
and enforcement of the relevant laws. The main responsibility of the Company Law 
Administration Division is application of statues of the Companies Ordinance 1984 to all 
listed, private and unlisted companies. It also supervises various field offices known as 
Company Registration Offices in various cities of Pakistan. Regulation of the insurance 
sector is dealt by the Insurance Division. It deals with the supervision and licensing of 
the insurers as well (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2000). 
From 1999-2004, the Commission has been involved in a number of initiatives to 
promote the rule-based governance. These ranged from ensuring transparency, carrying 
out monitoring and evaluation to taking punitive actions. Some of them are discussed 
below: 
7.3.1. Code of Corporate Governance 
One of the major activities the SECP has been involved with is the making of the Code 
of Corporate Governance50. During 1999-2000, the SECP initiated the process of 
deliberations over the Code. It was implemented in March 2002. The Code was finalised 
after extensive consultations and it was modelled on the principles of corporate 
governance of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) 
(Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2000; Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan, 2002).  
                                                          
50 There is a detailed description of the Code of Corporate Governance in Cheema et al. (2003). However, 
the chapter uses the original text of the Code of 2002 collected during the time of the fieldwork. This 
chapter does not use Cheema at al. (2005) discussion on the Code which is overly detailed and laborious.  
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There are certain voluntary and mandatory provisions of the Code of Corporate 
Governance. The most important shortcoming of the Code is making a voluntary 
requirement for having non-executive directors to represent the minority interests on the 
Board of Directors (BoD). The feedback from the fieldwork discussed later in the 
chapter shows that this condition has not been complied with in most cases. The other 
voluntary clause relates to nomination or election of a broker on BoD. The rest of the 
clauses of the Code are mandatory. The SECP is empowered to discipline compliance of 
the Code. The mandatory clauses relate to selection of directors of the company; 
eligibility and qualification of a director; directors’ office tenure; powers, responsibilities 
and functions of the BoD; procedures to appoint and remove the chief financial officer 
(CFO) and company secretary; setting up the frequency of financial reporting; and 
establishing the parameters for the directors’ report to shareholders (Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002, Code of Corporate Governance).  
Other mandatory clauses deal with forbidding any conflict of interest of the company’s 
directors holding shares in the company, disallowing auditors not to hold shares in the 
company, recommending disinvestment of shares by sponsors etc and setting out details 
of corporate ownership patterns. The rest of the mandatory clauses deal with audit 
mainly. The audit functions have been strengthened by the Code. It gives details of the 
formation of the audit committee; functions of internal audit; procedures for external 
auditors’ appointment and their rotation schedule; issuance of management letter by 
external auditors and requirement for the external auditors to attend the company’s 
annual general meeting (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002, Code 
of Corporate Governance). 
A deeper look into the Code of Corporate Governance shows that the idea behind having 
non-executive directors is to introduce an element of accountability in the system. Non-
executive director can better look after the interests of minority shareholders and also 
keep check on the health of the company. However, as a voluntary stipulation it did not 
yield the expected results. The Code also stipulates having an “independent” director 
representing a banking or non-banking financial institution. An independent director is 
not supposed to be related to the management of company to eliminate conflict of 
interest. An independent director is a representative of “institutional investor”. It is again 
meant to keep a check on the financial health of the company from the point of view of 
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the banking or non-banking financial institution (Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan, 2002, Code of Corporate Governance). 
According to the Code, a financial report needs to be submitted as the “directors’ report 
to shareholders”. It includes a financial statement on behalf of the management, changes 
in equity and cash flows etc. The financial report must also have details of shares held by 
associated companies; by chief executive officer and directors and their families; by 
banking and non-banking financial institutions; and by shareholders who hold voting 
rights in the company due to their shares being ten percent or more. This financial 
reporting is to be carried out on quarterly, six-monthly and yearly basis respectively. 
Quarterly reports are un-audited and are circulated with the director’s review. Six-
monthly financial reports need to have some review by the auditors while the annual 
financial statements are authorized by the auditors.  There is a disclosure clause that 
requires the management to declare the shares they hold in the company (Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002, Code of Corporate Governance). These 
stipulations are meant for better financial reporting and transparency. Annual company 
reports were being shared even before SECP; frequency of financial reporting increased 
with SECP. 
Another area the Code focuses on is the audit function within the companies. The Code 
emphasizes the establishment of an audit committee with a preference of a non-executive 
director of the company heading it and two other members being part of it including the 
chairman. The audit committee needs to meet every quarter to review the audit related 
matters. The audit committee’s terms of reference are to be decided by the BoD. They 
include matters like appointing external auditors, reviewing audit reports before their 
announcement, interacting with the external auditors, reviewing management letter etc. 
In other words, the audit committee plays the role of a bridge between the company and 
the external auditors. In addition to the audit committee, there is an internal audit for the 
company recommended as well. The internal audit coordinates with the audit committee 
and produces the internal audit report which is made available to external auditors 
(Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002, Code of Corporate 
Governance). 
The Code also stipulates detailed requirements for external auditors. External auditors 
need to carry a “satisfactory rating” from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
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Pakistan. All companies are required to change their auditors at least every five years. 
The management of the company cannot be partner with the audit company to avoid a 
conflict of interest. Moreover, the companies need to issue a statement of their 
compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance and their statement needs to be 
reviewed by statutory auditors (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002, 
Code of Corporate Governance). 
The 2002 Report of SECP notes that despite extensive consultation prior to the evolution 
of  the Code of Corporate Governance was evolved, “implementation of the Code was 
resisted by some elements in the private sector and the Commission had to stand firm to 
ensure that the initiative was not derailed” (Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan, 2002). This suggests the thesis’s hypothesis of the contested space on 
governance issues. The implementation of Code of Corporate Governance was opposed 
to the point that SECP had to acknowledge it in its annual report. While the evolution of 
the Code has been a definite “step forward”, it has not been without the issues of 
implementation.  
Take the requirement of having a non-executive director representing other interests 
including the interests of minority shareholders. This is needed for accountability, 
transparency and ensuring diffused control of the companies. As discussed earlier, this is 
a voluntary clause in the Code. During the fieldwork it was seen not to be implemented 
by the majority of companies in letter and spirit. Many companies did not appoint non-
executive directors. Even for companies where non-executive directors were appointed, 
their powers were often not at par with the executive directors. Giving credence to 
minority shareholders would have led to more accountability and reduced the possibility 
of manipulation by the majority shares executive directors.  
Changes in the disclosure requirements, appointment of important company officials and 
reconfiguring the role of directors have far-reaching consequences in the way companies 
function. Audits, frequent financial reporting, minimization of the conflict of interest are 
required for the professional handling of company matters in the family-held corporate 
sector. The SECP faced considerable resistance in the implementation of the Code of 
Corporate Governance. Listed companies began delisting from the stock exchanges since 
they did not wish to change. The chapter later discusses the delisting in detail. Key 
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informant interviews for the textiles sector referred to the Code of Corporate Governance 
not being implemented in letter and spirit.  
7.3.2. Carry-Over-Trade or ‘Badla’ versus Margin Trading 
Introducing the margin trading to replace the Carry-Over-Trade (COT) or ‘Badla51’ has 
been another ‘step forward’ in the SECP’s way of progressing towards efficient 
corporate governance. Badla is speculative in nature. The SECP’s effort has been to 
replace the speculative trading that carries risk, disputes and fewer settlements with 
banks financed margin trading that works like a stable overdraft. 
Various types of trading takes place in the stock exchanges in Pakistan. The most direct 
one is called delivery-based trading. Here, whatever a buyer pays is translated into his 
equity. The buyer gets payed soon afterwards. Opposed to this, Badla works on 
borrowed money. Financiers or investors lend the money and the trade takes place 
against the lent money. However, the trade is not settled and is carried over to other 
transactions where the same borrowed money is used for further trading. It is speculative 
in nature, leading to volatility in the market. Also the trade settlement is delayed and 
thereby reduces transparency (I, Ex-SECP top-echelon official, Interview). Hayat throws 
further light on this “post-trade financing”:  
“Those who wish to speculate on borrowed money in the T+352 market obtain 
funds from those who are willing to lend. Through a reverse repurchase, lenders 
pay the clearinghouse on behalf of speculators and take delivery of securities 
while speculators carry over their positions from one settlement to another. The 
speculators and lenders represent a mix of brokers, individual clients, and 
institutional investors. The motive for the speculators is capital gains and for the 
lenders, interest income” (Hayat, official SECP, Dawn, 05-01-2004) 
                                                          
51
 ‘Badla’s is the Urdu name for COT and it is also accepted in the international publications on finance. 
52 “Investors must complete or ‘settle’ their security transactions within three business days. This 
settlement cycle is known as ‘T+3’, shorthand for ‘trade date plus three days’. T+3 means that when you 
buy a security, your payment must be received by your brokerage firm no later than three business days 
after the trade is executed. When you sell a security, you must deliver to your brokerage firm your 
securities certificate no later than three business days after the sale. The three-day settlement date applies 
to most security transactions, including stocks, bonds, municipal securities, mutual funds traded through a 
brokerage firm, and limited partnerships that trade on an exchange. Government securities and stock 
options settle on the next business day following the trade” (http://www.sec.gov/answers/tplus3.htm). 
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Badla netted Rs 13 billion on average in daily financing in 2003 – with great variation 
ranging from Rs 6 billion to Rs 25 billion. Badla influences the overall trading to a great 
extent. Forty to sixty percent of trading is Badla on average. It represents almost half of 
the trading on average in the KSE (Hayat, official SECP, Dawn, 05/01/2004). So in 
Badla for example, a buyer pays one million rupees of cash and buys securities worth 
five million; four million being covered by the financier. On sale of securities, the buyer 
pays interest to the financier and hops on to another transaction. Hence the buyer is 
speculating on borrowed money.  
Badla provides the required liquidity for transactions. However, it is intrinsically linked 
with the “systemic risk” of the market. There is a possibility that buyers would 
“accumulate large unsettled positions” without having the actual ability to pay at the 
clearinghouse if push comes to shove. With the fall in prices, speculators masquerading 
as buyers tend to exit out by selling en-mass which puts further pressure on selling. 
Similarly, financiers try to hold back on funds as they fear speculators’ default induced 
by losses. In cases of default, clearinghouses often end up with more losses than they can 
accommodate. Due to Badla, any volatile condition leads to a crisis in the stock market. 
Liquidity in the market is highly skewed. There are 700 listed companies on the KSE. 
The degree of skewedness is so severe that 70 percent of trading is represented by 10 
stocks and 95 percent of trading accounts for only 30 stocks. The rest of stocks do not 
trade at all. A similar kind of imbalance is evident in Badla trading. Four53 shares took 
up half of the Badla financing (Hayat, official SECP, Dawn, 05-01-2004).  
 
The SECP introduced margin trading to replace Badla. The key difference between the 
two is that while Badla is post-trade financing, margin trading is pre-trade financing. 
Financing for Badla is provided by the individual investors or brokers while margin 
financing is funded by the banks or Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). A certain 
margin (for example 20 percent or 30 percent) of stocks in pledged with the help of bank 
financing. Margin trading works on the basis of collateral. A small percentage of current 
assets of cash is held as a collateral and purchase of shares is allowed against that 
collateral by providing financing for it. During 2003-04, Margin Trading Rules 2004 
were introduced to reduce risks linked with Badla. These reforms were introduced in 
                                                          
53
 Pakistan State Oil (PSO), Pakistan Telecommunication (PTC), Pakistan Oil Field 
(PAKO) and Hub Power Company (HUBCO). 
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collaboration with the stock exchanges and the Central Depository Company. The SECP 
also limited clearing house of the stock exchanges to limit guarantee of Badla to 29 
companies only. There was still the risk of default (Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan, 2004). 
In the margin trading, the risk of default shifts to banks or DFIs who are providing 
financing. In margin trading, the risk are monitored at three levels: banks or DFIs 
monitor risks being the financiers and investors; the respective stock exchange monitors 
risk regarding the  brokers, and brokers in turn look into the risk regarding the customers. 
Margin trading is a much safer than Badla. Margin trading can only be performed by 
brokers registered with the SECP, it further helps with risks mitigation. The registered 
brokers are required to have “minimum net capital balance” requirements; that helps 
further. The SECP also bars brokers from giving margin financing facilities to their own 
partners or directors and to any firm where there is a joint interest. This is to deal with 
the conflict of interest (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2004). 
 Despite the introduction of margin trading rules and plans to phase out Badla by 2005, 
Badla  still carried out majority of the trading in the market at the time of the fieldwork. 
According to a key informant interview done with a functionary of Islamabad Stock 
Exchange even after the fieldwork, close of 70 per cent of trading was done through 
Badla (X, Islamabad Stock Exchange, Interview). This figure is higher than stated by the 
SECP official above. Margin financing had not really taken off. It illustrates efforts to 
reform corporate governance have been ‘one step forward, two steps backward’.  
 There was huge resistance by the stock brokers to phase out Badla and replace it with 
quick  settlement of shares. In Badla, the shares keep on exchanging hands but a quick 
settlement is not carried out. Shares keep on changing hands just as in the property 
market, files of potential plots keep on changing without the change in the formal 
ownership. It is speculation and leads to conflict amongst brokers and shareholders. To 
discourage this speculation, the SECP called for settlement of shares within a short time 
of turnover. Stock brokers hugely resisted it because with every turnover without the 
settlement, they got their commission. Whereas, finalization of settlement within a short 
time of turnover decreased their profits (I, Ex-SECP top-echelon official, Interview).  
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The ADB is cognizant of the short-term carry-over trade or Badla54. Intra-day short-term 
trades are partly financed by Badla. More than 60 per cent trades are Badla or carried 
over. The ADB evaluation report had to concede: “though SECP is generally perceived 
to be an effective regulator, it has not yet been successful in eliminating market 
manipulation and maintaining a healthy balance between speculative and non-speculative 
investment” (Asian Development Bank, 2003, pp. 7-8). It shows serious challenges to 
the ADB’s efforts to implement the corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. 
7.3.3. Payment of Dividend 
The SECP took measures to ensure payment of dividend to shareholders as per 
regulation of Section 236 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. Companies who failed to 
pay dividend to shareholders were put on defaulters counter by the relevant stock 
exchange. During 1999-2000, the Enforcement Division of the SECP picked 177 
companies from Karachi Stock Exchange’s defaulters’ counter. These companies were 
asked to explain their poor performance regarding the payment of dividend. 76 
companies responded by paying their due dividend to the shareholders after a gap of five 
years (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2000). There has been 
improvement in the percentage of companies paying dividend. The number of companies 
paying dividend increased from 268 in 1998 to 354 companies in 2000. This 
improvement has been due to the monitoring by the Enforcement and Monitoring 
Division (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2001). During 2001-2002, 
shareholders of 255 companies received their dividends. Moreover, the rate of companies 
declaring dividend also improved. During 1998-99, 33 per cent of companies declared 
their dividend, in 1999-2000, 41 per cent of companies declared their dividend, whereas 
in 2000-2001, 48 per cent of companies declared dividend, and in 2001-2002, and 41 per 
cent of companies declared their dividend (Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan, 2002). Improvement in the payment of dividend has been a “step forward”. 
However, SECP report also shows that if 41 per cent of companies declared their 
dividend in 2002, it means that 59 per cent of the companies did not declare dividend. It 
raises question marks about the SECP’s ability to enforce corporate governance reforms 
as they have not been able to make the majority of the companies to declare the dividend. 
As discussed by Cheema et al. (2003), if dividend is not paid, it weakens the control of 
                                                          
54
 It is explained in detail later in the chapter. 
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external and minority shareholders and strengthens the family controlled nature of 
companies where the management can use the profits for “private benefits”. 
There is an issue regarding the non-payment of dividends that is worth discussing. 
Companies do not pay dividends when they run a loss or they reinvest back in the 
companies. Hence, it is not necessary that every case of non-payment of dividend is 
related to the management using it for personal benefits. Having granted that, there are 
general trends that point otherwise. Close to 60 per cent companies did not pay dividend 
in 2001-02. It is unlikely that such a large percentage of companies to have suffered 
losses or have reinvested. Moreover, non-payment of dividend was serious issue as it is 
mentioned as a violation of law in the SECP annual reports. If dividend was not being 
paid only due to some genuine reasons such as the loss or reinvestment, the SECP would 
have taken it into account and would not highlighted lack of payment of dividend as a 
violation.  
7.3.4. Holding of Annual General Meeting 
The holding of the Annual General Meeting (AGM) for listed companies is mandatory 
according to the Companies Ordinance, 1984. It is mandatory for companies to hold their 
AGMs within six months of the close of the financial year. It gives an opportunity to 
shareholders to be informed of the state of affairs of the company and to participate in 
the decision-making process. Annual general meetings of the company also provide a 
window to shareholders to comment on the performance of the management. AGMs also 
discuss matters related to dividends’ declaration, annual accounts approval, directors’ 
election and external auditors’ appointment. Failure to hold AGMs is a violation of the 
law (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2000; Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan 2002; Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 2003; 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 2004).  
Fines of over Rs 2 million were imposed by the SECP on 26 companies during 1999-
2000 for not holding the AGMs. The total number of companies monitored during 2001-
2002 was 617, out of which 548 companies held their AGMs while 69 companies did not 
hold their meetings within the stipulated time. Fine was imposed on 17 companies while 
proceedings were started against other companies. Thirty one show-cause notices were 
sent to companies due to non-holding of AGMs within the allowed time framework 
(Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2000; Securities and Exchange 
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Commission of Pakistan, 2002). Out of total of 536 companies during 2003-04, 472 
complied while 64 companies did not. Show cause notices were sent to defaulter 
companies and fines worth Rs 1.06 million were imposed (Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan, 2004). 
The breakdown of level of compliance over the years is as follows: 
Table 7.5: Compliance of Holding of Annual General Meeting 
Year No of Companies No of Compliant 
Companies 
Compliance % 
2004 536 472 88.1 
2003 582 498 85.6 
2002 617 548 88.8 
2001 635 534 84.1 
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2004 
Holding of AGMs is another step towards the rule-based governance. AGMs provide 
shareholders with a mechanism to keep check on the affairs of the company. It provides 
them with a window to keep tab on how the company is being run. Since, annual 
accounts are presented in the AGMs. With the timely holding of the AGMs, they make it 
possible for annual accounts and other related matters to be discussed by shareholders. 
AGMs could also provide with an illusion of accountability. There is not much that 
shareholders can do by meeting once in a year. It is by no means an effective mechanism 
of accountability by minority shareholders. Nonetheless it is a window of opportunity. It 
may not ensure the rule-based governance but it is certainly a step towards it.  
Companies are largely family held businesses as stated earlier. Key informant interview 
with an Ex-SECP top-echelon official showed that quite a few company owners were not 
happy with holding AGMs and attempted to resist it as much as they could. They were of 
the view that in the AGMS, “every Tom, Dick, Harry (amongst the shareholders) can ask 
a question and potentially embarrass the management of the company”. They tried to 
convince SECP to swap AGMs with sending a small gift to shareholders annually by the 
company (I, ex-SECP, Interview). 
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7.3.5. Accountability of Auditors 
Presentation of annual accounts is the linchpin of regime of the rule-based governance. If 
the quality of auditing is not up to mark, it does not present a true or fair picture of the 
accounts. Unless accounts are fairly presented, there is no mechanism to find out the 
health of company. Proper documentation is essential as a prerequisite of proper 
accounting. During 1999-2000, the Enforcement Division of the SECP reviewed the 
performance of auditors and two cases of auditors were sent to Institute for Chartered 
Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) requesting action against the auditors due to poor 
quality of auditing (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2000).  
During 2000-2001, several auditors were identified who were not working according to 
the statutory requirements while auditing the concerned companies. Action was taken 
against the negligent auditors and their cases were also referred to the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) for disciplinary measures (Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2001). During 2001-02, the SECP tried to mitigate 
the conflict of interest between the auditor firms and the companies they were auditing, 
emphasized auditors’ rotation, and also imposed fines on the auditor firms that were 
found guilty of misconduct (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002).  
During 2001-02, two audit firms were prosecuted for performing bad audit on accounts 
of the two listed companies. Court of Session was approached to prosecute the case of 
Adil Polypropylene Products Limited, and another case was also referred for 
adjudication (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002). Several cases 
were brought to the SECP’s notice where either the auditors did not fulfil the “statutory 
requirements” or issued false reports. The Enforcement and Monitoring Division of the 
SECP started proceedings against 20 firms in 25 cases and penalties were enforced on 
most of the firms. The Commission started handling cases on its own rather than 
referring them to the ICAP. Previous cases that were referred to ICAP took a long time 
to get decided (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002).  
During 2002-03, several violations of the Companies Ordinance and International 
Accounting Standards were noticed by the SECP. Due to the false nature of accounts, the 
SECP initiated proceedings against 14 chartered accounts firms in 19 cases. Penalties 
were imposed on 14 cases while the 5 were pending. ICAP was approached to take 
action against the negligence of accounting firms (Securities and Exchange Commission 
160 
 
of Pakistan, 2003). It is interesting to note that action against auditors continued even 
during 2003-04. It seems that despite tightening the screw, quality of statutory auditing 
still left much to be desired. During 2003-04, proceedings were again started due to false 
or bad accounting. One chartered accountant firm was fined while prosecution initiated 
against another one (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2004). 
Overall, the SECP took action against auditors year after year as discussed above, yet 
there were still irregularities in the performance of some auditors over the years. Despite 
the SECP’s adherence to professional accounting practices and its penalization and 
taking strict actions, there were still chartered accountant firms and listed companies 
which kept on violating the rules quite consistently. Key informant interview with Ex-
SECP top-echelon official revealed that chartered accountants resisted the SECP’s 
interventions not only in the auditing realm. They were also opposed to the SECP 
automating the company names and making them publicly available. Earlier, the 
accountants used to earn a certain income when a new company name was approved. 
Automation cut into their income. However, the real resistance was to the SECP’s 
attempts to penalize false or bad auditing as it cut into the deals the auditors would make 
informally with the companies they were auditing and which were tantamount to the 
violation of relevant laws (I, ex-SECP, interview). Resistance of accountants and brokers 
falls within the thesis’s assertion that the intermediate  classes resist the rule of law as 
well as the capitalist class. 
7.3.6. Unlawful Inter-Corporate Financing 
Inter-corporate financing can lead to productive capital formation. However it is often 
mis-used to transfer funds to associated companies for the management’s benefit. To 
discourage misuse, Companies Ordinance has imposed some restriction on associated 
companies getting investments from sister concerns (Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan, 2003). Inter-corporate financing is not encouraged to avoid 
unauthorized use of the company’s resources to fund associated undertakings. During 
2000-2001, proceedings were initiated against ten companies for violating Section 208 of 
the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and penalties worth Rs 7.3 million were levied. The 
companies were instructed to annex a list of their investments in their associated 
undertakings. The aim of this measure was to increase transparency with regards to inter-
corporate financing (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2001). 
 
161 
 
 During 2000-2001, the Enforcement and Monitoring Division of SECP sent directives to 
nine companies to check irregularities with the possibility of fraud. Ghani Textile Mills 
sold to “themselves” investment worth Rs 9.6 million made in the associated company of 
Ghani Glass Mills Limited. They were instructed by the SECP to deposit that money in 
the company’s account as it was considered an “undue gain”. Similarly, Pioneer Cement 
Limited “erroneously” paid Rs 11 million as reimbursement of medical expenses to its 
Chairman. The directors of the company were told to return that money to the company. 
Husein Sugar Mills sold shares of its subsidiary company to the directors of the said 
company at a low and “inadequate” price. The directors of Husein Sugar Mills were told 
to give Rs 15 million in the subsidiary company’s account to cater for the exceedingly 
low price. Similarly, six companies55 (which were a mix of textiles and non-textiles 
companies) were told by the SECP not to pass “special resolutions” regarding sale of 
their companies’ assets or to further inter-corporate financing in contravention of the law 
(Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2001). 
 
Abuse of inter-corporate financing was checked by the SECP in 2001-02 by pointing 
towards incorrect facts in the notices sent for annual general meetings. The companies 
approved the unlawful inter-corporate transfers through “proposed resolutions” that were 
to in effect hoodwink the SECP. The Enforcement and Monitoring Division stopped the 
transfer of Rs 120 million to associated companies by asking the parent companies to 
withdraw the “proposed resolutions” for such investments in 2001-02. Similarly, one 
company wanted to sell its investment in an associated company at a “throw-away 
price”; it was stopped from doing so. Companies were identified where they had made 
investments to their subsidiary companies, which were either over the allowed limit or 
such an investment was done without the permission of shareholders. In addition to this, 
15 companies were prosecuted for violating the “mandatory provisions of the Companies 
Ordinance”. Ten such cases were in the process of adjudication whereas five were 
disposed of. As a result of this action, the SECP made more than Rs 1.1 million to be 
returned to the companies (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002). 
Table 7.6 below describes in detail the actions taken against the cases of unlawful inter-
corporate financing during 2001-02: 
                                                          
55
 Dewan Sugar Mills Limited, Dewan Mushtaq Textile Mills Limited, Dewan Khalid Mills Limited, 
Dewan Textile Mills Limited, Haji Muhammad Ismail Mills Limited and National Tannery of Pakistan 
Limited. 
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Table 7.6: Cases of Unlawful Inter-corporate Financing Disposed of During the 
Year 2001-02 
S. 
No 
Company Amount 
Invested (Rs 
in Million) 
Action Taken 
1 Spencer and Company 
(Pakistan) Limited 
504.697 Penalty of Rs 1 million imposed on 
the CEO and direction given to 
recover the investment along with 
return 
2 Gharibwal Cement 
Limited 
501.841 Penalty of Rs 1.5 million imposed on 
the CEO and directors and direction 
given to recover the investments 
3 Mandviwalla Mauser 
Limited 
18.000 Penalty of Rs 200,000 imposed on 
the CEO and direction given to 
recover the investment and return 
thereon 
4 Yousaf Textile Mills 
Limited 
5.626 Penalty of Rs 10,000 imposed on the 
CEO 
5 Ghani Glass Limited 49.935 Penalty of Rs 135,000 imposed on 
the CEO and directors and direction 
given to recover the return on 
investments 
 Total 1,089.099  
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002 
Like the previous years, and even during 2002-03, cases of the unlawful inter-corporate 
financing surfaced. The SECP intervened to stop four companies from making Rs 27 
million worth of investment in their associated companies. More cases were investigated 
where investments were made in associated companies without the prior “approval of 
shareholders or free of return”. There were nine more cases of unauthorized inter-
corporate financing. Four of those were dealt by the SECP in 2002-03 while five were 
sent for adjudication. The SECP led to overall Rs 776.109 million being returned to 
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parent companies rather than being unlawfully used by associated companies (Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2003).  
During 2003-04, similar patterns of the unlawful inter-corporate financing continued. 
Two companies were stopped from making investments worth Rs 111.06 million in their 
associated companies due to intervention of the SECP. Moreover, evidence was gathered 
for cases where investment in associated companies was made without the proper 
approval of shareholders. Even during 2003-04, two companies were prosecuted for 
violating the Companies Ordinance in terms of the inter-corporate financing. One such 
company was told to take its investment back from its associated company and was also 
fined Rs 100,000 of penalty. The SECP’s actions to check unlawful inter-corporate 
financing during 2003-04 were estimated to return an investment of exceeding Rs 97 
million to the parent companies (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 
2004). 
Unlawful transfer of funds to associated companies is a clear example of violation of 
rule-based norms pushed by the IFIs in the realm of corporate governance. In the 
instances quoted above, unlawful inter-corporate transfer was either stopped or where the 
transfer had already taken place, it was reversed and in more serious cases even 
proceedings were initiated against the concerned companies. It is again a pattern similar 
to malpractices related to audit functions discussed above. The SECP kept on taking 
action year after year to stop unlawful inter-corporate financing, yet more such cases 
kept on surfacing as the years passed by. From the SECP annual reports, this chapter 
only discusses the cases where the unlawful inter-corporate financing was prevented or 
actions were taken to prevent it from taking place. We do not know of cases where the 
inter-corporate financing did take place as an unlawful transfer and either it was not 
brought to the notice of the SECP or the SECP could not take action against it. 
Nonetheless, the SECP’s action to prevent unlawful inter-corporate financing is a “step 
forward” in terms of transition to the rule-based governance.  
Unlawful inter-corporate funding is related to the earlier discussion of control versus 
ownership (Cheema et al., 2003). Given the family-based management and their 
discretion to use the company’s funds makes unlawful inter-corporate financing possible 
in the first place. Knowing the nature of family controlled businesses in Pakistan and the 
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SECP limitations, the percentage of unlawful inter-corporate financing checked by the 
SECP is likely to be small. Most such cases may have slipped through the system. 
7.4. Resistance to the SECP 
As the literature discussed above makes it abundantly clear that corporate sector in 
Pakistan is family business (Cheema et al., 2003). The same finding reverberated 
throughout the fieldwork. Textiles mills are owned by families including the public listed 
companies. This family owned corporate sector put up resistance to the SECP measures 
to enforce the rule-based governance. Perception amongst the majority of the textile 
manufacturers was that since textiles is mainly family held business, there is little need 
of its monitoring and the protection of the interests of minority shareholders. As 
discussed earlier, only a small number of companies actually trade their shares on the 
stock exchange and the rest of the companies’ shares are illiquid. Therefore, the textiles 
manufacturers interviewed were unhappy about what they termed “excessive 
monitoring” by the SECP (discussed in detail above) which led to de-listing of 
companies from the stock exchange. Views of the some textiles manufacturers on 
corporate governance by the SECP are stated below: 
“All textiles is mainly held by families. They may be public, may be private. It 
makes no difference (emphasis added). There you bring law like Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan, what’s the point? For most of the textile 
companies, their shares are neither being sold, nor purchased. They are stocks 
that are closely held by families… We have some conceptual difference with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. We have adopted whatever is 
happening in America and Europe. We have adopted those rules and systems by 
forgetting that their management is controlled by shareholders through equity, 
shareholding, and mutual funds. This is not the case in Pakistan. Other than few 
companies, which have transferred from government companies to publicly listed 
companies, companies are held by families… Securities and Exchange 
Commission laws are not encouraging public companies. Since 2001, 
insignificant number of companies are listing. Manufacturers are delisting. There 
are just too many laws while listed companies are closely held by families… 
What is the point of having so many formalities? The law requires me to have 
internal auditors. Such laws would have been appropriate had companies been in 
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the format of European and American companies where there is no one owner 
sitting” (O, Silk Company, Interview).  
The above quote is self-explanatory and it is by no means a minority view. Such views 
were echoed throughout the fieldwork. A socially aware large textiles manufacturer in 
Karachi spoke in similar terms: 
“It is fine to make rules and regulation to protect the shareholders. They are being 
effective but we should not compare them with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in New York... The rules are there but somehow the spirit vanishes. 
The form, the letter has been emphasized today without creating the spirit. You 
cannot bring change by creating rules, you bring change by creating conditions” 
(GT, Textile Mills, Interview). 
From this more subtle criticism of the SECP, a denim manufacturer in Karachi put his 
criticism of SECP more squarely:  
“A lot of companies are de-listing... There are a lot of the SECP’s requirements 
of Code of Corporate Governance and other prudential regulations. Due to the 
SECP, most of the companies feel suffocated. Too much of monitoring and too 
much control” (JC, Denim Company, Interview). 
This resistance is not limited to the criticism of the SECP. It translated into actions. It led 
to de-listing of public companies.  
In terms of background to listing, tax breaks provided the incentives to the corporate 
sector to list companies on the stock exchange. Tax breaks were given for publically 
listed companies by mid-1990s. Whereas corporate tax was 43 percent for private 
companies, the public companies paid only 35 percent. Hence, quite a few erstwhile 
private companies listed themselves on the stock exchange to take advantage of the tax 
differential56 (OJ, Federal Board of Revenue, Interview). However, the other side of 
going public for the companies was to declare the annual income, profits and liabilities to 
the public, to adhere to the Code of Corporate Governance, and the SECP monitoring. 
Public listed companies started to delist soon after the SECP initiated monitoring of 
                                                          
56
 It has changed now and the government has imposed a flat rate of 35% across the board. 
166 
 
corporate governance. The details are as below for the  Karachi Stock Exchange, the 
biggest in Pakistan: 
Table 7.7: De-listing of Companies from the Karachi Stock Exchange 
Listed Companies in 1994 724 
Listed Companies in 1995 764 
Listed Companies in 1996 782 
Listed Companies in 1997 781 
Listed Companies in 1998 773 
Listed companies in 1999 767 
Listed companies in 2000 762 
Listed companies in 2001 747 
Listed companies in 2002 711 
Listed companies in 2003 700 
Source: Karachi Stock Exchange, Annual Reports from 1994 to 2003. 
The figures in Table 7.7 show the effect of corporate tax breaks with an increase in the 
listing of public companies starting from 1995 and continuing more or less till 1997 
when the Securities and Exchange Commission Act was promulgated. It starts to decline 
from there to the period between 2000 and 2001 where there is a major drop. This period 
corresponds to the SECP taking various measures to promote rule-based governance as 
discussed above. It continues to decline from there onwards.  
De-listing of public companies is a strong example of resistance of the Pakistani 
capitalist class to the regime of corporate governance of the SECP funded by the ADB. 
Karachi Stock Exchange in 2003-04 ended up with fewer companies than it had a decade 
ago in 1994.  
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Other than de-listing, not many new companies listed on the stock exchange. Only a 
small percentage of registered companies were on the stock exchange. An owner of a 
large private textiles mill provided an interesting rationale for it: 
“My parents are conservative (in terms of financing). My father told me never to 
borrow money from others for business and not to lose control over the business” 
(JJ, Textiles Mill, Interview).  
Therefore, JJ’s company was never registered on the stock exchange or entered into a 
venture capital with a foreign firm due to fear of losing grip over his business. This short 
quote sums up well the larger sentiment in the corporate sector in Pakistan. Not listing 
and not raising equity as a process of capital formation is due to the fear of losing 
control. It shows the resistance to the SECP’s corporate governance reforms.  
Related to the family-owned nature of Pakistani corporate sector and the shares not being 
actively traded is the debate regarding the success of corporate governance reforms in 
Pakistan by the ADB. Ex-SECP top-echelon official in the key informant interview 
raised a critical issue. The cornerstone of any capital market development programme is 
to promote the equities market. A successful implementation should have translated into 
liquidity of trading in shares, so that the companies could raise finance through public 
equity rather than relying on family fortunes or bank loans. As discussed earlier, it did 
not happen in the case of Pakistan. Ex-SECP top-echelon official was of the view that in 
the broad sense, the ADB’s capital market development programme failed because it did 
not lead to an effective equities-driven capital formation, despite making gains in some 
other sectors such as revamping of interest rates for the national savings schemes etc. 
The SECP checked petty corruption through automation, it also initiated the leasing 
companies, modrabas and mutual funds and brought the non-profit sector under control 
through the Companies Ordinance. However, it did not lead to capital formation through 
equities market (I, Ex-SECP top-echelon official, Interview).  
This is a fairly strong indictment of the ADB’s intervention in corporate governance in 
Pakistan. The literature shows that the ADB was aware of it and acknowledged it (Asian 
Development Bank, 2003). This criticism is also applicable to the SECP. While, the 
SECP made progress on the Code of Corporate Governance, holding of Annual General 
Meetings, paying of dividends to shareholders, checking unlawful inter-corporate 
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financing and automating the company names etc; it failed to raise an effective capital 
formation through equities market.  
This chapter on SECP mainly covers the period from 1999 to 2004. However, just to 
gain some perspective on the developments immediately after the fieldwork, it is 
worthwhile to note that the Karachi Stock Exchange crashed in March-April 2005. It 
reached a peak as the Asia’s best performing stock exchange due to the combination of 
large inflows coming into Pakistan post September 11, 2001 and investment being made 
with short-time horizons in the property market and the stock exchange. KSE-100 share 
index ballooned from over 6,000 points on 31st December 2004 to over 10,000 points on 
15th March 2005. Market surged a great deal in these few months. The index started 
dropping from March 16th 2005 onwards. On 12th April 2005, it crashed by dropping 
back to a little less than 7,000. This crash led to a loss of Rs 780 billion, mostly to small 
and middle investors. Big brokers57 were thought to have made billions of rupees of 
windfall profits. The stock market crash happened due to “market manipulation, insider 
trading and market abuse”. Big brokers were later protected by the government by not 
letting the SECP Chairman Dr Tariq Hassan to implement the findings of the task force 
on KSE crash in March 2005 (New Pakistan, May 2005). 
If the SECP reforms to phase out Badla trading with margin trading had been 
implemented in letter and spirit, such high volatility in the market would not have 
occurred. The SECP made attempts to introduce margin trading. However, it clearly was 
not very successful and led to the market being manipulated by powerful brokers which 
led to its crash in March-April 2005.  
The ADB literature mentions a few powerful brokers running the capital market in 
Pakistan (Asian Development Bank, 2003). During the key informant interview, Ex-
SECP top-echelon official was very candid in terms of the powerful brokers and 
chartered accountants resisting the SECP management of corporate governance. 
According to I, the highest resistance to SECP was put up by the powerful stock brokers. 
Some of these brokers were so powerful that they had direct access to the then President 
Musharraf and then Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. In the key informant’s experience of 
                                                          
57 Names of 13 big brokers out of the list of 88 who have been named to have grossly profited from the 
crash of March 2005: Atlas Investments, AKD Securities, BMA Securities, Arif Habib, Orix Investment 
Bank, KASB, Taurus Securities, Abdul Jabbar Khanani, Escort Investments, Jehangir Siddiqui, Akbar Ali 
Cassim and Sons, Motiwala Securities, and Elixir Investments (New Pakistan, May 2005). 
169 
 
getting rules to be passed by the then President and Cabinet, he met one powerful stock 
exchange broker coming out of the President’s room as he went for the Cabinet meeting 
and the stock broker told then SECP top-echelon official that those rules would not be 
passed by the Cabinet. The SECP official did not believe the broker as those rules were 
item number two on the Cabinet meeting agenda and all the necessary groundwork had 
been done needed for the legislation. During the Cabinet meeting chaired by the 
President where the SECP top-echelon official was also present, proceedings took place 
exactly as predicted by the broker. Despite the SECP rules being agenda no 2 on the 
meeting, the concerned minister and bureaucrats backed out of their earlier written 
summaries and those rules were not passed (I, Ex-SECP top-echelon official, Interview). 
This incident is an anecdote; however, it is supported by a firm perception that the stock 
brokers were very powerful in Pakistan and they had access and influence in the highest 
policy making circles. Cheema et al. (2003) refer to Khwaja and Mian study on 
“insiders” and brokers of the stock exchange resisting change in the functions of the 
stock exchange. This was because even though the number of beneficiaries of the old 
system were small, the rents associated with it were large. Therefore, even a small 
number of powerful players could oppose the reforms. 
There is little domestic ownership of IFIs pushed reforms. Key informant I was of the 
opinion that “The decision makers do not believe in them (the reforms). They just do it to 
get money from the IFIs”. Hence, as soon as the programme term expires, the back-
tracking and policy reversals start taking place (I, ex-SECP top-echelon official, 
Interview). One of the key reasons behind the setting up the SECP was to have an 
autonomous institution run by professionals who manage corporate governance. The 
purpose was to take corporate governance away from the control of the Ministry of 
Finance. After the lapse of the programme loan period, however, the influence of the 
Ministry of Finance in the SECP and its Board of Directors was again palpable (I, ex-
SECP top-echelon official, Interview). Presently, the Secretary of Finance Division58, the 
Secretary of Ministry of Commerce59, and Deputy Governor of the State Bank are on the 
policy board of the SECP, with the Finance Division Secretary being the Chairman of the 
Board. The ADB’s massive effort to make the SECP autonomous has been largely 
reversed. 
                                                          
58 Government of Pakistan. 
59 Government of Pakistan. 
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7.5. Hidden Subsidy: Capital Gains Taxation and Vehicle Leasing 
Share trading on the stock exchanges was exempted from capital gains tax. In a severely 
under-taxed economy, such an exemption is an anomaly. As Chapters 4 and 6 state, it 
was possible to get access to some internal CBR documents entitled “Explanatory 
Circulars 1998-2004” (Central Board of Revenue, 1998-2004). These circulars show 
changes in taxation related legislation from 1998-2004. They offer an interesting insight 
into the implementation of the rule of law in the corporate sector.  
Capital gains tax is defined as “any profit or gain arising from the transfer of capital 
assets, other than immovable property or assets which are entitled to depreciation 
allowance, is chargeable under this head” (Central Board of Revenue, 2004, p. 29). In 
2004, government extended the period of tax exemption on capital gains. Capital gains is 
charged on redeemable capital of registered companies and sale of modaraba certificates. 
This period was extended until 2007 (Central Board of Revenue, 1998-2004, 
“Explanatory Circulars 1998-2004”). However, capital value tax was levied on purchase 
of shares in Stock Exchanges at the rate of 0.01 per cent. It was applicable on purchase 
of redeemable capital or modaraba certificate. It was imposed from July 2004. 
Apparently it seemed to push rather contradictory measures. On the one hand, the tax 
authorities were continuing to grant exemption to the capital market on capital gains tax. 
On the other hand, they imposed a nominal capital value tax on purchase of redeemable 
capital (Central Board of Revenue, 1998-2004, “Explanatory Circulars 1998-2004”). 
However, capital value tax is minimal. Overall, the tax authorities gave advantage to the 
capital market by persisting to exempt it of capital gains tax. The capital market really 
prospered during this period. In some sense, by extending exemption on capital gains, 
government gave a hidden subsidy to capital market sector. An elated performance of the 
stock exchange in early 2000s when Karachi Stock Exchange was considered one of best 
performing markets in Asia could not be delinked from this hidden subsidy. Similarly 
there was an exemption given to venture capital companies from withholding tax. That 
exemption was also extended till 2007 (Central Board of Revenue, 1998-2004, 
“Explanatory Circulars 1998-2004”). 
Chapter 3 discussed the thriving of consumer financing during the Musharraf era. The 
SECP had a certain role to play in it. Due to the capital market development plan of the 
ADB, leasing sector was reinvigorated. The SECP annual reports show that the 
171 
 
government encouraged vehicles’ purchase financing through concessions in the Finance 
Ordinance, 2001. It led to an increase of 9 percent of investment in the leasing sector. 
Tax concessions were again to the leasing sector in the Finance Ordinances of 2001 and 
2002 (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2002). Tax incentives were 
provided to the vehicle leasing sector which further contributed to a boom in vehicle 
leasing. Similar practices were repeated in the Finance Act 2003 (Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan, 2003). Giving boost to the vehicle leasing through 
tax concessions is another case of hidden subsidy being given through tax related 
concessions. 
 
7.6. Post-fieldwork Studies 
 
Pakistan’s stock market’s capitalization was close to Rs 60060 billion in 2003 and only a 
miniscule number of companies are listed on the stock exchanges (Bari, 2006). A World 
Bank report says that there are 47,500 registered companies in Pakistan (World Bank, 
2008). Out of 47,500 registered companies, only 700 plus are publicly listed, or just over 
2 per cent. Public listed companies are a miniscule part of the overall corporate sector in 
Pakistan, which shows the shallowness of the capital market development programme of 
the ADB.  
 
The ADB in its 2005 report states that the objective of the capital market development 
programme (CMDP) was “creating an enabling policy environment to enhance 
competition and a level playing field” (Asian Development Bank, 2005, p. iii). The 
ADB’s evaluation considered CMDP “highly relevant”. The ADB was satisfied with the 
“level playing field” provision, the SECP’s management of securities market and the 
leasing sector. It considered pension and insurance reforms only partly successful. It also 
underlined risks from new types of manipulation of the market in the securities and the 
need to strengthen the market surveillance system of the SECP. It repeated the findings 
of the ADB 2003 evaluation regarding the CMDP achievements and notes that the 
SECP-directed TA Loan 1577-PAK(SF) was only partly successful since it contributed 
                                                          
60 Pakistan’s GDP (factor cost) for 2003-04 was Rs. 5206.56 billion or 5.2 trillion (Government of 
Pakistan, Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2003-04). 
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only “marginally” to the strengthening of the SECP’s corporate governance structures 
(Asian Development Bank, 2005). 
 
The ADB 2008 evaluation of its capital market development programme in six countries 
-Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Viet Nam, Sri Lanka and Mongolia -is more realistic 
compared to earlier evaluations. It terms the ADB’s intervention as “borderline 
successful”. In terms of impact, while capital markets were more developed as the result 
of the ADB’s reforms, the evaluation acknowledges that liquidity in the stock markets of 
the developing countries has only been “modest”. It also admitted that on politically 
sensitive issues, either the ADB pushed reforms were “not implemented or reversed later 
on” (Asian Development Bank, 2008, pp. iii-v).  
 
The 2008 evaluation report also underscored the need of ownership and commitment 
from all relevant stakeholders over the long-term for the difficult reforms to succeed. In 
terms of achievement, the ADB evaluation report is of the view that though market 
capitalization hovered around 20 per cent of GDP in the programme countries and was at 
par with some other Latin American and Eastern European countries, it was less than 
other developed markets in Asia such as Singapore, China, Hong Kong and Malaysia. 
The evaluation report notes that the turnover of shares trading in Pakistan was high61 
matching more developed market, it was due to Badla trading that also introduced high 
volatility and unpredictability in the market. In terms of value addition, the ADB’s 
programmes achieved “substantial” value addition in the Philippines and Pakistan and it 
was not realized in Sri Lanka while the rest of the three countries fared in between. The 
evaluation also acknowledges the preponderant role of Ministry of Finance of the 
borrowing countries in the corporate governance organisations despite the fact that 
ADB’s intervention emphasized autonomy and independence (Asian Development Bank, 
2008).        
 
Conclusion 
There is a ‘one step forward, two steps backwards’ relationship between the law and 
governance in terms of the SECP’s performance. It captures the struggle between forces 
                                                          
61 Since turnover of shares is very low in the family owned and controlled corporate sector; such a high-
turnover of shares would have taken place in the government owned or foreign companies. 
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which want to impose a regime of rule-based governance and those which resist it. The 
SECP has taken action against bad auditors, unlawful inter-corporate financing, non-
holding of Annual General Meetings of the companies amongst other measures. It also 
introduced the Code of Corporate Governance and introduced margin financing to phase 
out Badla trading. The SECP is also perceived to be successful in the leasing sector. It 
also made interventions in the reform of mutual funds and insurance sector. All these 
measures are a step forward. 
Market volatility due to Badla trading, market manipulation by the powerful stock 
brokers, illiquidity in trading and a general failure in achieving a substantial capital 
formation through an equities market are failures for capital market development 
reforms. 
The ADB evaluation reports keep mentioning market manipulation by powerful brokers 
as the main opposition being faced to capital market development in Pakistan. As 
discussed in the chapter, it is the capitalist sector in Pakistan which also resisted 
corporate governance reforms. Since the corporate sector in Pakistan is family based and 
owned, it is wary of losing control if external investors and minority shareholders are 
protected. It is also way of active trading of shares of the public listed companies. It is 
the capitalist class which resisted the SECP reforms of corporate governance and started 
to de-list from the stock exchange rather than adhering to the reforms. In other words, the 
capitalists do not want more mature capitalism. They want to continue with their family 
controlled and owned corporate sector that helps them maximize their gains using all 
strategies including the rule-violating behavior. 
However, it does not mean that stock brokers and chartered accountants did not resist the 
SECP backed reforms for transparency and rule-based governance. Powerful stock 
brokers and other professional classes also resisted the reforms. The intermediate classes 
and the capitalist class indulged in the rule-violating behaviour either in collusion with 
each other or on their own. Such rule-violating behavior documented in this chapter 
points towards the challenges of transition to a modern “Weberian” state. 
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Chapter 8. An Overview of the Textiles Sector in Pakistan through 
Manufacturers’ Perceptions 
This chapter gives an overview of the textiles sector in Pakistan largely through the 
manufacturers’ perceptions and views. It also gives background, statistics, discusses 
various stages of production in the textiles and presents the key findings of the fieldwork. 
This chapter is based on sixty-four key informant interviews of the textiles 
manufacturers, representative of the textiles’ association, employees and stakeholders, in 
addition to statistics from the government publications and some secondary sources. This 
chapter is to serve as a background overview to the next Chapter Nine, which presents 
quasi-anthropological case studies on the phenomenon of inter-generational hereditary 
entrepreneurship. 
8.1. Background 
There is not much specific literature available on the textile groups in the 1950s and 
1960s. There is, however, literature on the monopoly houses of that era, and textiles was 
a significant part of those monopoly houses. 
As Chapter 3 states, erstwhile traders became the new industrial class in Pakistan in the 
1950s and 1960s due to an active role of the government institutions to redistribute 
resources to the emergent capitalist class. These erstwhile traders mostly traded in cotton 
and yarn. The industrial tycoons of Pakistan, i.e. the so-called 22 or 43 families,62 largely 
emerged from these traders. Half of the total production in the textile sector came from 
nine big industrial houses in 1959 with over 37 per cent textiles being produced by the 
top five industrial houses. Over 70 per cent of total production of these big industrial 
houses in the then West Pakistan consisted of textiles. This pattern got consolidated over 
the next decade. The largest four industrial houses produced 28 per cent of textiles in 
1970 where only twenty-three industrial houses produced the textiles in total (Amjad, 
1974; Zaman, 1984; Zaidi, 2005). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the government’s liberal finance played a crucial role. Thirty-
seven monopoly houses got 65 per cent of the total funds given from 1958 to 1970 by the 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC). One leading business 
                                                          
62 Depending on whether one takes Mahbub-ul-Haq’s definition who popularized the concept of 22 
families ruling Pakistan or Lawrence White’s definition who calculated monopoly houses to be 43.  
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house owner Adamjee was the Chairman of the investment corporation while other 7 
were on its board of directors. A similar pattern was observed in the National Investment 
Trust. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) started business enterprises 
and then disinvested them at throwaway prices to the leading monopoly houses such as 
Amin, Adamjee, Bawany, Dawood, Fancy, Isphani, Nishat, Saigol, Karim and Hoti. 
Quickly, a capitalist class in Pakistan was born. Many of the business houses started off 
in the textiles and jute businesses but then branched into others such as chemicals, sugar, 
cement, shipping, and later into insurance and banks. Half of the total assets in textiles 
were owned by the 17 largest houses (Amjad, 1974; Zaman, 1984). 
Papanek (1967) is of the view that profits were so high in a captive domestic market in 
the 1950s and 1960s that textiles manufacturers were able to earn 50 to 100 per cent 
profit on their investment and “robber barons” emerged in two to three years time having 
fully earned back their initial investments.  
Significant patronage was distributed through bank loans in the 1980s and 1990s as 
discussed in the thesis earlier. Using 1996-2002 election results and bank loans data, 
Khwaja and Asim state that politically connected firms borrowed “45 per cent more and 
have 50 per cent higher default rates” than others. They also say that incidence of 
politically motivated loans is higher in the textiles sector compared to other sectors 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005).  
The spinning sector expanded at an exponential rate (Cheema, 2000). Default of bank 
loans in the textiles in the 1980s and 1990s led to its decline. The government banks 
bailed out inefficient, sick, failing firms through political corruption that defaulted on 
loans. It led to negative spiral of productivity in the spinning sector (Cheema, 2003). 
8.2. Textile Sector in Contemporary Pakistan 
Textiles is the leading manufacturing sector in Pakistan. As discussed in Chapter 4, all 
statistics on Pakistan emphasize the primacy of the textiles sector: 
Textiles “… share in the economy, in terms of GDP, exports, employment, 
foreign exchange earnings, investment and contribution to the value added in 
industry; makes it the single largest determinant of the growth in overall 
manufacturing activity… Pakistan has emerged as one of the major cotton textile 
product supplier in the world market and its share in world yarn trade is about 30 
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percent while its share in cotton cloth trade is about 8 percent” ( Government of 
Pakistan, 2003, Economic Survey of Pakistan 2002-03).  
The above quote illustrates that value addition has not taken deep roots in Pakistan’s 
textiles sector. While Pakistan had 30 percent share of yarn in world trade, it has only 8 
percent of world share in cloth. Moreover, Pakistan’s overall share in the world textiles 
was only 2.9 percent in 2000 (United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, 
2009). We will return to this later in the chapter. 
Major economic contribution by the textile sector during 2002-03 is given 
below: 
Table 8.1: Primacy of the Textiles Sector in Pakistan in 2004 
Exports 68 % of total exports (US $ 7.4 billion) 
Manufacturing 46 % of total manufacturing 
Employment 38 % of total industrial workers 
GDP 10.5 % of total GDP 
Investment 31 % of total investment 
 
Taxes Rs. 101 billion per annum 
Salaries & Wages Rs. 4.5 billions per annum 
Contribution To R&D Rs. 148 billion per annum 
Banks financing US$ 1 billion during 2002 & 2003 
Investment in last 4 years US$ 4 billion 
Source: Pakistan Investment Guide, Ministry of Industries, Government of Pakistan, 
2004 
These statistics speak volumes about the significance of the textiles sector.  
The structure of Pakistan’s textile industry in 2004 was as follows: 
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Table 8.2: Composition and Structure of the Textiles Sector in 2004 
Sub-sector No. of Units Size (installed capacity) Production 
1. Ginning 
(unorganized/cottage, small 
sector) 
1221 5,488 Saws More than 10 million cotton 
bales63 
2. Spinning 
Spinning (organised sector) 
 
392 
 
9.2 million spindles, 147,853 
rotors 
 
1,550 million kilogram yarn 
 
Composite Units (organized 
sector) 
 
50 
 
(un-stated) (un-stated) 
Total (Spinning and Composite) 442 (un-stated) 
 
(un-stated) 
 
3. Weaving 
 
Composite Units 
(organized sector) 
 
50 
 
9,876 looms 
 
384 million square meter of 
fabric 
 
Independent Weaving  Units 
(organized sector) 
 
140 
 
23,600 shuttleless looms 
 
(un-stated) 
 
Independent Weaving Units 
(unorganized/cottage, small-
scale sector) 
 
453 
 
50,000 looms 
 
3600 million square meter of 
fabric 
 
Power looms 
(unorganized/cottage, small 
scale sector) 
20600 175,200 looms (un-stated) 
4. Finishing  
Organized Sector 
 
10 (plus composite units) 
 
(un-stated) 
 
(un-stated) 
 
Unorganized/cottage, Small 
Sector 
625 
 
Cotton 
 
2,700 million square meter 
  Synthetic 760 million square meter 
  Total 3460 million square meter 
5. Garments 
 
Organized Sector 
 
50 
 
5,000 sewing machines (un-stated) 
 
Small-scale Cottage Sector 2500 30,000 sewing machines 650 million pieces 
6. Terry towels (small-scale 
cottage sector) 
400 7,600 looms  
55 million kilograms 
7. Canvas (small-scale cottage 
sector) 
100 2,000 looms 35 million kilograms 
8. Knitwear (small-scale cottage 
sector) 
600 12,000 knitting machines 400 million pieces 
Source: Government of Pakistan, 2004, Pakistan Investment Guide; All Pakistan Textile 
Mills Association, October 2004. 
The Table 8.2 above gives an overview of the textiles sector in Pakistan. It shows that 
the only organised sub-sector within textiles is spinning. The bulk of weaving is done in 
the small-scale weaving sector or on the power looms. For finishing, the statistics of the 
formal sector are not available but indications are that the bulk of finishing is also done 
in the small-scale and unorganised sector rather than the formal sector. The formal 
textiles sector was largely limited to close to 400 spinning mills and 50 composite units 
in 2004. 
  
                                                          
63 One bale of cotton is approximately 170 kilogram of cotton. 
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Appendix 3 is a comprehensive representation of the basic textiles sector from 1948 to 
2004-05. The table shows capacity not being used in the formal sector weaving. Less 
than half of the installed capacity was not being used. Looms hours worked started to go 
down in 1970-71 and in 2004-05, they were roughly 1/6th of 1970-71 average. It is the 
same period when the informal sector started taking roots in Pakistan. Hence, it would be 
fair to assume that weaving capacity started to shift from the formal to informal sector 
from 1970-71 onwards. With the change of government in late 1970s, spinning picked up 
from 1980-81 as the increase in yarn production shows.  
Appendix 3 also shows rapid increase in the spinning started from mid-1980s. It almost 
doubled by 1990-91 and had increased four-fold by 2004-05. Production of cloth really 
started to pick up around 1954 when Pakistan’s emergent industrial class set up the 
textiles mills and there was the Korean War boom as discussed in Chapter 3. From 29.5 
million meter in 1948, cloth production peaked to 658.3 million meter in 1970-71. It 
started going down from then onwards in 1970s and 1980s. It somewhat started to pick 
up from 1991-92 reaching barely above its 1970-71 figure of 658.3 million meter in 
2003-04.  
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Table 8.3: Pakistan Share of Cotton Yarn and Cloth in World Trade (1971-2002/03) 
(000 Metric Tons) 
Period Cotton Yarn Cotton Cloth 
1971 24.5 5.4 
1972 28.8 5.9 
1973 25.4 7.1 
1974 14.1 8.0 
1975 25.6 5.8 
1976 14.6 5.8 
1977 7.1 4.5 
1978 11.0 5.9 
1979 11.8 4.5 
1980 11.7 5.9 
1981 10.6 6.6 
1982 13.5 6.5 
1983 14.8 7.3 
1984 9.2 6.0 
1985 14.5 6.5 
1986 17.1 5.7 
1987 16.7 5.8 
1988 18.3 6.2 
1989 22.6 6.1 
1990 29.4 7.1 
1991 30.4 7.6 
1992 35.1 7.4 
1993 34.9 6.4 
1994 27.5 6.4 
1995 28.0 5.9 
1996 29.1 8.3 
1997 23.8 7.0 
1998 23.8 10.4 
1999 26.1 13.0 
2000 27.3 9.7 
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2001 28.0 9.9 
2002-03 30.0 8.0 
Source: All Pakistan Textiles Mills Association, 2004; Government of Pakistan, 2003, 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 2002-03.  
The decline from 1970s is evident in Table 8.3. Pakistan had over 28 percent share of 
world yarn trade in 1972, and in 2001 it still had roughly the same percentage as of 1972. 
Pakistan’s share in cotton cloth almost doubled since the 1970s which is a step towards 
value addition. Cloth export’s share started to increase since the early 1980s and kept on 
hovering around 6 percent for 1980s. It remained around 7 percent in the first half of the 
1990s and increased to over 10 percent for the first time in 1998 before coming down to 
8 percent in 2002-03. 
Pakistan’s share of yarn exports dropped in 1974 and then kept on steadily declining 
from 1976 onwards, touching a low of 7.1 percent in 1977. It started to pick up from 
1985 and reached above 30 percent in the years of spinning glut of the early 1990s. 
Again started to come down in 1994 around the time of spinning crisis and reached 30 
percent in 2002-03 again. 
Table 8.3 should be read along with the point 8.4.2 in the findings of the fieldwork 
concerning post-nationalisation textiles sector later in the chapter. 
Appendix 4 shows the value addition in bedwear, garments, hosiery and cotton 
manufacture. All of these sectors started to take off by the mid-1980s. This finding is 
verified by the qualitative fieldwork. Appendix 4 should also be read along with point 
8.4.2 regarding the post-nationalisation textiles sector discussed in chapter later. 
There were special regimes governing the trade in the textiles sector for over thirty years. 
The Short Term Cotton Arrangement was enacted in 1961, the Long Term Cotton 
Arrangement was prevalent from 1962-1973, and finally there was the Multi Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) from 1974-1994. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)’s general preferences were changed to set up the MFA. The purpose of MFA 
was to protect the imports into the US and Europe from certain countries such as China 
and allocate quotas to other less developed countries in the world. Multilateral trade 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round included the textiles sector in 1986. At that time it 
was not possible to bring the quota driven trade into normal GATT rules right away. 
However, in 1995, it was decided to make quota based trade of the textiles and garments 
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under the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC). ATC gave a ten years phase-out transition period for quotas. The rationale 
behind agreeing on a ten year transition period was to provide time for adjustment for the 
exporters and importers to adapt to the WTO regulations. With the start date of 1st 
January 1995, the transition took place in stages and ended on 31st December 2004 
(Pakistan Textile Vision, 2000; United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, 
2009; Siegmann, 2005). 
MFA quota regime had a great impact on Pakistan’s textile and garments exports. Forty-
eight percent of exports of Pakistan’s textiles and eighty-seven percent of exports of its 
apparel were done through the quota regime to markets such as the United States and 
European Union in 2001 (Siegmann, 2005). 
8.3. Different Stages of Textiles Production in Pakistan 
1) Cotton ginning64 is the first stage of value addition in textiles. Pakistan has an 
inherent advantage in textiles since its main raw material, cotton, is grown in 
Pakistan in southern Punjab and upper rural Sindh in Pakistan.65 Ginning 
factories are located around the cotton belt.66 They are owned by farmers.  
2) Ginned cotton is made into yarn through spinning. Spinning is the main textiles 
sector. Spinning is done in the organized sector due to the nature of production. 
Over the years, due to advancement in the value-addition capacity, 73 per cent of 
yarn is consumed within the country to make grieg cloth or finished products and 
                                                          
64 Pakistan is cotton growing country. There is lots of contamination in Pakistani cotton which affects the 
ability to produce good quality yarn, fabric and garments. It is difficult to produce higher value added 
products due to this contamination. Pakistani cotton is contaminated by “bad” ginning. Ginning is leased 
out by absentee landlords in upper Sindh and southern Punjab. Lower Sindh cotton is early but is not of 
good quality. Pakistan does not have modern ginning facilities. Since cotton production is localised, 
textiles manufacturers do not invest in ginning. Contaminated and non-contaminated cotton gets a rough 
treatment during ginning which deteriorates its quality further. The quality of raw material for spinning is 
not of good quality (RB, All Pakistan Textile Manufacturers Association, Interview; JJ, Textiles Mill, 
Interview). With Pakistani cotton, the manufacturers generally get up to 30-40 counts. For better results, 
you need yarn of 80 to 120 counts. Poly-cotton gives you up to 300 counts (S, Textiles Mill, Interview). 
Pakistani manufacturers are also using polyester fibre along with cotton for spinning. A multinational 
company set up the first polyester fibre making plant by mid-1990s. Hence, other than importing polyester 
fibre, it is also being produced locally. 
65
 To give a recent estimate, close to 10 million bales of cotton per year have been produced in Pakistan 
from 1999 till 2004. 
66 The quality of ginning is generally not considered to be good. It is an enigma why the government or the 
textile capitalist class does not invest resources to improve the ginning quality. 
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only 27 per cent of it is exported (Textiles Commissioner’s Office, 2004). 
Distribution of yarn makes an interesting read. According to the Textiles 
Commissioner’s Office documents the largest portion of yarn i.e. 39 per cent 
goes to the un-organised sector that includes power looms and small scale 
weaving units. 27 per cent of yarn is exported. 22 per cent goes to the organized 
sector to be consumed in shuttleless looms. 7 per cent yarn goes to organized 
knitting and 5 per cent to towel sub-sector (Textiles Commissioner’s Office, 
2004). It shows that in terms of yarn consumption, the informal cottage sector is 
the biggest consumer. It conforms to the statistics shown in Table 8.2 regarding 
weaving. 
3) Yarn is made into grieg cloth through weaving. Weaving is done both in the 
formal and the informal sectors. In terms of the number of units, informal sector 
is bigger than the formal sector as Table 8.2 shows. According to the key 
informant interviews, there is the lack of proper estimates about the informal 
sector. No one exactly knew how big the informal weaving sector was. The 
available statistics on weaving are in Table 8.2. 
4)  The grieg cloth produced through weaving is processed through printing and 
dyeing. Printing and dyeing is again done both in the formal and informal sectors. 
Though, figures for the formal sector production were not available. The figures 
for small-scale and unorganised sector production show that a large part of 
printing and dyeing is done by small, independent units. In terms of economies of 
scale, bulk of the printing and dyeing is done in big composite units.  
5) The processed fabric is turned either into garments or home textiles. Garments 
are again produced both in composite units and in the small scale sector. There 
are 2500 small garments units in the cottage sector compared to 50 garments 
factories in the organized sector (Pakistan Investment Guide, 2004). Towels and 
canvas is a growing sub-sector. Knitwear is a highly under-utilized sector in 
Pakistani textiles. In knitting, the yarn is knitted directly. Despite being the most 
profitable,67 it has not been fully capitalized. 
 
                                                          
67 One Bale of 170 Kgs of Cotton is worth (in USD) 119 in raw cotton, 253 in cotton yarn, 434 in towels, 
579 in cotton grieg fabric, 603 in finished fabric, 618 in bed-wear, 1,401 in knitwear and 1,561 in woven 
garments. (Pakistan Investment Guide, Government of Pakistan, 2004). 
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Pakistan’s organized sector is still dominated by spinning, though other sub-sectors are 
catching up and value addition has increased. The spinning sector’s preponderance also 
came through key informant interviews: 
“The strongest sub-sector in the textile industry in Pakistan is spinning. Weaving 
and knitting complements it. A lot of finishing units have recently been 
established highlighting the trend that shows that industrialists are investing in 
downward integration. More value addition-oriented sectors are being invested 
in. In weaving, manufacturers are using shuttleless looms. Now the trend is 
towards having composite units” (B, All Pakistan Textile Mills Association, Key 
Informant Interview). 
There is a heavy reliance on cotton crop due to dominance of spinning. Even though 
Pakistani manufacturers have been importing cotton since the 1990s and using polyester 
fibre in their spinning, the cotton crop still plays a pivotal role. Raw materials constitute 
about 70 per cent of the total cost of production. Textile manufacturers need to store 
cotton upfront for three months, November to January, for their whole year of 
production. If the textiles manufacturers succeed in buying cotton at a cheap price, they 
make huge profits (G, Textiles Mill, Interview). 
Spinning and weaving in the organised sector is capital intensive, energy intensive and 
highly automated (BS, Defunct Textiles Mill, Interview). Thirty-eight per cent of total 
employment is generated by the textiles sector, yet, textiles sector has relatively limited 
capacity to generate jobs on its own. Jobs are really generated by the garments sector as 
the formal textiles sector is largely automated and does not create mass employment. 
The garments68 and apparel69 sector is mainly in Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad and Sialkot 
but has some presence in Multan and Hyderabad as well. There are 50 large and 250070 
small garments units in the cottage sector: 60 per cent in Karachi, 30 per cent in Lahore, 
5 per cent in Sialkot, and 5 per cent in Faisalabad, Multan, Hyderabad combined. 
                                                          
68 This chapter mainly discusses the textiles sector in Pakistan. Garments, apparel and hosiery etc are 
discussed only to give an idea of the downward integration in the textiles sector. Garments sector on its 
own is not the focus of this chapter. 
69 Apparel includes garments, any kind of garments including knitted and woven fabric and other type of 
garments including jeans, knitted sports goods, woven and knit pyjamas (night-ware), and industrial 
clothing. (NN, Former Chairman Pakistan Readymade Garments Association, Interview). 
70 Pakistan Investment Guide, 2004 figures (see previous page). 
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Organised sector mostly exports. The informal estimate is that 90 per cent of garments 
production in the formal sector is exported. There are a few well-known companies, like 
Cambridge and Bonanza which manufacture garments for the domestic market. The 
companies that export use a number of different strategies. Some of them directly sell to 
stores abroad, e.g., to Walmart. Others sell to other American and European chains and 
others still to overseas importers. Importers have their sourcing offices with buying 
agents in Karachi, Lahore, and Faisalabad. Garments in the unorganised sector is a 
small-sized operation. It ranges from 10 stitching machines to 150 machines employing 
30 to 200 workers respectively. It is generally a “one person show”. Labour laws and 
social compliance standards are not followed in the unorganised sector. Unorganised 
sector sells to the domestic market and to flea markets abroad (NN, Former Chairman 
Pakistan Readymade Garments Association, Interview). Garments is the most labour 
intensive sector.  
Hosiery is still a cottage industry in Pakistan, despite 5 per cent of composite units. In 
the unorganised hosiery sector, the whole family often runs the show together: “father is 
cutting the cloth and children are stitching it” (TA, Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers 
Association, Interview). Just like garments, hosiery is a labour-intensive sector process 
in the informal sector as sewing is involved. The size of hosiery set up varies. For 
example, a vertically integrated hosiery-based textiles mill, Masood Textiles Mill, in 
Faisalabad, has 10,000 employees where as a small unit has 20 employees (TA, Pakistan 
Hosiery Manufacturers Association, Interview). 
Towels sector deals in bibs, aprons, small towels, and mopping towel. Majority of towel 
factories (90 per cent) are in Karachi, whereas the rest are in Lahore. In the unorganised 
towel sector, there are ten thousand small factories. Big towel companies also buy from 
small units (NS, President Towel Manufacturers’ Association, Interview). One-fifth of 
the towel production is done by commercial exporters in the un-organised sector. 
However, 80 per cent of total towel production is done by 20 companies that includes 
recognised names like Naqshbandi, Afroze, Universal, Hala, and United (SU, Towel 
Mill, Interview). 
The fieldwork was done near the end of the phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing by the end of 2004. There was a strong perception that garments 
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were going to suffer in the post quota phase due to the high competition from China. A 
small garments factory owner said: 
“Garments units are working on very small margins. It has become very 
competitive now. If it gets more competitive, I will not be able to sustain.” (R, 
Garments Company, Interview). 
R’s words indeed proved to be correct. A few years after the fieldwork of 2004, an effort 
was made to contact over half a dozen garments factories interviewed at the time of the 
fieldwork. It was not possible to contact even one of them as they had all gone under in 
the post-MFA phase in Pakistan. 
 
8.4. Main Findings of the Fieldwork on the Textiles Sector in Pakistan through 
Manufacturers’ Perceptions  
We present the main findings of the fieldwork through the textiles manufacturers’ 
perceptions below: 
8.4.1. Bhutto’s Nationalisation Undermined the Textiles Sector in the 1970s 
From late 1960s, the years of “disjuncture” started in Pakistan’s political economy 
(Sayeed, 2002). As discussed in Chapter 3, massive concentration of wealth led to unrest 
in towns and urban areas. Populist parties won the elections. After the dismemberment of 
Pakistan, the People’s Party (PPP) government in the erstwhile West Pakistan formed the 
government and implemented the policy of nationalization. It did not nationalise textiles, 
though there were rumours that it might happen. Still, it had a massive impact on the 
textiles sector. Pakistani nascent business class had no idea what had hit them.  
There was public anger against Ayub government and its “cronies”. Resentments against 
the business class were part of the PPP’s election manifesto. Still, the capitalist class was 
shocked at the initial wave of nationalization. When Bhutto nationalised banks and 
insurance companies in 1974 that broke the back of the capitalist class. The government 
cut the hand off that was feeding the big business. The business community was in a 
state of disarray. Those who had invested in East Pakistan lost their assets. Others assets 
were nationalized. Quite a few of them left the country as they feared persecution. The 
strong reactions of the capitalist class on the impact of Bhutto’s nationalisation come 
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across in the case studies on inter-generational hereditary entrepreneurship are discussed 
in Chapter 9. The negative impact of Bhutto’s nationalisation comes across sharply in the 
textiles statistics given above in the tables and in the appendices. We provide a few 
quotes from the manufacturers to illustrate their resentment against Bhutto’s 
nationalisation:  
“Bhutto destroyed the industrial class, though left some big fish. We lost the 
discipline. Middle management and skilled work force, they both lost the 
discipline. Bhutto pushed Pakistan back” (JJ, Textiles Mill, Interview). 
“Bhutto’s nationalisation of banks was really a disaster. You can use any word 
that you want. It brought down the country to a very bad financial condition” (R, 
Garments Manufacturer, Interview). 
8.4.2. Post-Nationalisation Textiles Sector 
The contemporary textiles industry in Pakistan mainly consolidated in the 1980s, having 
emerged in some form in the 1970s. It expanded from the mid-1980s onwards and 
modernised in the 2000s. There are some old groups such as Crescent Textiles Mill, 
Colony Mill, Kohinoor Textiles Mill, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills and Nishat Textiles Mill 
who started in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the majority of the textiles sector consists 
of the post 1970s groups. Just to quote an example: Lawrence White accounted for the 
forty-three monopoly houses in 1960s. Out of those forty-three71 groups, very few are in 
business in contemporary Pakistan. Moreover those few old groups who still existed at 
the time of the fieldwork went through a process of metamorphosis. They split up or 
went dormant or faced labour problems in the 1970s. They regrouped in 1980s. In a 
sense, their present reincarnation also belongs to the 1980s. Tables earlier in the chapter 
further illustrate this point. 
Bhutto encouraged the small-scale industry in the 1970s. As a result of this, lots of units 
came into existence that were either in printing or dyeing or in towel making. Both 
printing and dyeing were low-budget forward chain integration in the textiles sector. 
Commercial exporters and outsourced vendors got into it. In the 1970s, the towel 
                                                          
71 Lawrence White’s list in terms of financial strength of the industrial groups includes  Dawood, Saigol, 
Adamjee, Jalil (Amin), Shaikh, Fancy, Valika, Bawany, Bashir (Crescent), Wazir Ali, Ghandara, Isphani, 
Habib, Khyber Textile Group, Nishat Group, BECO, Gul Ahmed, Arag (Haji Habib), Hafiz, H.A. Karim, 
Millwala, Hyesons, Dada, Premier Group, Hussein Ebrahim, Monoo, Maulabaksh, Adam, A.K. Khan, 
A.A. Ghani, Rangoonwala, Haroon, Hirjina, Shaffi, Fakir Chand, Haji Hashan, Dadabhoy, Shahnawaz, 
Fateh Textile Group, Noon, Hoti, Ghulam Faruque, and Haji Dost Mohammad (Zaidi, 2005). 
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industry boomed in Pakistan. The Soviet Union agreed to buy towels from Pakistan 
through a barter agreement. It enabled firms like Hala Enterprises in Lahore and 
Naqshbandi in Karachi to get initiated in towel production. Later, these towel companies 
started to produce for American clients as well. They were mainly supplying cheap 
“white” towels for the motel industry (Manufacturers interviews). 
In Bhutto’s period, small units with a few looms were given income-tax exemption. 
Small units mushroomed, particularly in Faisalabad. Small scale industry was 
encouraged and economies of scale was neglected. Although the tax exemption was 
removed after the Bhutto era, most of the small industrialists avoided paying tax. Due to 
their origin in the tax-exempted days of Bhutto era, they considered that it was their right 
not to pay tax (B, All Pakistan Textile Mills Association, Interview). 
Commercial exporters started out in the 1970s. Quite a few industrial houses like Afroze 
Textile Industries, Karachi; Al-Abid Silk, Karachi; J.K. Spinning, Faisalabad; Milli 
Textile Mills, Faisalabad; S.M. Denim, Karachi and King’s Apparel, Karachi, started out 
as commercial exporters in the 1970s and they gradually developed a base for themselves 
and started manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s. Manufacturers started to move into 
value addition and “higher end of production” (Manufacturers Interviews). Again, tables 
earlier in the chapter and in the appendices show how the textiles, garments production 
and exports started to pick up from the mid-1980s onwards. 
Cheema (2000) has discussed in detail how the “new entrants” dominated the spinning 
industry in the 1980s, particularly from the mid-1980s onwards. The government was 
essentially giving a subsidy on cotton in the 1980s. Cotton was bought on fixed rates 
from growers and sold to buyers. This fixed rate was apparently in place to offer support 
price to farmers. Also, a ban on export of cotton was a hidden subsidy in price offered to 
spinning factories. Cotton, the main raw material for spinning, was made available to 
factories at lower than world price. It enabled spinners to earn windfall profits. However, 
in the 1990s this situation changed. Cheema is of the opinion that this happened mainly 
due to the collective action of the farmers’ lobby and their electoral strength in the 1990s 
(Cheema, 2000). Key informant interviews indicate that the hidden subsidy on cotton 
was done away with both due to the pressure of International Financial Institutions and 
pressure by the farmers’ lobby (Manufacturers Interviews).  
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“During the 1980s, license regime disappeared and new breed of entrepreneurs 
came in. They had political clout. They got government patronage. Banks 
provided them money without scrutiny” (CB, Industrialist, Interview). 
Earlier, the industry had high entry barriers and there were restrictions on setting up the 
business. Nawaz Sharif removed those restrictions and licensing regime was done away 
with (B, All Pakistan Textile Mills Association, Interview). International Financial 
Institutions again played a role in doing away of the licensing regime and liberalising the 
entry into business. 
Small entrepreneurs invested successfully in weaving, printing, and dyeing in the 1980s. 
This part of the story came across quite clearly in Faisalabad during the fieldwork. Since 
the city of Faisalabad had over a hundred thousand power looms to weave cloth, new 
emerging small commercial exporters or cloth merchants-turned- entrepreneurs set up 
printing machines. The sociological background of the new class of textile manufacturers 
of the 1980s and 1990s in Faisalabad is interesting. Their fathers and forefathers were 
traders in cotton, yarn and cloth. There is a ‘yarn market’72 in Faisalabad near the Big 
Clock (Ghanta Ghar). Fathers and forefathers of the new manufacturers used to sit in the 
yarn market to trade yarn and fabric. From trading yarn and cloth, they got into textiles 
manufacturing. From traders, some of them or their children moved into becoming 
commercial exporters and then continued to get high dividends due to value addition 
through printing and dyeing. Later on, they moved back into weaving and spinning.  
Karachi had a somewhat similar story as far as garments are concerned. Garments 
manufacturers set up small units in the 1980s and 1990s. The story of birth and growth of 
T Garments explains how the garments sector worked in Karachi. T Garments was a 
small garments factory in Karachi. Its owner, UB, a Punjabi described it as follows: 
“I used to work with my cousin in another garments factory in 1980s. We have 
been in the leather business. My parental grand-father was from Amritsar (Indian 
Punjab) and maternal grand-father from Kanpur (India). I started this business 
from the scratch in 1993. I just had one buyer. I started as commercial exporter. I 
got an order, bought raw material and rented a place and started off with riding 
trousers.  I had the know-how. It was a special knit. I got it dyed. That’s how I 
                                                          
72 Known as Sutarmandi. 
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started. In the first five years, the business doubled every year. I moved to a 
bigger place in 1996. I had 400 stitching machines and established in-house 
washing” (UB, Garments Company, Interview).  
In the 1990s, the removal of cotton subsidy and liberalization of the economy had 
adverse impacts on large scale manufacturing. The textiles sector experienced negative 
growth like most of the other medium and large-scale manufacturing industries in the 
mid-1990s. Its growth rate went down by 1.21 per cent over this period. There were 1135 
“reporting establishments” in 1990-91 which decreased to 1068 in 1995-96 (Government 
of Pakistan, 2001, Census of Manufacturing Industries, 1995-96).  
After the crisis in the spinning sector in the early to mid 1990s, Pakistan’s textile sector 
had another turn-around from 1999 onwards. From 1999 to 2004, the textiles exports 
increased 63 per cent and value-added textile exports increased by 71 per cent. 
Approximately $4 billion of investment was made in balancing, modernizing and 
replacement (BMR) in the textiles sector. This investment was made due to the phase out 
of quota regime at the end of Multi-Fibre Agreement. The textiles sector re-invested 
heavily in modernization to make it competitive with China and India. Most of the BMR 
investment was made in spinning and finishing sub-sectors. Despite the fact that cotton 
production was consistently close to 10 billion bales since 1999, Pakistan still imported 
over two billion bales of pima cotton. Due to liberalization in the 1990s, export and 
import of cotton was permitted. It allowed “product diversification” in the textiles sector. 
Pakistani cotton is short to medium staple in the range of 7-30 counts. Imported cotton 
with enhanced spinning capacity could go up to 80 counts. It helped to produce wider-
width fabric needed for bed-sheets and home furnishing. Higher counts of spun cotton is 
also needed to produce fine women clothing (All Pakistan Textile Manufacturers 
Association, 2004).  
In 2004 and 2005, textile manufacturers were quite buoyant about the state of textiles 
sector. A manufacturer of a large textiles mill commented: 
“Textile industry has come a long way from the 1970s and 1980s. The spinning 
industry from the late 1980s has had tremendous improvement in technology and 
productivity. There was a recession after six years of growth from 1986 to 1992. 
There was a downturn. The big spinners realized that they need to have weaving 
capacity in order to balance their own growth and go logically forward to the next 
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step of integration. In the early 1990s, we saw development of shuttleless looms. 
Money went into weaving by the manufacturers who were spinners before. 
Others started expanding in finishing, printing and dyeing” (GT, Textiles Mill, 
Interview). 
Despite USD 4 billion of investment in modernizing Pakistan’s textiles and clothing 
sector, a study by the Asian Development Bank concluded that Pakistan continued to 
produce “the least sophisticated products” and that it lost exports share in the dynamic 
sub-sectors of the global market. The ADB report was of the view that technology, skills 
and quality would be the yardsticks in setting the pace of the future growth of Pakistani 
textiles (Asian Development Bank Institute, 2004). 
8.4.3.  Big companies were predicted to dominate in the post MFA-phase 
Multi-fibre Agreement on textile and clothing expired on 31st December 2004. With the 
expiry of the quota regime, the overwhelming feeling amongst the textile manufacturers 
was that it was going to lead to concentration of power in the big groups. The informal 
textiles sector in weaving and finishing would continue to exist as before as it caters to a 
different market. However, amongst the formal sector, the big players would dominate.  
Nishat Mills Ltd (Faisalabad/Lahore), Nishat Chunian (Lahore), Kohinoor Textiles Mills 
(Lahore), Kohinoor Weaving Mills (Lahore), Gul Ahmed Textiles Mills (Karachi), Al-
Karam (Pvt) Mills (Karachi), Sapphire Textile Mills (Lahore), Mohammad Farooq 
Textiles Mill (Karachi), Chenab Textiles Mills (Faisalabad), and Masood Textiles Mill 
(Faisalabad)73 were some of the big companies listed amongst the big textiles mills. All 
companies with an annual turnover of more than $100 million were considered big 
textiles companies.  
The big groups exported 80 per cent of their output. Big groups sold to the US and 
European chains like Walmart, JC Penny, and Sears etc. They mostly produced bed 
sheets and home textiles. Towels, men’s shorts, socks are auxiliary products sold by 
intermediary companies in the export market. A few composite units such as Masood 
Textile Mills Faisalabad catered to such knitted garments export.  
                                                          
73
 In Karachi Stock Exchange list of top one hundred companies called KSE 100, there are only 7 textile 
companies i.e. Nishat Mills, Kohinoor Textile, Nishat (Chunian), Gul Ahmed Tex., Bannu Woollen, 
Dawood Lawrencepur, Gadoon TextileXD (http://www.kse.com.pk). 
191 
 
The top textiles groups were all composite units and vertically integrated. It meant that 
they processed ginned cotton all the way to the end product. They had spinning units that 
produced yarn from ginned cotton, weaving machines that produced cloth from yarn. 
Grieg cloth went through certain treatments like mercerizing and then the cloth was 
either printed in automatic rotaries or dyed in large dyeing machines. It was cut and 
stitched in the garments section. Finally the end product went through packaging, 
marketing and sales departments.  
Textile manufacturers thought that big companies were going to dominate in the post-
quota phase: 
“The future lies with 40 major companies. The rest are going to be irrelevant.  
The reason is that the nature of business is such that it plays on scales and how 
organised you are. There is not much room for the cottage industry. It has to be 
on big scale; otherwise you cannot survive for long. One shalwar kurta (dress) of 
tailor versus thirty thousand garments in a factory. This is a phenomenon. That is 
the way.  Pakistani textiles is up against something humungous like socks cities 
and necktie cities in China. Only the big fish can survive that kind of competition” 
(TT, Textiles Mill, Interview). 
 
Another owner of a large textiles mill was of the view: 
“In the textiles, big players would survive and do well now. Social compliance is 
needed to sell it to retail groups abroad. Only big groups can provide social 
compliance. With the phase out of quota, buyers like Walmart do not need to deal 
with ‘a guy with 50 machines’. They would like to deal with big players so that 
they can deliver on time. Big players are organised, they have got the financing, 
and they have got the factory conditions and quality control. One cannot have 
economies of scale unless you are big. Earlier, manufacturers used to set up 
factories with 12 thousand spindles, then 25 thousand spindles. No one talks 
about 25 thousand spindles now. People talk about 100 thousands spindles. The 
same is in weaving. It’s getting bigger and bigger and more competitive” (JB, 
Defunct Textiles Mill, Interview). 
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The Textiles Commissioner office in Karachi was very clear that the government would 
support the big groups. Only the big groups would be able to compete with China. It was 
the war of quality and processing (H, Textile Commissioner Office, Interview). 
The trend was shifting towards vertically integrated units at the time of the fieldwork. 
The textiles manufacturers were of the view that customers had started to prefer a 
finished product from under one roof, i.e. spinning, weaving, printing all under one 
management. According to their view, the trend was shifting towards customer specific 
items by moving away from the standard products. Industry had to deliver better 
products at lower costs and with better, efficient service. The order lead times had also 
gone down (BL, Textiles Mill, Interview). 
In the middle-level textiles companies, the trend was to have one major company listed 
as a public limited company, while three or four small and export based sister concerns 
would be private companies. Some companies had textiles mills set up separately from 
their export houses. It helped to act as commercial exporter on the side along with being 
a manufacturer. In terms of tax advantages, export houses did not declare annual tax 
returns. One per cent of income tax was deducted at source at the time of export by the 
bank. Earlier there used to be four different rates: .75 per cent, 1 per cent, 1.25 per cent 
and 1.5 per cent on the principle of the value addition. However, by 2004, a flat rate of 1 
per cent was imposed across the board. It was a presumptive income tax. There was 
pressure on Pakistan by the international organisations to revise the tax upwards. 
Pakistan, however, kept the low-tax rate to “facilitate” its exporters. Export houses did 
not file income tax returns, they only filed their annual statements (OJ, Federal Board of 
Revenue, Interview).  
The big companies, on the other hand, were moving towards merger with their sister 
concerns to attain economies of scale. Kohinoor Maple Leaf Group, Nishat Textiles Mill 
and Sapphire Textiles Mill had merged their spinning, weaving, printing and garments 
sections. This was meant to attain the economies of scale (B, All Pakistan Textile Mills 
Association, Interview). 
Nishat Mills was the biggest textiles mill in the country after the merger with 180 
thousand spindles, 600 looms, 2 rotaries and 2 dyeing machines. They produced 7 
million meter of grieg cloth in a month, 6 million meter a month meter of dyed cloth and 
3 million meter of narrow width fabric. Various units in the Nishat Mills worked as 
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autonomous units. For example, if the spinning unit could sell specialized yarn to an 
outside buyer at a higher price compared to selling it in-house to its weaving, unit, it was 
allowed to sell outside. This was the strategy to make units competitive. With big groups, 
the trend was to bring all operations under one roof rather than compartmentalizing them 
into other sister concerns (Manufacturers’ Interviews).  
The perception amongst the textiles manufacturers was that medium and small 
companies would be disadvantaged against the big companies in the aftermath of MFA 
phase-out. There was the sense that small companies would die. There was also the sense 
that the powerful textiles association, All Pakistan Textile Mills Association, was 
controlled by the big groups (O, Silk Company, Interview). One owner of a small 
company aired his strong views and resentment against the big groups as follows: 
“Small and medium entrepreneurs do not get loans from the banks easily. They 
have to mostly reinvest their own profits. There is a cartel of large 
manufacturers, exporters and distributors. They are one domain. It is getting 
stronger and stronger every day. It is a cartel. It is not a free market” (R, 
Garments Company, Interview). 
Perceptions amongst the textiles manufacturers indicated that the top forty groups had 
concentration of power and it was set to increase in the post quota phase. With social and 
environmental standards requirements and the need to deliver on time set by the 
international buyers, only those companies who had economies of scale were going to 
survive at the end of MFA.  
Table 8.4 and Table 8.5 below illustrate the state of Pakistan’s textiles and 
manufacturing sector in the immediate post-MFA phase out period: 
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Table 8.4: Leading Asian Exporters of Textiles, 2007 
 Share of 
World 
Exports 
2007 (%) 
Share of 
World 
Exports 
2000 (%) 
Rank in 
Top 15 in 
2007 
Growth from 2000-
2007 (%) 
Share in Economy’s Total 
Merchandise Exports 2007 
(%) 
China 23.50 10.30 2 19 4.6 
Hong Kong – 
re-exports 
5.4 7.8 3 1 3.9 
Hong Kong – 
domestic 
exports 
0.2 0.8 - -12 2.6 
Korea 4.40 8.10 5 -3 2.8 
Taiwan 4.10 7.60 6 -3 4.1 
India 4.00 3.60 7 8 6.5 
Pakistan 3.10 2.90 9 7 41.3 
Japan 3.00 4.50 10 0 1 
Indonesia 1.60 2.20 12 1 3.2 
Thailand 1.30 1.20 13 7 2 
All Asia 
Textile 
Exports 
47.8 44.8 - 7 - 
World Textile 
Exports 
100 100 - 6 1.7 
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), 2009. 
Pakistan did not lose market share in textiles in the aftermath of MFA. As stated earlier, 
MFA phased out by end of 2004. Pakistan’s share in the world textiles was 2.9 per cent 
in 2000 and it grew by 7 per cent in the 2000-2007 period and its share was 3.10 per cent 
in 2007. So, the USD 4 billion investment in BMR paid off. Overall, China gained 
massively in the post-MFA phase. Gains for India and Thailand were not significant and 
other Asian countries lost out vis-a-vis China which made most of the gains (UNIDO, 
2009). 
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Table 8.5: Leading Asian Exporters of Garments, 2007 
 Share of World 
Exports 2007 (%) 
Share of World 
Exports 
2000 (%) 
Rank in Top 15 in 
2007 
Growth from 
2000-2007 (%) 
Share in 
Economy’s Total 
Merchandise 
Exports 2007 (%) 
China 33.4 18.2 1 18 9.5 
Hong Kong –Re-
exports 
6.90 7.20 3 8 7.2 
Hong Kong – 
domestic exports 
1.40 5.00 - -9 27.5 (sic) 
Bangladesh 2.9 2.6 5 10 80.8 
India 2.8 3 6 7 6.6 
Vietnam 2.1 0.9 7 22 14.9 
Indonesia 1.7 2.4 8 3 5 
Thailand 1.2 1.9 11 1 2.7 
Pakistan 1.1 1.1 12 9 21.3 
Sri Lanka 1 1.4 15 2 42.4 
All Asia Garments 
Exports 
52.4 46.0 - 10 - 
World Garments 
Exports 
100 100 - 8 2.5 
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), 2009. 
Pakistan did not lose out its share in the garments either in the post-MFA phase. Its share 
of the world exports was 1.1 percent in 2000 and it remained the same in 2007. It did not 
gain or lose. China again gained massively in the phase-out of MFA. Both Bangladesh 
and Vietnam also gained due to the duty free access to their exports in the West as they 
fall in the least developed countries category (UNIDO, 2009). 
Overall, Pakistan’s textiles did well in the post-MFA phase with a slightly increased 
market share. In garments, its market share of world exports remained the same largely 
due to the output of the vertical composite units. The small garments factories went 
under. 
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8.4.4. Textiles is a family run business 
As outlined in Chapter 7, most of the corporate sector is run by business families. The 
same finding came through in the textiles sector fieldwork. There were 442 textiles 
companies in the organised sector at the time of fieldwork (Pakistan Investment Guide, 
2004, Ministry of Industries, Government of Pakistan). 190 textile companies were listed 
on the Karachi Stock Exchange. Over 200 non-listed companies were private limited. 
Again, as discussed in Chapter 7, shares trading on the Stock Exchanges was illiquid and 
trading took place against shares of only few companies. Thirty companies accounted for 
90 per cent of trading in the Karachi Stock Exchange (Malik and Hayat, The News, June 
14, 2008).  
Families held most of the shares for most of the companies. Shares were not held by 
public at large and there was hardly any venture capital. Manufacturers’ interviews 
indicated that they either themselves were owners or sons and nephews of the owners. 
The large companies had hired professional management. However, owners still decided 
and effectively ran the business. Sons of manufacturers inherited the right to be next in 
line on the company throne. The fieldwork bore unanimous testimony to it all over 
Pakistan. Views of some of textiles manufacturers are stated below: 
“Faithfulness only comes with blood is the entrenched belief amongst the 
manufacturers.  They do not keep professional management. Lack of joint 
ventures is a problem. You cannot advance unless there are joint ventures. There 
are family restrictions to such ventures” (H, Textiles’ Commissioner’s Office, 
Interview). 
The interviews showed that the textiles sector was family run business - and that it often 
lacked professional management. The largest manufacturing sector in Pakistan did not 
want mature capitalism. Inter-generational hereditary entrepreneurship is discussed in 
detail in the next Chapter 9 in the context of family and caste acting as social institutions 
of accumulation. 
8.4.5. Patterns of Bank Loan Default 
The patterns of banks loan default varied: default of loans taken through political 
connections, circumstantial default, and default due to plain fraud. During the fieldwork, 
three textiles companies publically known to be defaulters were taken as case studies. All 
three companies got into trouble when they took loans from international credit 
197 
 
institutions such as the IMF’s subsidiary International Financial Corporation (IFC) or 
foreign banks and defaulted on them. The international credit institutions took the 
textiles companies into litigation and the local banks followed suit for their defaults. In 
other words, had these textiles companies not borrowed from the international credit 
institutions, they might have continued to go on without much trouble as the local banks 
were not geared up for prosecution of defaulters. The justice system is almost 
dysfunctional in Pakistan. It perpetuates conditions where bank loans default and the 
politics of patronage continues with impunity. Details from three case studies are given 
below: 
N Textiles Mills in Lahore whose owner BT committed fraud and faced criminal 
proceedings. BT comes from a branch of a well-known family which own textiles’ 
business in the Punjab. The rest of the distant family’s textiles concerns were running 
quite well. In the early 1990s, BT had most ambitious and innovative ideas to expand his 
textiles business. He dazzled banks with his ingenuity. Other manufacturers described 
him moving around with two slick laptops displaying the latest business models. It was a 
period when banks were providing liberal credit for expansion in spinning. Banks got 
really taken in by BT’s glib marketing. A National Accountability Bureau (NAB)’s 
officer was of the opinion that BT did not spare any bank on the famous financial street, 
I.I. Chundrigarh Road, in Karachi. BT got huge loans both from the public banks and 
foreign lending institutions such as the IFC and the American Express. BT did not invest 
much of the loan in his textiles mill, defaulted on payments and closed down the mill. 
The American Express as a foreign bank was the first one to declare BT a defaulter. 
National banks followed suit. NAB arrested BT in 1999 when the Musharraf government 
started its high-handed accountability campaign. BT served prison and was out on bail at 
the time of the fieldwork. BT in his own interview did not admit fraud. He was of the 
view that he expanded too quickly and was too ambitious and that’s what led to default. 
However, there was consensus amongst the manufacturers and the NAB officials that BT 
never borrowed with the intention of investment in the textiles mill. He committed fraud 
(BT, Defunct Textiles Mill, Interview; NT, the National Accountability Bureau, 
Interview; Manufacturers Interviews).  
Another defaulter was UJ of I Enterprises. UJ set up his towel factory in the 1970s and 
was running a successful business. Push for expansion came in the mid-1980s. He 
planned to set up a huge spinning plant in the late 1980s. The financing, however, only 
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came through in the early 1990s. The slump in the spinning sector had already started. 
He could not deal with higher cotton prices and recession. According to him, “I did not 
have enough financial depth to take on the adverse circumstances”. UJ had also 
borrowed from the IFC. UJ’s case was one of the circumstantial default. Other 
manufacturers were of the view that UJ kept a tight control over his towel making 
operations and did not delegate powers which led a default in the business. UJ is Chinioti 
and was still running part of business after having settled terms with the State Bank’s 
new rules on default under the then Musharraf government (UJ, Textiles Mill, Interview; 
Manufacturers’ Interviews). 
NB of B Cotton Mills was another fallen star who defaulted in Lahore. NB and BB, two 
brothers set up B Cotton Mills in the mid-1980s. Earlier they were builder-contractors 
and used to construct buildings for textile manufacturers. They branched into the textiles 
from construction and set up their own weaving plant in 1987. It was a state of the art 
plant with the latest Sulzer weaving machines. They also won an international award for 
high quality weaving. They made plans for expansion. The elder brother BB wanted to 
get into backward expansion by setting up a spinning unit. Younger brother NB wanted 
to go into forward integration by concentrating on printing. Elder brother prevailed. They 
got huge bank loans but their expansion coincided with a slump in spinning. They lost 
their investment and were declared defaulters. Other manufacturers were of the view that 
B brothers were close to Nawaz Sharif, the twice elected Prime Minister of Pakistan in 
the 1990s. Manufacturers were of the view that the B brothers got huge banks loans due 
to their political connections. Due to their close political connections, they were singled 
out by the next political government of Pakistan People’s Party in 1993. Banks hounded 
them and they lost their edge. B brothers were still running their spinning business at the 
time of the fieldwork and wanted to make a comeback in the textiles, while their default 
cases were continuing on the side (NB, Textiles Mill, Interview; Manufacturers’ 
Interviews). NB’s default was a combination of a flawed business strategy and having 
partisan political connections with one leading political party that ruled Pakistan in the 
1990s.  
These case studies document the various patterns of rule-violating behaviour and rent 
transfers from the public banks to the textiles manufacturers. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
non-performing loans were Rs 66.1 billion in December 1990 and they increased to Rs 
271.4 billion in December 2000 (Pakistan: Financial Sector Assessment 1990-2000, 
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State Bank of Pakistan). It shows rent transfers on a gigantic scale despite the 
liberalisation process in the financial sector having started since the early 1990s. 
8.4.6. Capitalist Class in Pakistan was Powerful and Protected its Interests Well 
Business association and bodies were in place in the textiles industry; however, most of 
lobbying took place on personal level. All Pakistan Textiles manufacturers Association 
(APTMA74) was a powerful textiles body representing large scale spinning, weaving and 
composite units. There were other over three dozen75 textiles and garments related bodies 
in the field.  
According to Kochanek, Ayub’s government was close to the top influential monopoly 
houses on a personal basis in 1960s. He lamented the lack of associations’ culture. 
Lobbying was done through negotiations. The organized power of the capitalist class was 
diluted due to the petty politics and factional fights in the Chambers of Commerce. Most 
of the lobbying was done through personalized contacts (Kochanek, 1983). The 
fieldwork found that the patterns described by Kochanek fitted well with the nature of 
lobbying that took place in 2004. The top textiles manufacturers had direct access to the 
then President Pervez Musharraf and the then Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz (I, Ex-top 
echelon SECP official, Interview). Business associations represented the “formal” 
interests of the businesses before the government, while most of the deals were sealed 
under the table. Textiles manufacturers had easy access to top executives of the country 
                                                          
74 “All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA) is the premier national trade association of the textile 
spinning, weaving and composite mills representing the organised sector in Pakistan. APTMA emerges as 
the largest association of the country as it represents 346 textile mills out of which 274 are spinning, 43 
weaving and 29 composite units. These spinning mills have production facilities of texturing, mercerizing 
and dyeing of yarns; weaving mills have sizeable number of air-jet looms, and the composite mills have 
manufacturing facilities from spinning to finished textile products under one roof. The total installed 
capacity of APTMA member mills accounts for 8,000,000 spindles, 63,216 rotors and about 10,000 looms. 
The Association’s members produce spun and open-end yarn, grey, printed dyed fabrics and bed linen” 
(All Pakistan Textiles Mills Association, 2004). 
 
75 Some of them were: Pakistan Bedwear Exporters Association, Karachi; Pakistan Cotton Fashion 
Apparel Manufacturers and Exporters Association, Karachi; Pakistan Readymade Garments Manufacturers 
& Exporters Association, Karachi; All Pakistan Cloth Exporters Association, Faisalabad; Pakistan Yarn 
Merchants Association, Karachi; Pakistan Canvas & Tents Manufacturers and Exporters Association, 
Lahore; Towel Manufacturers Association of Pakistan, Karachi; Pakistan Carpet Manufacturers & 
Exporters Association, Karachi and Karachi Cotton Association, Karachi. APTMA, the powerful 
association and lobby group of organized sector spinning; weaving and composite units had offices in 
Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad and covered most of the Pakistan through its regional zones. 
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and influenced policy decision in the textiles sector in particular (I, Ex-top echelon SECP 
official, Interview). 
The participant observation also showed that the textiles sector had “cultivated” deep 
contacts in the relevant bureaucracy in Pakistan and there were discussions over the 
phone about the “favourable” outcomes of the policy meetings that impact the textiles 
sector in Pakistan in exchange of “gifts”. Before the expiry of MFA, Pakistani 
bureaucracy and its Export Promotion Bureaus interacted very closely with the textiles 
sector to allocate, re-allocate and manage the quota. There were widespread perceptions 
of mismanagement of the quota regime and Pakistani’s bureaucracy having allowed 
“quota mafia” to exist.   
The legalised corruption was also pointed out by key informants during the fieldwork. 
Powerful bureaucrats served on the boards of dozens of corporate companies at the same 
time. The board meetings took place in exotic locations around the world with lucrative 
perks and benefits. It was also pointed out that capitalists offered their flats in London 
and New York to bureaucrats’ offsprings who go there for studies (I, Ex-top echelon 
SECP official, Interview). Hence, legalised corruption and “favours” took place along 
with other monetary “gifts”. 
Pakistan’s capitalist class is powerful and well-connected, in general, with not only the 
top decision-makers but also with the bureaucracy in general. On the other hand, the 
capitalist class is not powerful enough to push for improvements in infrastructure or 
cheap availability of utilities or availability of much needed skilled human resource in 
the country overall. Yet, the capitalist class is well-connected and powerful enough to 
protect its immediate interests and earn rents as a result of its interaction with the state 
institutions. 
8.4.7. Different Nature of Patronage 
Cheema states that accumulation was efficient in the 1960s because a small group of 
elite bureaucrats could interact with emerging capitalist class through “repeated 
interaction”. It is a game theoretical application of prisoners’ dilemma in political 
economy. Whereas there was “decentralised corruption” in late 1980s, due to the 
fragmented state structure, less concentrated power of bureaucracy, urban intermediate 
class of the Punjab entered spinning and bringing the overall efficiency and productivity 
of the spinning sector down (Cheema, 2003). As discussed earlier, there was still close 
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interaction of bureaucracy in Pakistan with the capitalist class at the time of the 
fieldwork despite the fact that ISI policies had phased out and liberalisation of economy 
took place.  
One of the reasons that the 1960s patronage and rents creation was different from the 
1980s onwards has to do with political stability of the regimes. Cheema (2000) discusses 
political stability being highlighted by the spinners (Cheema, 2000). Lack of political 
stability in the 1990s came across very strongly during the fieldwork. In the 1990s, the 
two main political parties kept on taking turns without ever completing their terms in 
office and reversing the economic and industrial policy decisions of their rivals when in 
power. Hence, there was huge political instability and uncertainty and it had quite 
adverse impact on the corporate sector. 
However, on the basis of fieldwork, this chapter states that the larger explanation of the 
difference nature of patronage of the 1960s and the 1980s onwards had to do with the 
varied ways of rent creation. There was crony capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s and the 
state institutions actively intervened, planned and facilitated the process of the 
emergence of capitalist class in Pakistan. Chapter 1 and 3 discuss in the patronage in the 
earlier decades of Pakistan. The role of the state institutions was critical in creating rents 
while redistributing the evacuee property after the partition. The state institutions used 
various instruments of its industrial policy to bolster the emergent capitalist class in the 
1950s and 1960s. The Ayub government distributed patronage through its rural works 
programme by allocating funds for the local bodies’ representatives known as the 
members of Basic Democracies. Politics of patronage was in practice since the formative 
years of Pakistan. 
In the 1980s onwards, the role of “political entrepreneur” became important as pointed 
out earlier in the literature.  The nature of the 1980s patronage got fundamentally altered 
due to Bhutto’s nationalisation of 1970s. As the literature in Chapter 3 points out that 
Bhutto used the nationalised units and other public sector departments to allocate jobs in 
the public sector. It set precedent of a new way of interacting with the state. The new 
way was to take-over the state institutions and use them to earn rents not only for the 
development of the capitalist class but also to indulge in the theft of resources. The 
interaction of the state institutions with the capitalist class led both to growth-retarding 
rents and in other instances to also value enhancement. 
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Discussion on the role of the “political entrepreneur” of the 1980s is contextualised in 
the nationalisation of Bhutto years. From 1980s onwards, the most lucrative way to earn 
rents for  the political elite and the intermediate classes had been to take-over the state 
institution. Phenomenal rise in non-performing loans in the 1990s has been discussed. 
There was theft of resources and rents were used unproductively. However, some of the 
defaulted bank loans and other rents were also used for value-enhancement as this 
chapter discusses in the next section. 
8.4.8. Value-Enhancement 
As discussed above, significant parts of the textiles sector defaulted on bank loans, which 
amounted to a theft of resources. Alongside this there were some value-enhancing 
activities. In the background of a rather tenuous relationship of the textiles sector with 
the rule of law, some rents that the capitalists earned through their interaction with the 
state institutions led to value-enhancement. The fieldwork points both to theft as well as 
to value enhancement of the industry.  
The fieldwork showed that almost one third of the large textile mills in our sample 
availed the loan write-off facility from the State Bank of Pakistan. The State Bank 
refused to divulge the names of such companies but confirmed this finding. This group 
of large textiles companies is also amongst the top exporters in 2004. We could therefore 
not match the individual defaulter companies against the list of top exporters on a case 
by case basis. The link between the defaulter companies having enhanced value and 
defaulters is established indirectly in our sample.  
One egregious example is that of a textiles group found during fieldwork had received 
economic “favours” through the privatization process in contravention of the rules in 
1991. One of the mills owned by this politically-connected group became the largest in 
the country in 2004. This is a micro example of rents being used productively. 
At the macro level there are indications of the textiles sector having become competitive 
internationally. As per Table 8.4, the UNIDO (2009) statistics reveal that Pakistan’s 
share of the world exports in the textiles was 2.9 per cent in 2000. After the phase-out of 
the MFA, Pakistan rather than lose market share in fact gained slightly to achieve 3.1 per 
cent in 2007. Amongst the Asian exporters, China gained massively as generally 
predicted. India and Thailand also did not lose its market share and gained slightly. Other 
Asian exporters lost their market share. Even in garments as per Table 8.5, Pakistan did 
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not lose its market share. Contrasting this with Pakistan’s manufacturing performance in 
the 1990s this is progress, albeit limited. This is considering the fact that large-scale 
manufacturing suffered in the 1990s.  
Due to the SAP and its policy of liberalization and massive tariff reductions, Pakistan’s 
industry in particular and the economy in general had suffered in 1990s, considered the 
“lost decade” for economic development in the literature. More than four thousand 
companies were declared “sick” and the large-scale manufacturing growth was negative 
in 1996-97. In such adverse circumstances, Pakistan’s textiles industry spent USD 4 
billion on balancing, modernization and replacement in the early 2000s to deal with the 
challenges of post-MFA phase. It paid the dividends. Pakistan’s textiles sector showed 
signs of being internationally competitive in 2007 as per the UNIDO (2009) estimates. 
Value-enhancement did take place in the textiles sector in Pakistan.  Apart from the one 
example of a highly productive politically-connected textiles mill in our sample general 
trends also show this. These trends were indirectly established through the fieldwork and 
supplemented by the macro picture. We have also established earlier that rents creation 
took place in the textiles sector. We assert that while some of these rents ended up as 
plain theft of resources, others added value.  
Conclusion 
Pakistan’s textiles sector mostly exports yarn, though value addition in the exports of 
bedwear, garments and other manufactured items has increased since the mid-1980s. The 
contemporary textiles sector consolidated itself in the 1980s after being uprooted by 
Bhutto’s nationalisation. The nature of patronage and rents creation has changed over the 
decades. Patronage in the 1950s and 1960s was transferred largely by the state 
institutions actively planning and intervening in favour of the emergent capitalist class. 
Its nature changed after Bhutto’s nationalisation. Patronage from the 1980s onwards was 
a system where the state institutions had been ‘taken over’ and the political influence 
used to get liberal bank loans leading to both the theft of resources as well as some 
value-enhancement.  
The future of the Pakistan’s textile sector was considered to lie with the top forty 
companies, which had vertical units and could achieve economies of scale. The capitalist 
sector was strong and powerful enough to be connected with the decision-makers and 
204 
 
bureaucracy to protect its immediate interests. However, it was not powerful enough to 
make the state institutions implement much needed improvements in the physical 
infrastructure as well as the human resources in the country.  
The way family held capitalist sector works in Pakistan, it shows that the industrialist in 
Pakistan do not want more mature capitalism. The family-held nature of the Pakistan’s 
textiles sector is explored more in the next chapter 9. 
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Chapter 9. Inter-Generational Hereditary Entrepreneurship: Family 
and Caste Capitalism in the Textiles Sector in Pakistan 
This chapter applies the concept of caste capitalism to Pakistan’s textiles sector and 
makes an attempt to link it to the rule of law debate. It is mainly based on textile 
manufacturers’ narration of their family stories and their perceptions. Though, this 
chapter provides four case studies. These four case studies have been chosen from a pool 
of forty case studies. These forty case studies have been conducted through sixty-four 
key informant interviews of the textiles manufacturers, representative of the textiles’ 
association, employees and stakeholders. The four case studies given in this chapter are, 
therefore, representative of the overall trends of the fieldwork on the textiles sector. The 
chapter builds a narrative around family and caste as social institutions through which 
accumulation takes place. It also links family and caste capitalism to the state’s policies. 
9.1. “Business is in their Blood”: Caste Capitalism in the Textiles Sector in Pakistan 
“Chinioti are business-minded and hard working. Business is in the blood 
(emphasis added). It is not just a job, it is their whole life” (BN, Garments Mill, 
Interview). 
One of the surprising findings of the study of the textiles sector is that it turns out to be 
dominated by family and caste capitalism. We found that social institutions play a 
preponderant role in accumulation. Two trading castes Memons and Chiniotis have 
dominated the textiles manufacturing since the founding of Pakistan. Just like Marwaris 
in India, Memons and Chiniotis have dominated the textile industry in Pakistan. Memons 
were ascendant in the 1950s and 1960s while Chiniotis have risen since the 1980s.  
9.1.2. Literature on Caste and Accumulation 
Basile and Harriss-White have studied the “social structures of accumulation” of a small 
town in India and the role of caste therein. They criticize the “double reductionism” in 
the orthodox economics, whereby capitalism is reduced to the market and in turn market 
is reduced to the economic realm. Opposed to this, the “social structures of 
accumulation” school of thought contextualizes accumulation through the interplay of 
social institutions. They argue that in countries such as India, accumulation is embedded 
in the social structures or institutions located in the sphere of civil society, independent 
of the state. Social institutions including ‘caste’ mediate production factors; they play a 
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part in the process of money being converted to means of production; they organise the 
production process; they usher the transformation of product into money through the sale 
process. In other words, accumulation is embedded in the social institutions at every 
process of production, exchange and distribution.  Basile and Harriss-White note that 
other variables such as locality, occupation, gender, religion, and party politics also play 
a role in organising the process of accumulation. However, the most prominent category 
of importance for the social structures of accumulation is that of caste. The capitalist 
class interacts with caste and occupational associations and transforms the institution of 
caste in the process (Basile and Harriss-White, 2000). 
Basile and Harriss-White take a Gramscian interpretation of civil society whereby social 
institutions regulate conflicts in capitalist production to ensure accumulation and 
stability. They say “caste is a specifically Indian form of civil society” (Basile and 
Harriss-White, 1999, p.5). In the organisation of contemporary occupation “caste 
clustering” is prevalent. Hence, “caste clustering” plays a role in the resources and skills’ 
distribution; labour markets’ regulation; information asymmetries and support of 
material and human functions of production (Basile and Harriss-White, 2000).  
“Caste clustering” lowers transaction costs. Harriss-White explains the growth of 
networks76 through transaction costs lowering matrix. Exchange through networks is not 
tantamount to market exchange as intermediaries play an important part in the regulation 
and functioning of the networks. Networks are built around the concept of trust. They 
reduce the market exchange costs by lowering transaction costs.  Transaction costs such 
as insurance, information, suitable pricing, security against default and uncertainty are 
lowered. It is done through “repeated contracts” amongst the members of the networks 
regulated by social institution. These repeated contracts are based on relations and they 
take time to evolve and “reproduce the networks” (Harriss-White, 2003). 
Harriss-White quotes Khalid Nadvi to explain “collective efficiency” through social 
networks tied together through geography and work in the similar sectors or clusters. 
Some of the facilitating factors behind “collective efficiency” that lower transaction costs 
through exchange of information. An exchange is based on personalised contacts. The 
process specialisation in the cluster based exchange takes place through subcontracting 
arrangements (Harriss-White, 2003, p. 206). 
                                                          
76
 In our case, “the network” is caste capitalism. 
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Chari (2004) developed the concept of “fraternal capital” to describe how the agrarian 
past of the Gounder caste in Tiruppur, South India, has turned the small town into a 
garments production powerhouse. Chari attributes Gounder caste success on their 
“propensity to toil”. Tiruppur became a global production centre of cotton knitted 
garments. Tiruppur’s exports revenue ballooned from $25 million to $636 between 1986 
and 1997 due to the success of “fraternal capital”. From making basic T-shirts; Tiruppur 
graduated into exporting fashion garments with a nine times increase in its exports 
during the period mentioned above. Small firms ushered this boom by being woven into 
the detailed arrangements of subcontracting. Gounder caste coming from the working 
class and agrarian origins organised these subcontracting arrangements and capital 
around them (Chari, 2004).  
Chari’s academic interest lay in analysing how the agrarian past of the Gounder men and 
their “propensity to toil” led to their industrial present in Tiruppur. The revolution started 
in the stitching sections in 1970s which led to harnessing of capitalist development and 
this “provincializing capital” used the subaltern power and knowledge as its means. 
Chari states that state did not play a role in promoting garments production through 
Gounders, rather they succeeded “despite the state”. However, this claim is contradicted 
a bit later by pointing out state’s role in shielding the small-scale sector’s specific 
commodities and also in the disbursement of credit by the State Bank of India led 
industrial development in a decentralized manner in Tirrupur. Moreover, kinship 
relationships served the purpose of providing the “background” that worked well to keep 
the caste hegemony intact in the garments work. It also had an impact in terms of 
devising labour arrangements that were differentiated by caste and gender (Chari, 2004).  
There was upward class mobility as Gounders who worked as wage earners or 
contractors became owner-operators of the stitching sections. Fraternity and ownership 
relations guided this process of subcontracting and industrial decentralisation by working 
through ‘sister concerns’’ networks. Collective bargaining processes and piece-rates 
produced better and finer quality of garments (Chari, 2004).  
It is interesting how Chari has used the concept of “toil”. He does not refer to toil to 
denote “physical effort”, rather toil is a “specific, shared history of work that confers 
advantages in work discipline”. Chari looks at “toil” as a well-spring of skilled resource 
for Gounder men to “draw from their past” (Chari, 2004, p.782). It is exactly his 
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interpretation of toil as a “specific, shared history of work” that is similar to the 
“business in their blood” description in the case of Memons and Chiniotis in Pakistan. 
We see the “propensity to toil” and “business is in their blood” capital through kinship 
and fraternal ties in other contexts as well. In China, it is “guanxi” (connections). 
Batjargal and Liu define guanxi as the “Chinese version of social networks and 
networking…a web of extended family relationships, a cluster of patron-client exchange 
relationships for instrumental purposes…and special relationship due to the existence of 
particularistic ties” (Batjargal and Liu, 2004, p. 160). They further emphasize that there 
is empirical proof of guanxi capital working in China as it ushers in a trust relationship, 
speeds up mobility in the job market and contributes to performance of the firm. In their 
view, guanxi is not limited to the private realm only, it extends into guanxi relationships 
with government officials as well. Entrepreneurs in China use network members to 
gather credible information and use guanxi contacts to get loans from banks. Investment 
decisions are made through their working out the indirect or direct relations of social 
capital. Guanxi relationships mitigate against risks and decrease monitoring costs 
(Batjargal and Liu, 2004).   
New businesses are set up by those who have had previous experience and knowledge of 
the industry and selection of investment decisions are made through “prior relations” 
(Batjargal and Liu, 2004). It is worth asserting this point. In the case of Memons and 
Chiniotis, prior industry experience and knowledge came up during the qualitative 
interviews quite strongly. Memons and Chiniotis harnessed their business skills in trade 
and hides and skin before the partitions. Hence, after the partition, when there was a need 
to make an industrial class for Pakistan, they quickly assumed the mantle given their past 
knowledge of business and trade.  
Batjargal and Liu further explain that relationship between the rule of law and guanxi: 
“Chinese are more likely to rely on guanxi mechanisms and channels to protect 
their interests than on contractual covenants, which may be difficult to enforce 
given the legal and institutional deficiencies” (Batjargal and Liu, 2004, p. 169).  
“...general partners of state-owned venture capital firms are more reliant on 
informal social mechanisms than formal legal means” (Batjargal and Liu, 2004, 
p. 169).  
209 
 
In these observations, the authors hit the nail at its head. Similarly, Memons and 
Chinioti-dominated caste capitalism flourished in Pakistan after the partition. This was 
through social networks, prior business and trade knowledge and path dependent 
business skills formation. Lack of Weberian impersonalisation and the weak rule of law 
also contribute to the dependence on caste capitalism. Since the formal legal system does 
not guarantee honouring of contracts, litigation is often inconclusive and the 
implementation of the rule of law is costly in terms of time, effort and money. There is 
reliance on caste networks to secure timely supply of input factors of production and 
manage the process flow of production. It is the weak legal system that contributes to 
relations of production being reliant on the larger family and caste relationships. The 
weak legal system and rule of law indeed explains the caste capitalism of Memons and 
Chiniotis.  
Even though Memons and Chiniotis are neither strictly restricted to one geographical 
area nor to one town we find that the conclusions drawn by Harriss-White aptly describe 
caste capitalism in the textiles sector in Pakistan. Textiles entrepreneurs themselves were 
shy of admitting the significant preponderance of Memons and Chiniotis in the textiles 
sector. One manufacturer was alarmed  at being identified as belonging to a leading caste 
in the textiles sector in contemporary Pakistan. Another common response was, 
“Everybody is doing well”, not only the Memons and Chiniotis. However, our fieldwork 
findings (see below) show that Chiniotis and Memons constituted 69 per cent of the 
major exporters in key textiles categories in 2004. It may well be explained through the 
proposition that caste lowers transaction costs such as information, search, reputation, 
reliability. There is little doubt that caste-specific feedback loop was working in the 
textiles sector and  subcontracting was getting organised through personalised contacts. 
Repeated interaction of  trust facilitated by caste relationships could explain the hold of 
caste capitalism in the textiles sector.  
9.1.3. Background 
Several Muslim trading communities moved to Pakistan from what became India after 
the partition. Memons77 moved to Karachi and Chiniotis moved to Lahore and 
Faisalabad. Before that, there were only a couple of “local” business houses in Pakistan, 
                                                          
77
 A generic word used for Gujaratis, Kathiawars, Bohras and others. 
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like Colony78 in the Punjab and Gandhara and Hoti in the NWFP. Even Saigols who 
were Punjabi had their earlier business experience in Calcutta. 
Memons and Chiniotis are trading communities who have their roots in pre-partition 
India. Memons belong to Gujarat in India and they went to trade in Asian and African 
countries and other parts of the India since the 18th century. They have a long history of 
being in business. Chiniotis are from a place in the central Punjab79, North-West India 
called Chiniot. They went to Calcutta and other parts of the united India, but mainly to 
Calcutta, to deal in hides and skins in the 19th century since Hindus who dominated trade 
in India did not want to deal with leather due to religious taboos (B, All Pakistan Textile 
Mills Association; UJ, TT, SU, Textile Mills, Interviews).  
From geographical point of view, during colonial times, people tended to migrate from 
North-West India to the Madras-Calcutta belt. People went to ‘mainland’ India from the 
‘frontier’ regions. There was hardly any business in the frontier regions. Most of the land 
was controlled by Muslims while most of the business was controlled by the Hindus. 
Muslims were landlords and peasants and not in business. Thus, pre-partition textiles 
were controlled by Hindus (B, All Pakistan Textile Mills Association; UJ, TT, SU, 
Textile Mills, Interviews).  
When Pakistan came into being in 1947 and mass scale migration took place between the 
new India and Pakistan, both Memons and Chiniotis went to Pakistan and started off 
with trading and quickly ventured into manufacturing. Post-partition textile mills were 
largely set up by Memon and Chinioti families such as Valikas, Dawoods, and Crescent. 
Memons were basically traders. After they came to Pakistan, they were supported by the 
government to set up plants. Memons like Valikas, Adamjees, Dawoods, Gul Ahmed 
rose to prominence in Karachi while Chiniotis like Nishat and Colony in the Punjab. 
They were all traders to begin with. Our key informants claimed that 80 per cent of the 
textiles sector in Pakistan was controlled by Memons and Chiniotis at the time of the 
fieldwork in 2004. This chapter takes it as an indicative statement (B, All Pakistan 
Textile Mills Association; UJ, TT, SU, Textile Mills, Interviews). Memons are called 
“Seths” and Chiniotis are “Mians”. Hence, the common perception during the fieldwork 
was that the “Seths” and “Mians” were controlling the textile sector. 
                                                          
78 Colony group is also Ismaili Chiniotis. 
79
 It is part of Pakistani Punjab now. 
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9.2. Inter-generational Hereditary Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Fieldwork 
We matched this qualitative finding regarding caste dominance of textiles with the 
empirical data. We identified “major exporters” of bed linen, cotton fabric and cotton 
yarn for 200480 (Government of Pakistan, 2004) and sought to find out81 whether they 
belonged to Chiniotis or Memons or neither of them. Out of 4982, 22 were Chiniotis, 12 
were Memons and 15 were neither Chinioti nor Memon. In other words, 69 per cent of 
“major exporters” in our sample were Chiniotis and Memons and 31 per cent were 
neither of the two. Memons alone were 24 per cent of “major exporters” and Chiniotis 
alone were 45 per cent of “major exporters”. This confirms the qualitative finding 
regarding caste dominance of the sector. 
Most of the key informant interviewees had a single phrase to describe hold of Chiniotis 
and Memons over the textiles sector: “business is in their blood”. This chapter interprets 
“business is in their blood” to denote inter-generational role of hereditary 
entrepreneurship in the textiles sector in Pakistan. We contextualize inter-generational 
hereditary entrepreneurship through looking at the role of social networks in the 
development of the textiles sector in Pakistan. The inter-generational hereditary chain is 
vertical but tied to the horizontal linkages in terms of clan membership of closely knit 
community. As one Chinioti entrepreneur put it: in a family business, every male family 
member is given a role and the family acts collectively by taking everyone together. 
                                                          
80 The year of fieldwork. 
81 Information about the ethnic background was gathered from Tariq Mahmood, the Chairman All Pakistan 
Textiles Mills Association (APTMA) Lahore; Mohammad Azam, Zonal Incharge Secretary APTMA 
Karachi; Aftab Ahmed, Secretary Pakistan Textile Exporters Association, Faisalabad and Mushtaq 
Chhapra, a Memon businessman in Karachi. 
82 Adamjee Enterprises (Memon), Afroze Textile Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (Neither), Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd. 
(Neither), Ali Akbar Spinning Mills (Chinioti), Al-Karam Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (Memon), Al-Rehmat 
Traders (Pvt.) Ltd. (Neither), Amer Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (Chinioti), Amsons Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 
(Memon), Arzoo Textile Mills (Chinioti), Chenab Ltd (Neither), Diamond Fabrics Ltd. (Chinioti), Din 
Textile Mills (Chinioti), D.L. Nash (Pvt.) Ltd. (Neither), Fairdeal Textiles (Pvt.) Ltd.  (Memon), Fawad 
Textile Mills (Chinioti), Gadoon Textile Mills (Memon), Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (Memon), Gulistan 
Textile Mills (Chinioti), Home Furnishings Ltd. (Memon), Husein Industries Ltd. (Memon), Indus Dyeing 
Manufacturer Co Ltd. (Chinioti), KAM International (Neither), Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. (Neither), 
Kohinoor Weaving Mills (Neither), Lahore Textile and General Mills (Chinioti), Legler Nafees Denim 
Mills (Chinioti), Lucky Textile Mills (Memon), Masood Spinning Mills (Neither), Mohammad Farooq 
Textile Mills (Memon), Monoowal Textile Mills (Chinioti), Mustaqim Dyeing Printing Industries (Pvt.) 
Ltd. (Memon), Nafeesa Textile Ltd. (Chinioti), Naveena Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (Chinioti), Niagara Mills 
(Pvt.) Ltd. (Neither), Nina Industries Ltd. (Neither), Nishat (Chunian) Ltd. (Chinioti), Nishat Mills Ltd. 
(Chinioti), Quetta Textile Mills (Chinioti), Rahimbaksh Textile Mills (Chinioti), Reliance Cotton Spinning 
Mills (Chinioti), Riaz Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (Neither), Sadaqat Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (Chinioti), Saif 
Textile Mills (Neither), Samin Textiles Ltd. (Neither), Sapphire Textile Mills (Chinioti), Shams Textile 
Mills (Chinioti), Siddiqsons Denim Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (Neither), The Crescent Textile Mills (Chinioti) and 
Yunus Textile Mills (Memon). 
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They do so by assigning tasks to every family member. Families exist and prosper 
together (BT, Textiles Mill, Interview). The inter-generational hereditary vertical 
integration becomes horizontal as extended family ties transform into social networks.  
Genealogies of inter-generational hereditary entrepreneurship and migration came 
through strongly through in the qualitative fieldwork interviews. These inter-generational 
cross-migratory case studies reflect on how social institutions such as caste and family 
played a leading role in the continuation of business cycles. We discuss below four case 
studies, two each from Chinioti and Memon families: 
“Memons and Chiniotis do well since business is an art. Memons and Chiniotis 
have it in their blood” (emphasis added) (R, Textiles Mill, Interview). 
9.2.1. D Textiles Mill 
D Textiles Mill is one of the oldest mills in Pakistan. It was set up in the 1940s. At the 
time of the fieldwork, it was a public limited company. It was a spinning mill with a 
weaving component. It had 185,000 spindles and 120 looms. D Textiles Mill also had 
another spinning mill at the time of the fieldwork. This other spinning mill was set up in 
1992, with 12,000 spindles, and had expanded to 35,000 spindles in 2004. 
The story of the inter-generational hereditary entrepreneurship of the D Textile Mills 
owners is as follows, in the words of the present generation:  
“We are the fourth generation of the family. We are an Ismaili Chinioti family. 
The group was started in 1860s. My great grandfather started the business in 
Chiniot. He started with rice and flour milling. My great grandfather, with his 
sons, also went into the cotton ginning business. They had fifteen ginning 
factories in the cotton belt, which stretches from the Jhang to Faisalabad and 
Multan. They would travel quite a bit. In 1946, my grandfather, bought land in 
Muzzaffarabad, near Multan and set up D Mills. My grandfather died shortly 
after the construction of the mill started. My father and his brothers took up the 
business after his death. At that time, there were very few names in the industry” 
(OT, Textile Mill, Interview). 
OT’s grandfather’s brothers split from him in 1920s. That was the first split in the 
family. The second split happened in 1962 during the time of OT’s father and his 
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brothers. His father had three brothers. The second split happened in 1962. OT’s father 
and one of his uncles stayed together. The other two brothers split up. Other brothers got 
two subsidiary textile mills. OT’s father got D Textiles Mill, Multan. The third split in 
the family happened when OT’s father and his brother also split up. OT’s family kept the 
group name while the other brother opened up his business with a new name (OT, 
Textiles Mill, Interview). 
OT has been in the business since 1985 while his younger brother joined in 1992. His 
younger brother ran the Textiles in Multan along with their father. The younger brother 
was considered the brains behind the whole operation. OT looked after the business in 
Lahore. Their business philosophy was to do volume business on low margins. They 
relied on the economies of scale (OT, Textiles Mill, Interview). 
The above case study of a Chinioti family illustrates that there is not only welding of 
family ties, but also the splits along the line. The broken lines of the family set up their 
individual businesses and the new generation joins up with their own immediate family 
members. It reflects how vertical inter-generation hereditary entrepreneurship is 
spreading horizontally. 
9.2.2. C Textiles Group 
C Textile Mill Group, also set up by Chiniotis, did not experience family splits as 
witnessed by the D Textile Mills. C Textiles Group owned ten textile mills at the time of 
the fieldwork. Their flagship C Textile Mills was set up in 1951. They had 150,000 
spindles and 300 looms at the time of fieldwork. The overall capacity of all their textiles 
units was half a million spindles. They had one thousands looms for weaving and 
processing capacity of half a million meters per day. They also have integrated fabric 
production: dyeing, bleaching to finishing. They produced home textiles. Their flagship 
C Textile Mills is not public limited, while two other textiles mill are. They believed in 
value addition as their business strategy. Their story in the words of the present 
generation management is as follows:  
“The business started with my father and his brothers. My father had four 
brothers. They also had their cousin with them. So five of them started the 
business together. They set it up in the tanning business in India in pre-partition 
times. They were originally in the tanning of leather in 1910. They went from the 
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Punjab and worked all over India. This is more like a classical model for all 
Chiniotis. We are Chinioti family” (TT, Textiles Group, Interview). 
The description below by another member of the C Textiles Mill illustrate the role of 
migration and the specificity of Chinioti caste in consolidating business as discussed 
earlier in the chapter. 
Each of brothers of the C Textiles Group had two or three sons. BT’s father had three 
sons. Their forefathers moved from undivided India where they had had their business in 
a few locations: Madras, Calcutta, Jalandhar and Delhi. Their primary business was 
exports of leather. BT’s grandfather and his brothers were involved with the leather 
business at the time. BT’s grandfather was the eldest brother. They came to Pakistan in 
1949. That is when they started the cotton ginning business. They set up a number of 
ginning factories in the interior Sindh and Multan (BT, C Textiles Group, Interview). 
C group was in cotton ginning before Pakistan came into being. Other than tanneries, 
they had their offices in Karachi. They were in cotton ginning and cotton export. When 
Pakistan came into being, they set up ginning mills in Pakistan. Finally, they set up their 
first flagship textile factory – C Textile Mills - in 1951. Their flagship unit was one of 
the first composite textile units established. It was the pioneering mill in Faisalabad. It 
was managed by TT’s father. During the time of the fieldwork, TT’s brother managed it. 
Slowly and gradually, C Group went into export of fabric in the late 1950s. The group’s 
major business was trading cotton as it was a natural progression from cotton ginning. 
They were trading up to 40 per cent of total cotton produced in Pakistan in the 1960s. 
Then they started trade in other commodities as well. The Group expanded by acquiring 
industrial units off Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and went into 
sugar, jute and insurance business as well. It was a time when businesses were controlled 
by government licenses and C Group had no problems with it. They bought another 
textiles mill in the early 1960s, and set up yet another textile mill in their home town of 
Chiniot. It was sanctioned to someone else but C Group bought it. They also expanded in 
sugar and got two more units in 1960s (TT and BT, C Textiles Group, Interviews). 
In 1970s, a “triple calamity” hit business groups:  the loss of the then East Pakistan, the 
massive devaluation and “hostility to anything that was industrial or business” and it led 
to nationalisation. The C Group was embarking on expansion in the then East Pakistan 
but  “luckily” had not established any major stakes there and henceforth did not suffer 
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losses on account of the secession of the East Pakistan (TT, C Textiles Group, 
Interview). 
C Group did lose cotton ginning and cotton export trading due to nationalisation. Cotton 
export was their major business. They had a company which was exporting cotton from 
Pakistan. The company was set up during pre-partition days. The company was not 
nationalised, but the government took over cotton trading and export, hence the company 
went out of business: 
“It was a huge loss. Along with business, we lost the heart and faith due to the 
terror of the (Bhutto) regime. Businessmen and industrialists were not called nice 
names. It was said that people who were in the industry are leaches. Even until 
today, people have not been able to shake that mind set off completely. That 
‘phenomenon’ (Bhutto’s nationalisation) put us further in the dark ages” (TT, C 
Textiles Group, Interview). 
C Group was “more or less” dormant throughout 1970s. Textiles and sugar were not 
nationalised. Factories kept on running “in whatever manner they could”. C Group 
restarted their active interest in business in 1979. They expanded and set up new textile 
units: “None of them were named C because of fear of nationalisation. We used lot of 
generic names, anything but C (emphasis added)”. Later on, they went into steel pipes 
and engineering pipes in 1985. They also put up the first investment bank in 1989. They 
set up some leasing companies in late 1980s. In the 1990s, they mainly grew in the 
financial services sector and set up several modarabas, leasing companies and 
investment banks. There was also consolidation and expansion of the textiles. C Group 
set up other textiles mills, making it a total of ten at the time of the fieldwork (TT, C 
Group, Interview).  
The structure of the business was such that the entire family had joint ownership of all 
the companies. For public companies, the family owned about 50 per cent of the shares 
of the companies and the rest were owned by the public (BT, C Textiles Group, 
Interview). 
C Group’s family members represented their companies on the board of directors but the 
day to day management of the company was handed over to professionals. The structure 
of family ownership was such that no one person owned a single company. Everyone 
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owned shares in every company. There had been no split in the family. Everyone owned 
an equal number of shares. Ownership was mutual. Depending on the particular field of 
expertise, each member of the family got allotted a certain company to manage for a 
while. In this way, different members of the family got allocated management 
responsibilities in different companies. So at any given point in time, one family member 
was working for one family business and then he could be shifted to another business 
depending on his interest and expertise (BT, C Textiles Group, Interview). 
“Ours is a Chinioti family. Chiniotis are successful because they have been in the 
business for a long time and the business of trade is in the blood. The family used 
to be known as the ‘cotton kings’ because at the time they were exporting cotton 
out of Pakistan whereas no one else was doing as much export” (BT, C Textiles 
Group, Interview). 
C Textiles Group’s story is quite different from D Textiles Mill, though they were both 
amongst the Chinioti pioneers in textiles in Pakistan. In the C Group, there had been no 
family splits and the family remained a cohesive group. It is a strong commentary on 
family and caste ties working as a social institution. C Group’s ancestors migrated from 
Chiniot to India to trade in leather and then moved back to Pakistan to start off with the 
textiles. Hence, migration is linked up with caste and family’s emergence as a social 
institution mediating accumulation. 
9.2.3. HB and BL Textiles Mills 
HB and BL Textiles Mills in Karachi belong to a Memon family. They are both large 
textile mills with HB being a public limited and BL a private limited. They have similar 
stories of migration and inter-generational hereditary entrepreneurship. However, the 
owner of the HB Textiles Mill did not want to speak much. This case study draws on his 
cousin JJ’s narrative  about the family history. 
HB was set up as a private company in 1953. It was later listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange in 1972, as a public limited company. The installed capacity of the mill is over 
100,000 spindles, over 500 looms and a finishing and processing plant.  
HB and BL Textiles Mills’ owners’ Memon forefathers were in business since 1900s. JJ, 
owner of BL narrated the family story as follows: 
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“We are a Memon family. We have been in the business in Pakistan since 1947. 
We chartered the flight and came in with the whole family from Rajkot, Gujarat, 
India. There we were in trading, so here we also started trading. Then we got into 
import of textile business with Japan in 1948. We decided to put up a textiles 
mill. My uncle put it up. He passed away before the mill started operating in 
1950. He did the construction for the mill. There was a proposal to get into a joint 
venture with the Japanese. My father suggested our share would be 51 per cent 
and Japanese would own 49 per cent. Japanese wanted it the other way round. He 
did not agree. He came back from Japan, liquidated all the trading companies and 
started the textile mill with 100 per cent of our capital in 1954. He got the same 
machines as were due in the joint venture. We did not know how to set up the 
textile mill. He hired middle managers and spinning managers from Japan. We 
got them on a five year contract. That’s the story of birth of HB Textiles Mill 
which is run by my cousin now” (JJ, Textile Mills, Interview). 
JJ started working in the textiles business in 1971. By 1985, all of his cousins were 
grown up and were running the business. He narrated the story of his personal endeavour 
in the textiles sector: 
“I told them (his cousins) that they either work my way or I walk out. It was 
instead decided that I leave. I started running BL Textiles Mill in 1985. It used to 
be B Textile Mill before. It was lying idle. It had been foreclosed. We bid for it. 
Four manufacturers bid for it. I was most desperate. We bid the highest and got 
the mill. It was a ghost house. There was no electricity, no water. Somebody had 
taken the machines out. We went to get it registered. We needed L4 license83. L4 
was the license to operate. Later, the IMF and World Bank forced Pakistan to 
reform and do away with L4, which is good. We went to the concerned 
department and said we want to pay excise duty and start production. They 
refused to give us the license on that day. It was summer Ramzan84, and they 
made us sit outside in the sun. At iftar85 time, they said ‘come tomorrow’. They 
made us sit like this for three days and then gave us the license. Our ‘crime’ was 
that we had bought a mill through the high court by paying full amount and we 
                                                          
83
 Licensing has been abolished now. 
84 Muslim holy month of fasting. 
85 Break of fasting after sunset in the holy month of fasting. 
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had bought cotton that was waiting to be spun. We wanted to pay the taxes. We 
were standing in the queue but they refused to take our taxes because we did not 
have L4 number. We managed to make it work out with great difficulty” (JJ, 
Textile Mills, Interview). 
JJ restarted the old mill in 1985 with European machinery. By 1990, they were into 
exports with an edge in home textiles. Anti-dumping duty was imposed by Europe on 
Pakistan in 1992. Anti-dumping duty made it difficult for them to compete in Europe. 
BL Textile Mills found a niche in the US market. They expanded and made sister 
concerns. They set up another textile mill in 2001 (JJ, Textile Mills, Interview). 
Other than HB and BL Textiles Mills owned by two Memon cousins, another of their 
cousin owns a towel making factory. The family also has two other private textiles mills. 
HB and BL Textiles Mills stories show how the inter-generational hereditary 
entrepreneurship works out in real life. This is a story of typical Memon family who 
have been in business in Gujarat (India) since the 1900s. They were in trading. They 
migrated to Pakistan and started off with trading and then branched into the textiles 
sector. The family splits later on egged on by extended members of the family to set up 
their own ventures which turned out to be successful due to the “business in their blood” 
rationale.  
9.2.4. B Defunct Textiles Mill  
Memons were in ascendance in the 1950s and 1960s. By 2004, many Memon groups 
were still in business, but their hegemony was broken as a lot of them went under in the 
1970s due to Bhutto’s nationalisations. This resonates with the story of B Textiles Mill in 
Karachi which went under in the 1970s. This mill was part of a big B group of the 1960s. 
They were a Memon family. One of the family members, JB,  narrated the story of 
migration and hardships: 
“We are a Memon family. We belong to Gujarat, India. There was nothing much 
to do in Gujarat. Agriculture was bad. We were Muslims in that part of the world. 
People started going out in the business. Depending on where you were situated, 
if you were in coastal areas, people went to Sri Lanka, South Africa and then to 
East Africa. We were in the interior. We are from a place called Jetpur. We had 
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inner roots, so we went to Calcutta. My grand-father built the B Group in 
Pakistan. He was close to Jinnah (JB, defunct B Textiles Mill, Interview). 
JB related the story of the demise of the B Group in the 1970s: 
“We sold our textiles factory in 1971. It was a huge place, into acres. We made a 
big mistake by selling it. It was later sold to BL Textiles Mill. Bhutto destroyed a 
lot of institutions. We thought he would also take over the textile industry, so we 
decided to sell it to get rid of it. B Group lost everything in the then East Pakistan 
overnight. We lost a jute mill in the East Pakistan, 25 thousand people were 
working there. We lost the largest tea gardens spread over acres. We had three 
textile mills there that we lost. They were all medium sized textile mills. We lost 
chipboard plant and we lost 5 units of jute. One of our biggest businesses was 
jute trading. We lost it overnight. We do not even know the real value of our 
assets. Stock exchange was not active in those days and we do not know the real 
value of our assets lost. We came to the then West Pakistan and after a while, 
Bhutto nationalised our life insurance company called B Life Insurance. He 
nationalised our ND Bank. My grandfather, my father and my uncle had started 
the bank. When nationalisation started, we sold off our sugar mill and our textile 
mill. We decided that we had enough. Enough of this non-sense. We lost 
everything in East Pakistan. We got no compensation for it. This phrase of ‘22 
families’ got popular and it made things bad for us. They took our passports 
away. Having lost everything there, we came here. We lost things here too. 
Bhutto took Pakistan 30 years back. People are still frightened to do things 
because of nationalisation. He took over things like flour mills and cotton export. 
We were also into the export of cotton. He started government organisations like 
Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan. Though, he did not take away everything 
but our business stopped. We were not allowed to function anymore. Pakistan has 
suffered enormously. We lost a generation. The work ethics in this country totally 
deteriorated. The will to do business was lost after the fall of the East Pakistan 
and Bhutto’s nationalisation. We started to break-up as a family as well. When 
you have this kind of situation, what do you do?’ One person said he was going 
to London, like my brother who left for London. Others in the family said we did 
not want to get involved with nationalised business. Everybody had their own 
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views at that time of crisis. The big family got broken up” (JB, defunct B Textiles 
Mill, Interview).  
The story of B defunct Textiles Mill group shows how the social institution of family and 
caste could not save the business and how the government’s nationalisation and break up 
of Pakistan made the family lose their business. It is a commentary of the state’s policies 
and political influences and their interaction with the social institutions of family and 
caste. It shows how the latter could not save the business due to the powerfulness of the 
former. 
9.3. Caste Capitalism and the State’s Policies 
Memons and Chiniotis represent caste capitalism in the textiles sector in Pakistan. 
However, they are two different castes. They have their distinct sense of caste identity 
and loyalty. Exaggerated and differentiated claims to fame accompany all success 
stories. The same is the case with Memons and Chiniotis. Some Memon manufacturers 
were of the opinion that unlike Chiniotis, Memons came to Pakistan by transferring their 
capital from India to Pakistan and were pioneers in setting up the textiles industry in 
Pakistan. Some Chinioti manufacturers were of the opinion that they were initially 
suppliers and vendors and later became involved in the small scale spinning plants that 
mushroomed in Lyallpur (now Faisalabad)86 after the partition. Chiniotis set up the 
flagship textiles mills soon after the partition in then Lyallpur. Chiniotis also scored 
point against Memons for fleeing the country after Bhutto’s nationalisation and only 
returning later, while the Chiniotis dug in during the difficult times, staying put, and 
prospering later (Manufacturers Interviews). 
Caste capitalism is intricately linked to state’s policies. “Social structures of 
accumulation” prosper or decay in the context of the state’s industrial policy and 
patronage as the above discussed case studies show. In the 1950s and 1960s, Memons 
were in ascendance and enjoyed close association to policy makers. Since the 1980s, 
Chiniotis are in ascendance. The close nexus of the Punjabi industrialists with the state 
became prominent in the non-party elections of 1985. As Chapter 3 discusses, the rise of 
the Sharif and Chaudhry families goes back to the 1980s. Though, both these families are 
                                                          
86
 Now Faisalabad. 
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non-Chiniotis and not in the textiles sector, there was a spinoff amongst the Punjabi 
Chinioti groups in the textiles sector.  
Close association of the largest textiles mill group and defaulter textile mill owners with 
the Sharifs became clear during the fieldwork. It was also pointed out that some Chinioti 
manufacturers have been able to earn rents due to the state institutions’ patronage from 
the mid-1980s onwards.  
The larger point is caste capitalism explains reduction in transaction costs, path 
dependency, repeated contracts, trust and proves to be a lubricant in easing the 
production processes. Yet, the caste capitalism functions in the context of the overall 
state policies as the ascendance of Chiniotis over Memons in the post 1980s period 
indicates. Of course, the other contributing factor is that Memons were in ascendance in 
the 1950s and 1960s and were hit hard both by Bhutto’s nationalisation of 1970s and 
dismemberment of Pakistan and suffered the most. Most of the leading Memon families 
left the country in disarray as the case study discussed earlier shows. Yet, rise and fall of 
business groups cannot be explained without taking into account the state institutions’ 
patronage. 
The balance of power between Memons and Chiniotis changed since the 1980s and it has 
roots in the politics of the state patronage. During the fieldwork, there were strong 
perceptions that the patronage took place and benefitted the Chiniotis. They were able to 
earn rents. Textiles Mill A in our sample expanded quickly in late 1980s due to the close 
connections of the owners with Nawaz Sharif while he was Chief Minister of the Punjab. 
There was also a perception that the owner of the largest textiles mill in Pakistan, a 
Chinioti, got spoils of the privatisation process set in place by Nawaz Sharif in 1990. The 
owner of the group got a bank privatised by the government in 1991 despite the fact that 
he was not the highest bidder. He got it due to patronage by Sharifs. It is quoted as a 
concrete example in the banking circles. This also extended to other investments by the 
group including textiles. The owner’s son described the influence of government on their 
group’s performance as below: 
“My father, NN, has always been close to various governments. The government 
changes a lot over here, when you take a group like ours. The governments are 
mostly against the industry. We have had lots of difficulties with the Benazir 
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government87. With the present government88 things have been fine. We had hard 
times with the Benazir government in the 1990s. We did not get along well with 
them. They wanted to take back ND Bank from us. We got the Bank during 
Nawaz Sharif’s privatization campaign in early 1990s. Benazir government 
thought that the privatisation was wrong. They were after us. We resisted and did 
not let the blackmail take place” (IN, Textiles Mill, Interview). 
It shows the rent generation and the politics of patronage is intricately linked to social 
institutions such as caste and family. The overall interaction between the state 
institutions and the capitalists leads to overt and covert transfers, often mediated through 
the caste capitalism. 
Conclusion 
Caste capitalism has been at work in Pakistan’s textiles sector for over sixty years and it 
has strong similarity with the way fraternal or guanxi (connections) capitalism has 
worked in other parts of the developing world. The politics of state patronage has cast its 
long shadow over the contestation by two particular castes – Memons and Chiniotis - in 
the textiles sector. Together, these two castes dominate the largest export sector in 
Pakistan and caste capitalism works in the context of overall state’s politics. Other than 
their historical specificity, one of the key reasons that these two castes dominate the 
textiles sector in Pakistan is because of the lack of Weberian impersonalisation and the 
weak rule of law in the country. When the rule of law is weak, there is greater likelihood 
of the relations of accumulation being even more firmly getting entrenched and 
embedded in social institutions such as caste and family.  
 
  
                                                          
87
 First Benazir government was from 1988 to 1990, while the second Benazir government was from 1993 
to 1996. 
88 The Musharraf regime was from 1999-2008. This interview took place in 2005. 
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Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
The first part of the Chapter summarizes the key findings of the thesis. In the second 
part, the rule-violating behavior is discussed in terms of its differential impact on 
accumulation. The second part also discusses the case studies in the light of the literature 
review. There is also a brief discussion on the appropriateness of the methodology used 
in the thesis and possible future extension of this work. 
The thesis investigates the relationship between the political economy and the rule of law 
in Pakistan from 1999-2004. This is in terms of transition from a traditional society to a 
modern “Weberian” state. It chronicles the challenges of such a transition.  
Empirically, the thesis looks at the International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) ‘good 
governance’ reforms (couched in the neo-Weberian language) and the reaction to these 
by the capitalist and intermediate classes in contemporary Pakistan. It has three case 
studies: (a) a tax law (General Sales Tax imposed as VAT), (b) a corporate sector 
regulatory body (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) and (c) a productive 
sector (textiles sector). These case studies are contextualized through a political economy 
framework, providing due historical context since the 1950s. It also provides a 
background analysis of the IFIs Structural Adjustment Programme that started in 
Pakistan from 1988 onwards, and links the governance debate to the neo-liberal agenda 
of pro-market institutional governance reforms. The textiles sector case study provides a 
linkage to the taxation and regulation issues in the corporate sector. It also discusses 
caste capitalism as a social institution, both due to its historical specificity and also with 
an eye to links to the wider rule of law issues.  
The IFI’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) aimed to roll back the interventionist 
role of the Pakistani state. The IFI’s first generation reforms dealt with macroeconomic 
stability, tightening of fiscal belt, freeing of trade, bringing down tariff, free flow of 
currency exchange, liberalizing imports and exports and cutting down subsidies. 
However, IFIs, after having failed in their structural adjustment programmes in Latin 
America and having faced the financial crisis in Asia, tried to reinvent themselves and 
focused on "soft" second generation reforms after the mid-1990s. These second 
generation institutional governance reforms dealt with the rule of law, government 
effectiveness and the state's ability to be a regulator. The IFIs called for improved 
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taxation, modernized audit and accounts institution, regulation of government borrowing, 
supervision of regulations through a securities regulatory body, accountability through a 
permanent national accountability bureau, access to information, and reforms in the 
judicial system. 
The whole premise for the IFIs institutional governance reforms was to take power away 
from the government and bestow it to pro-market independent and autonomous 
institutions. For example, control of the central bank was taken away from the Ministry 
of Finance and the State Bank of Pakistan was made an autonomous institution in 1997. 
Company Law Authority within the Ministry of Finance made into an autonomous 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in 1999. IFIs wanted to reduce 
corruption, rent-seeking and check abuse of government's powers through institutional 
governance reforms. However, the IFIs over-simplified the entrenched structural 
problems in the political economy of developing countries like Pakistan by seeking to 
substitute rent-seeking with the institutions of law. As the case studies show, the IFIs 
reforms met huge resistance in Pakistan. 
As the literature in Chapter 2 argues that the structural factors in the developing 
countries do not allow across the board implementation of the rule of law. The politics of 
patronage is prevalent in the countries like Pakistan with patron-client relationships 
structured around the payoffs in exchange for political/organizational capabilities. 
Institutions matter, but just replicating the institutions of the advanced countries in the 
developing countries does not lead to desired results. Developing countries have their 
own political, economic and social dynamics that need to be taken into account. 
For the period under scrutiny (1999-2004) the thesis argues that, in Pakistan, contestation 
took place between the IFIs promoted pro-market rule-of-law reforms and the forces on 
the ground opposing it. The thesis is essentially a story of aspects of this contestation. It 
is shown that IFIs reforms met concerted resistance from both the capitalist and the 
intermediate classes. The governments tacitly supported these domestic social groups 
while paying lip service to the IFIs governance agenda. 
This contestation (between the rule of law reforms and resistance to them) forms the core 
of the first two case studies. The IMF pushed VAT-styled General Sales Tax (GST) to 
substitute for the revenue lost through doing away with customs duties. In the GST case, 
the resistance was put up by the capitalist and intermediate classes of traders, retailers 
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and wholesalers. Chapter 6 of the dissertation focuses on how the refunds system was 
subverted by these groups by claiming fake returns on fake invoices. This led the tax 
authorities to giving more refunds than the actual tax receipts. Tax official admitted to 
providing more money in refunds than the actual receipts. During key informant 
interviews, manufacturers admitted that the textiles sector indulged in the phenomenon 
of ‘fake and flying’ invoices. A few manufacturers explained in detail how the fake 
system worked in practice. VAT works properly when only few exceptions are allowed, 
and it needs to be applied to the entire chain of economy. Initially, GST had provisions 
that gave incentives to purchases from registered suppliers, in order to enable 
documentation of the economy and increased registration. However, as internal Central 
Board of Revenue (CBR) documents show, this provision was done away with due to the 
heavy cost being imposed on CBR by the tax dodgers. Instead, CBR over the years has 
given so many exemptions that GST resembled an excise duty rather than a properly 
functioning VAT.  
At the same time, capitalists in the textile sector were keen to avoid proper 
documentation of their economic activities. When all major export sectors including the 
textiles were zero-rated in 2005, the manufacturers preferred being exempted rather than 
allowing proper registration of their economic activities. Resistance to the proper 
implementation of the GST/VAT shows rule-violating behavior and challenges to the 
transition towards a modern “Weberian” state. Documentation of economy can lead to 
proper income tax being levied. Resistance to the documentation part of the GST is 
actually a resistance to the assessment. Proper income tax is paid by only a fraction of 
population, i.e. the salaried employees. Pakistan’s tax to GDP ratio was just over 10 per 
cent in the early 2000s but has continued to plummet since then and is amongst the 
lowest in the middle income countries. Traders, retailers and wholesalers have publically 
protested the imposition of GST. On the other hand, the IMF’s loan was suspended in 
2010 because Pakistan refused to implement a reformed GST that called for doing away 
with exemptions. Overall, the imposition of the GST in a VAT mode ended up with 
limited success. 
In the second case study in Chapter 7, the struggle over imposing a proper regulatory 
framework for corporate governance in Pakistan is summarised as a case of ‘one step 
forward, two steps backward’. The ADB funded the formulation of the new regulatory 
law and also the setting up of the autonomous regulatory body, the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission (SECP) of Pakistan in 1999. The purpose was to take control 
away from the Ministry of Finance and give it to an autonomous institution to provide a 
level playing field for intra-capital relations. The SECP came up with the Code of 
Corporate Governance by introducing the concept of voluntary non-executive directors 
and audit committees amongst other measures. The SECP also pushed for holding of 
Annual General Meetings of the companies, to get dividend paid to shareholders, to 
prevent unlawful inter-corporate financing, to improve the auditing standards and to 
introduce margin financing in order to phase out the volatile carry-over-trade or ‘Badla’ 
financing. All such measures were steps towards the pro-market rule-of-law and meant to 
ensure a level playing field. Due to the family-oriented nature of its corporate sector, 
stock markets in Pakistan are largely illiquid. Very few shares of companies are bought 
and sold and 30 companies’ share constituted 90 per cent of trading as the literature 
referred to in chapters 7 and 8 shows. However, the ADB induced reform of corporate 
governance largely failed to create an equities market that could, potentially, bolster 
capital formation. The SECP was also not able to fully phase out post-financing carry-
over-trade or ‘Badla’ either. Stock brokers resisted the reform as they preferred high 
turn-over without the transactions leading to quick final settlement. The more the turn-
over of the shares, the more their commission, whereas settlement-oriented secured 
transactions acted against their interests. However, the high volatility in the market led to 
the crash of the Karachi Stock Exchange in early 2005.  
The ADB evaluation reports discuss the market manipulation by a few powerful stock 
brokers. They, however, fail to mention the resistance to the corporate governance by the 
capitalist class itself. It is not only the intermediate class of professionals such as 
chartered accountants and stock brokers which resisted the SECP reforms. The capitalist 
class itself resisted it, as evident from the qualitative key informant interviews. The 
textiles manufacturers were of the opinion that inappropriate rules of the Northern 
regulatory bodies were being imposed in Pakistan.  
It is obvious from the SECP case study that Pakistan’s capitalist and intermediate classes 
do not want mature capitalism. Capitalists want to keep the family controlled and owned 
corporate sector, which is either not registered on the stock exchange or, if it is, then 
barely traded there. Capitalists resist the pro rule-of-law reforms. The SECP reforms led 
to capitalists de-listing their companies and taking them away from public view rather 
than letting them be regulated. The SECP case study further throws light on the rule-
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violating behaviour of the capitalist and the intermediate classes. It shows why transition 
to a modern “Weberian” state is difficult in Pakistan.  
The third case study of the textiles sector in Chapters 8 and 9 shows that the textiles 
sector in Pakistan has a tormented relationship to the rule of law. Not only did the 
textiles sector get more bank loans than other sectors, it defaulted more than others, as 
Chapter 8 points out.  It is also one of the worst sectors amongst the large-scale industry 
for non-payment of GST, as per Chapter 6. In terms of loan default, three different case 
studies in Chapter 8 present three different scenarios ranging from default of loans 
secured through political connections, default due to fraud, to circumstantial default. In 
these case studies of default, the IFC and foreign banks initiated the default proceedings 
and the national banks followed suit. The national banks did not take the initiative to go 
after the defaulters, highlighting their tolerance to default. The textiles case study 
explains dimensions of the rule-violating behavior and shows how the “Weberian” 
impartiality and rule-based governance is challenged. 
Other than the formal/informal sector dichotomy prevalent in the textiles sector, there 
was also the issue of commercial exporter versus manufacturer exporter from the rule of 
law viewpoint. The phenomenon of fake invoices for GST refunds was linked with the 
commercial exporters being without permanent premises.  
In the textiles sector, it is worth pointing out that the default of bank loans, one the one 
hand, led to the theft of resources. On the other hand, it led to some value-enhancing 
activities. Despite the tormented relationship of the textiles sector with the rule of law, 
some of the rents that the capitalists earned through their interaction with the state 
institutions led to value-enhancement. The fieldwork points both to theft of resources as 
well as to the value-enhancement.  
At the level of the fieldwork, almost one out of every three large textile mills in our 
sample availed the loan write-off from the State Bank of Pakistan. The State Bank 
refused to divulge the names of individual companies that got their loans written-off. 
They, however, confirmed that one amongst every three large textiles mill in our sample 
availed the loan write-off. This pool of large textiles companies is also amongst the top 
exporters in 2004. Due to the confidentiality clause of the State Bank of Pakistan, we 
could not match the individual defaulter companies against the list of top exporters on a 
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case by case basis. The link between the defaulter companies having enhanced value is 
established in an indirect way in our sample.  
At the micro level, a textiles group in our fieldwork sample got economic favours in 
1991 through the privatization process in contravention of the rules in 1991. This textiles 
company owned by a politically-connected group became the largest textiles mill in the 
country in 2004. This is a micro example of the rents being used productively. 
Indications of the textiles sector having established itself competitive internationally are 
also there at the macro level. As discussed in Chapter 8, the UNIDO (2009) statistics 
reveal that Pakistan’s share of the world exports in the textiles was 2.9 per cent in 2000. 
After the phase-out of the MFA, Pakistan did not lose its market share in textiles, nor in 
the garment subsector. It in fact gained slightly to 3.1 per cent in textiles in 2007. Other 
than China (first and foremost), India and Thailand; most other Asian exporters lost their 
market share in textiles. In garments, China gained massively, Vietnam and Bangladesh 
also gained somewhat and Pakistan did not lose its market share. Contrasting these 
statistics with the Pakistan’s manufacturing performance in 1990s (where the large-scale 
manufacturing even went into the negative growth in 1996-97), this is a welcome sign. 
Due to the Structural Adjustment Programme and its policy of liberalization and massive 
tariff reductions, the 1990s is considered in the literature the “lost decade” in terms of 
economic development. In these adverse circumstances, Pakistan’s textiles industry spent 
USD 4 billion on balancing, modernization and replacement in early 2000s to deal with 
the challenges of post-MFA phase. It paid dividends. Pakistan’s textiles sector showed 
signs of being internationally competitive in 2007 as per the UNIDO (2009) estimates. 
All our three levels of investigations (micro case study example, general trends 
established through the fieldwork, and the macro picture) indicate that value-
enhancement did take place in the textiles sector in Pakistan. We have also established 
earlier the overt and covert transfers were made to the textiles sector. We assert that 
some of these rents ended up as theft of resources. Other rents added some value.  
It seems what distinguished the industrialists who used the rents productively from those 
who wasted them is the “decentralized competitiveness” and the path-dependant business 
histories. In other words, it was the not the result of disciplining mechanisms used by the 
state institutions that forced some industrialists to be productive rather than wasting 
resources. The state is weak in Pakistan and lacks effective enforcement capacities. 
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Some rule-violating behavior led to value-enhancing activities due to the peculiar 
business histories of the industrial groups which entrenched them in path-dependant 
ways of utilizing the rents for value-enhancement compared to others who were largely 
the new entrants and used the acquired rents to get rich quickly. The industrialists who 
used the rents for value-enhancement may have been in the business for generations. 
Business is the way of life for them as illustrated by a phrase very frequently used during 
the fieldwork: “business is in their blood”. We are only pointing to a very general trend 
and there are exceptions to this pattern. Established houses went under particularly in the 
aftermath of Bhutto’s nationalization and also afterwards. Similarly, some new entrants 
have done very well. They often started with dyeing/printing and earned profits, 
reinvested profits in the backward expansion and went into spinning. There are sizeable 
exceptions to the general pattern we describe above. Despite this, we point to a general 
pattern of path-dependence where some family business groups with peculiar histories 
used the rents for value-enhancing activities. We describe the peculiar nature of caste 
capitalism in the textiles sector below. 
The family-controlled and owned business was the other major finding of the fieldwork. 
The family ownership interacts with the rule of law by not letting the equity market 
develop and not transforming the business into joint ventures as discussed in the thesis. 
This poses challenges to the notions of impersonalisation that is the hallmark of 
Weberian thinking. 
All accumulation is socially embedded. The literature (Harriss-White, 2003) points 
specifically to the accumulation being organized by the “social structures” of caste, 
gender, locality and religion in the informal sector in India as per Chapter 9. Lieven 
(2011) discusses in detail the role of kinship-based networks in the politics of patronage 
in Pakistan. The fieldwork of the thesis shows that two trading castes - Memons and 
Chiniotis –were the dominant players in the textiles sector.  
Both the Memons and Chiniotis have peculiar migratory histories, taking them from 
colonial India to East Africa and Pakistan. Memons and Chiniotis’ inter-generational 
hereditary entrepreneurship has been chronicled through four caste studies in Chapter 9. 
It is a commentary on the rise and fall of leading textiles groups and their stories of 
accumulation mediated through migration, family and caste. Different groups used 
different strategies for family cohesion, control and horizontal spread. Memons who 
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were ascendant in the 1960s were badly hit by Bhutto’s nationalisation and 
dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. With a different phase of patronage starting in the 
1980s, Chiniotis overtook Memons in the textiles due to their close connections with the 
ruling Punjabi politicians. Chiniotis dominance continued in the 1990s and beyond. This 
illustrates quite well that while all accumulation is socially embedded, accumulation also 
takes place in the overall context of the state policies and its overt and covert patronage. 
Memons got the state patronage in the 1950s and 1960s, while Chiniotis were favoured 
more from the 1980s onwards.  
Finally, the weak rule of law is also an underlying reason for the caste capitalism of 
Chiniotis and Memons. Had there been an honouring of contracts and a well-functioning 
justice system, there would have been less reliance on family and caste networks for the 
growth of business. The weak rule of law regime perpetuates dependence on family, 
kinship and caste relations even in the formal textiles. Lack of Weberian 
impersonalisation is exemplified well through caste capitalism. 
In Chapter 2, North et al. (2013) state that the institutions of the OECD countries behave 
quite differently when they are replicated in the developing countries. Chapter 2 also 
discusses Mushtaq Khan’s (2004, 2005) criticism of the “good governance” reforms and 
the “service delivery model”. In line with these arguments, the case study chapters also 
show that the IFIs governance reforms only had limited success in Pakistan. The textiles 
manufacturers interviewed used similar language to that of the literature reviewed. The 
textiles manufacturers were of the opinion that Western rules are being imposed in the 
case of the SECP and such rules do not go with the ground realities of the family-owned 
and controlled capitalist sector in Pakistan. The rule-violating behavior of the Pakistan’s 
capitalist class and its intermediate classes did not lead to the law being made applicable 
across the board in an impartial manner in the Weberian sense.  
Rule-violating behavior may have several different consequences for accumulation. On 
the basis of the case studies, we can divide the rule-violating behavior in terms of its 
linkage with accumulation into the following five categories: 
1) Rule-violating behavior that led to theft of resources: As Chapter 7 states, the 
non-performing loans were Rs 66.1 billion in December 1990 and they increased 
to Rs 271.4 billion in December 2000. Interviews with the textile manufacturers 
show that many of the new, politically connected, companies rose while making 
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use of the easy flow of bank loans and folded up soon afterwards either due to 
unfavourable business climate or due to them having started the business for 
embezzlement purposes. Chapter 8 discusses in detail a case of fraud of bank 
loans in the textiles sector. There is no doubt that one outcome of rule-violating 
behavior was theft of resources. 
2) Rule-violating behavior that led to value-enhancing activities: As discussed in 
detail above that some overt and covert transfers from the state institutions to 
textiles manufacturers were used productively and led to value-addition as well. 
3) Rule-violating behavior that may or may not have had much impact on 
accumulation: Not paying taxes is a rule-violating behavior discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. Resistance to the GST was such that its entire refunds systems was 
subverted by making fake claims for more money than was actually paid in tax. 
Under-taxation is a rule-violating behavior and its impact on accumulation is 
indirect, if at all. Earning tax revenues gives fiscal space to the governments to 
spend on infrastructure and human resource development. Such development 
expenditures may in turn help with the productivity of the capitalist sector and aid 
in accumulation. However, such a link is only indirect and there is rule-violating 
behavior that may or may not have a direct influence on accumulation. 
4) Rule-violating behavior that may not have had much impact on accumulation: 
The case study chapters show that some rule-violating behavior may not impact 
accumulation in any significant way. Unlawful inter-corporate financing in one 
such examples. The SECP had disallowed transferring money in excess of an 
allowed limit to its sister concerns. The companies nevertheless indulged in the 
unlawful inter-corporate financing. Some were caught and penalized for it. 
However, such transfers to sister concerns may not have had much influence on 
accumulation. Similarly, not holding the Annual General Meetings (AGMs) is 
unlawful and the SECP pushed the companies hard to hold their AGMs. Holding 
AGMs increases transparency and accountability and is desirable for the 
implementation of the rule of law, but it may not directly influence accumulation. 
5) Rule-violating behavior that led to assets destruction: There is some rule-
violating behavior that destroys assets rather than contributing to accumulation. 
Speculative COT/Badla financing is one such measure. Badla financing is 
speculative and works on borrowed money. The trade is not settled and carried 
over to other transactions where the same borrowed money is used for further 
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trading. Badla introduces an element of uncertainty and speculation in the stock 
exchanges. It leads to high volume of trading and fewer settlements. Such high 
speculation can potentially lead to a crash of the stock market as happened in the 
case of Karachi Stock Exchange in April 2005. Therefore, measures such as the 
speculative Badla trading leads to assets destruction rather than accumulation. 
Similarly, when some textiles manufacturers under-priced their products in 
Western markets, it led to the imposition of anti-dumping duties for the whole 
industry. It was possible for some “black sheep” manufacturers to under-price 
their products below their standard costs either because they defaulted on bank 
loans, not paid their utility charges, not paid the due tax or were recipients of 
some form of unlawful covert transfers. They used such rents to subsidize their 
products and under-priced their products to increase their profit margin. When 
caught, such rule-violating behavior led to the imposition of an anti-dumping 
duty on the entire industry. Anti-dumping duty made Pakistani products more 
costly compared to their competitors and led to cut in the profit margins. 
Unlawful under-pricing is another such behavior that negatively impacts 
accumulation. 
Overall, various categories of the rule-violating behavior described above and in the case 
study chapters of the thesis chronicle the resistance of the traditional society to the 
development of a modern “Weberian” state. They document the challenges to the 
framework of the “Weberian” state that IFIs want to enforce in countries like Pakistan. 
Due to the weakness of the state and underlying structural distribution of power, the rule 
of law based framework is resisted.  
We have looked at the relationship between political economy and the rule of law by 
contextualising this in terms of transition from a traditional society to a modern 
“Weberian” state. The thesis was able to pursue this issue empirically. As Chapter 8 
argues, there is capitalism in Pakistan and the textiles sector is a capitalist sector. The 
formal textiles sector is dominated by the top forty companies. They are averse to mature 
capitalism and resist rule based governance. The case studies on GST and SECP not only 
document the resistance to the rule-based governance generally, they also situate the 
resistance in the biggest large scale manufacturing sector of the textiles.  
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The qualitative methodology for an inter-disciplinary Development Studies thesis proved 
useful, utilising a combination of qualitative research methodologies. Quasi-
anthropological qualitative key informant interviews and case studies of textiles 
manufacturers also worked well, along with a critical reading of primary and secondary 
documents. Reading of documents showed another side of the picture and was 
triangulated with manufacturers, and other stakeholders’ perceptions, views and stories. 
This combination stitched together a good representation of ground realities.  
Overall, the thesis achieved what it set out to do. It has presented new ways of analysing 
political economy and the rule of law and, in turn, it has contributed to the understanding 
of the political economy of the development in middle income countries like Pakistan. 
The overall finding of the thesis is that the rule-based governance was resisted in the 
contemporary Pakistan of 1999-2004. The capitalist and the intermediate classes did not 
want mature capitalism. They wanted family-controlled and owned corporate sector and 
indulged in rule-violating behaviour by resisting the rule-based governance in the 
aftermath of ISI era. This is the robust and firm main finding. 
The thesis also shows that the nature of patronage has changed since Bhutto’s 
nationalization of 1970s. The trend to allocate development funds to the rural elected 
representatives started with the Ayub regime’s Basic Democracies (1959). The new 
forms of patronage focused on taking over the state institutions since 1970s. The 
literature discusses the role of “political entrepreneurs” seeking the state patronage. The 
new trend in Pakistan is to takeover the state in order to redistribute rents to the elite and 
the intermediate classes. Those who manage to take over the state institutions redistribute 
the patronage to their connected clients. It is the easiest way to accumulate wealth for 
consumption as well as for reinvestment in the business. Short term investment in 
property or stocks is preferred over investment in industrialization. Stashing money away 
in foreign banks and buying foreign property is preferred over investment in the country. 
The qualitative fieldwork threw light on these aspects.  
Other than dealing with clientelism, the state has also been under pressure from the neo-
liberal reforms of the IFIs. The IFIs focused on cutting down the role of the state. They 
pushed for the roll-back of the interventionist state and at the same time wanted 
“government effectiveness” to deliver a level playing field for intra-capital relations and 
also for the capital’s relationship with the state. Also they wanted to achieve these 
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seemingly contradictory objectives (where the state is weak and strong at the same time 
via-a-vis different functions) by largely ignoring labour. Their plans for “government 
effectiveness” with a lean state were resisted as the thesis shows. 
As Chapter 2 discusses, there may not be much difference between the civilian and 
authoritarian governments in developing countries as the underlying structural patterns 
of patron-client relationships remain intact. This finding is re-confirmed by the thesis. 
Military governments have not fared much better than civilian political governments. 
The military governments, including the Musharraf government since 1999 in Pakistan, 
had to grant patronage to maintain political stability and earn legitimacy by appeasing 
the powerful social groups. Military as an organization has protected its own immediate 
interests very well. However, military governments have failed in enforcing the rule of 
law, as they also had to make concessions similar to the democratic governments to 
survive due to the structural constraints of the society.  
The literature review of Chapter 2 discusses the Weberian rational-bureaucratic state, 
where there is impersonalisation, impartiality, division of labour and hierarchy. The 
principles of the legal-rational bureaucracy are equally applicable to other large-scale 
organizations other than the government, e.g. big private enterprises, political parties, 
army, church or trade unions. Moreover, the state has monopoly over the instruments of 
violence. North et al. (2013)’s “open access order” (OAO) as a contrast to the “limited 
access order” (LAO) builds on this to develop its own approach. In OAO, there is an 
open competition in the political and economic institutions. The government’s 
commitments are well-implemented and durable in the OAO. It also allows organizations 
outside the government (opposition parties, citizens groups) to organize and keep a check 
on the government’s powers. Political, economic, educational and religious activities are 
allowed openly as long as they fulfill the impersonalisation criteria. The rule of law is 
applicable across the board. The concept of OAO broadly meets the criterion of a 
modern “Weberian” state. 
A close reading of the IFIs documents and the objectives of their reforms shows that they 
want to establish a modern “Weberian” state. Concepts such as the “rule of law”, 
“sanctity of contract” and providing a “level playing field for all” are discussed time and 
again in the IFIs documents. They want to replicate the institutions of the advanced 
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countries in the developing countries and consider “politics” as hindrance to achieving 
their objectives.    
Opposed to this, Mushtaq Khan and Lieven (Chapter 2) both argue that it is precisely all 
about politics. Pyramidal patron-client networks are essential political and economic 
structures of the developing countries. The underlying distribution of power in a country 
determines its compatibility with dynamic institutional capabilities. The neo-Weberian 
notion that personalized politics through clientelism needs to be checked first for 
development to take place is flawed. This is because faction-based patron-client 
networks exist due to the structural features of the developing countries. Systems of 
governance work through the politics of patronage. Lieven (2011) also states that the 
state is weak in Pakistan and kinship-based social groups are strong in Pakistan. 
The easy provision of the bank loans provided opportunities for the capitalists to 
accumulate rents often through rule-violating transfers. Rents were also earned through 
pursuing the policy of privatisation. The state-owned enterprises and financial 
institutions were privatised often and through this bestowed favours and allowed the 
politically connected elite to earn rents. The rest of the rule-violating behaviour of the 
capitalist elite and the middle classes (discussed in the case study chapters) might or 
might not have had an impact on accumulation, yet it forms part of a pattern of 
traditional societies like Pakistan in their transition towards a modern “Weberian” state. 
The weakness of the state was apparent not only its lack of ability to collect taxes or 
enforce corporate regulations but also its inability of the state institutions to recover the 
defaulted bank loans. The judicial system is clogged to the point of being dysfunctional. 
There is no effective deterrent against the rule-violating behavior. In the loan default 
case studies discussed in Chapter 8, the international lender - the IFC and foreign banks– 
initiated criminal proceedings against three defaulters and only then did the national 
banks follow suit. The national financial institutions lacked the capacity to keep adequate 
collateral, asses the viability of projects or recover the defaulted loans. In the Musharraf 
era, a new institution Corporate Industrial Restructuring Corporation (CIRC) was set up 
to “sell” the bad loans by seizing the available collaterals, restructuring and auctioning 
them to make some recovery for the government. CIRC only managed to recover a 
fraction of the original due loans and the interest. Some details of the CIRC activities are 
given in Appendix 2.   
236 
 
The literature discussed in Chapter 2 has different focus ranging from the “elite” to the 
“intermediate classes”. North et al. (2013) focus on the “elite bargains” in rent creation 
for the relative political stability. Mushtaq Khan (2005) in his earlier writings has 
focused on the role of the “intermediate classes”. Political entrepreneurs from the 
“intermediate classes” are part of faction-based patron-client relationships where they 
earn economic payoffs due to their political/organizational strength. In the case study 
chapters of the thesis, we found that there need not be conflict amongst the “elite” and 
members of the “intermediate classes” while they indulge in rule-violating behavior. In 
the context of the GST, the traders, retailers and wholesalers vehemently opposed the 
taxation and documentation of the economy. The capitalist elite used its own strategies to 
subvert the GST refunds mechanism. Similarly, in the case of  SECP, it was not only the 
capitalist class that resisted regulation and started to delist their companies from the 
stock exchange; accountants and stock brokers equally detested the rule-based 
governance measures. There need not be conflict amongst the “elite” and the 
“intermediate classes” regarding rule-violating behavior. They may resist rule based 
governance due to their own vested interests either on their own or in alliance with each 
other.  
In terms of the application of the North et al. (2013)’s framework (as discussed in 
Chapter 2), Pakistan had basic “limited access order” – LAO - during the case study 
period of 1999-2004, with features of maturity as well as vulnerability. Pakistan’s 
economy grew rapidly from 2002-2004 period (Table 3.1), largely as the result of 
exogenous factors as discussed earlier. This growth proved to be fragile in the post case 
study period. In terms of the mature feature during the case study period, the government 
organizations were well-established. From 1999-2002, there was direct military rule, yet 
the local government elections were held in 2001. The National and Provincial 
Assemblies’ elections were also held in 2002. The elections allowed political 
organizations to exist outside the government. The leaders of both the main political 
parties – Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) – 
were in exile. The party (PML-N) which was ousted through the military coup in 1999 
split and the newly created faction, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid), sided with the 
military government. As stated earlier, organisations existed outside the ambit of the 
government and this feature points towards the relative maturity. There was opposition 
within the Parliament (without its top leadership), independent TV and radio stations 
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were allowed and the civil society functioned freely. These private organizations were, 
however, not powerful enough to hold the government fully accountable, yet they were 
functional. There were elements of vulnerability as well in the basic LAO during the 
1999-2004 period (which became accentuated from 2007 onwards).  
In terms of vulnerability, the old rent creation mechanism in the form of “competitive 
clientelism” (to use Mushtaq Khan’s term, 2013) of 1990s had broken down which led to 
uncertainty. From 1988-1999, the two main political parties – PPP and PML-N took 
turns to rule. The political governments did not complete their tenure as the political 
parties in the opposition often allied themselves with forces outside the Parliament to 
bring down the government. Both the main political parties and their political clients 
remained keen to get to power and earn rents. It was a period of “competitive 
clientelism” in Pakistan. The old rent creation mechanism was unstable. It broke down 
and the army took over in 1999. But the army had to share power with the new civilian 
leadership from 2002 onwards. There was an effort to cobble a new “dominant coalition” 
with its own rents sharing mechanism. The new civilian leadership was in alliance with 
the military government. The period from 1999-2004 had a basic LAO with features of 
both maturity and vulnerability. From 2007 onwards, the vulnerable features became 
more prominent and the government’s monopoly over the instruments of violence was 
seriously challenged due to the deepening Taliban insurgency. Other armed groups also 
actively started to indulge in violence.  
The influence of the capitalist elite has increased both directly and indirectly in the 
“dominant coalition” in the contemporary Pakistan. As Chapter 3 points out, the share of 
businessmen went up from 6 per cent in 1970 to 20 percent in 1997 in the National 
Assembly seats in the Punjab province. It points to a trend of the new leadership that 
emerged out of the local government elections of the 1980s, assuming the mantle of new 
political leadership. As discussed earlier, the industrialists having learnt the lessons of 
the losing power and rents during Bhutto’s nationalization, many joined politics with a 
few of them taking over the national leadership also.  
A few representatives of the textile groups got ministerial posts in the Musharraf 
government, but the textiles manufacturers were themselves not an active partners of the 
“dominant coalition” during 1999-2004. Their interests were served through their 
indirect connections with the “dominant coalition”. The leading textile groups have been 
238 
 
close to the decision-makers. It was the continuation of the policy of 1980s and 1990s 
that the Chinioti industrialists associated themselves closely to the industrialist-politician 
Nawaz Sharif and got state patronage.  
As stated earlier, the rents creation that took place as the result of the interaction of the 
state institutions with the capitalist both led to theft of resources as well as value-
enhancing activities. By extending the North et al. (2013) framework, we speculate that 
even seemingly waste of resources might have been necessary for political stability. 
North et al. (2013) call the rents needed for ensuring relative political stability as a 
development problem. Mushtaq Khan (2013) states that the policy agenda for LAOs 
needs to limit violence at the political level and sustain growth at the economic level.   
The textile manufacturers interviewed were cognizant of the need of political stability for 
their business growth. There had been lots of political instability in the 1990s when both 
the main political parties kept destabilizing each other’s governments. The textile 
manufacturers time and again emphasized the need of political stability and long time 
horizons for the government’s policies that can help them make their long-term business 
plans. 
North et al. (2013) point out that for the maturity of a LAO, the rule of law needs to be 
made applicable to the elite first. In other words, “elite bargains” are important in 
achieving relative political stability through rent-sharing mechanism. Applicability of the 
rule of law to the elite is one of the “doorstep conditions” identified for transition from 
LAO to OAO. In the case of Pakistan, the rule of law is not yet applicable to the elite as 
it has not reached the stage of meeting the “doorsteps conditions”.  
To conclude, the transition to a modern “Weberian” state is desirable. It is, however, a 
worthwhile end of a difficult, negotiated and long process. The structural analysis, 
largely inspired by the Marxist political economy, is critical of over-simplification of 
such a complex process. These challenges to the “Weberian” rule of law and 
impersonalisation are analysed in the case study chapters. We have seen with the GST 
and the SECP case studies that the IFIs had only limited success in their governance 
reforms of pushing a framework for pro-market rule of law reforms. The case study 
chapters chronicle a wide range of the rule-violating behavior. The resistance to taxation 
measures and corporate governance explains various forms of the rule-violating 
behaviour. The structural analysis helps to understand the rents creation in the form of 
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bank loans as an intrinsic part of the politics of patronage. One can speculate that rents 
provided through massive bank loans default may have been necessary to maintain 
political stability and earn legitimacy for various governments in contemporary Pakistan. 
Different forms of rule-violating behavior had varying (or even no) impact on 
accumulation.  
The challenge of achieving the “Weberian” impersonalisation is elucidated through the 
specific phenomenon of caste capitalism where personalisation is prevalent. Caste 
capitalism is also linked with the weak rule of law and less likelihood of contracts being 
honoured, hence reliance on the family and caste networks. The main finding from the 
case study of the textiles sector is that capitalists in Pakistan do not want more mature 
form of capitalism. Overall, various forms of rule-violating behaviour and lack of 
impersonalisation shed light on the challenges of transition to a modern “Weberian” 
state.  
In terms of further implications of themes explored in the thesis, it should be pointed out 
that Pakistan is considered the least effective tax collector amongst the middle income 
countries. The structural factors may not be too different across the Indian Subcontinent 
or South Asia. India and Sri Lanka are able to gather 1.5 to 2.5 percent more revenue 
through the GST than Pakistan (World Bank et al., 2008). Having taken into account the 
similar structural factors in South Asia, there has to be an explanation why Pakistan 
cannot collect even as much tax as its surrounding countries. This can be explored in 
terms of the further investigation into the weak state capacities and the rule-violating 
behavior specific to Pakistan. 
Under-taxation traps Pakistan in a vicious cycle. Due to the lack of fiscal resources, 
Pakistan cannot adequately provide power generation, infrastructure or human resource 
development required for viable economic development. On the other hand, lack of 
domestic revenue generation makes Pakistan more and more dependent on the IFIs. 
Pakistan is stuck in the whirlpool of debt burden where a substantial part of its resources 
is allocated just to service the debt, leaving little space for its developmental agenda. The 
debt burden is so alarming that more loans are needed to pay off old ones. With every 
new negotiation of the loan programme with the IFIs, Pakistan accepts more “good 
governance” reforms that have been shown here to have had only limited success. It is 
thus clear that there is a dire need to raise taxation levels in Pakistan at least to the South 
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Asian level. We take into account the prevalent politics of patronage discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2 that is part and parcel of any the developmental agenda. We also take into 
account the structural factors that explain why across-the-board rule of law is not 
possible to begin with and why the rule of law is resisted. However, there has to be a 
good explanation why Pakistan cannot achieve the same tax to GDP ratio as India or Sri 
Lanka having similar structural features. Such an explanation needs to be developed 
academically and its implications on the political economy of taxation policy need to be 
studied further.     
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Appendix 1: Key-Informants Interview Checklist for the Textiles Sector 
1. When was the company established?  
2. Who established the company? What is the story of company since its establishment?  
3. Where did the money come from?  
4. Where did the machinery come from?   
5. Was this the principle business? Why did you get into this particular business?  
6. Was it established as a spinning unit/weaving unit?  
7. What was the capacity at inception?  
8. What is the capacity today?  
9. How has the company grown? Is it mostly reinvesting retained profits? Has most of 
the money for expansion come from loans? 
10. Has the business branched into other industries?  
11. How has the business scenario changed in Pakistan? How is the business scenario 
today different from what it was in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s?  
12. Who were the big groups in the textile industry in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
and who are big groups now?  
13.  How did these groups emerge? Who were they? How did they become the big names 
in the industry?  
 
14. Who succeeded and who failed and why?  
15. What has the government’s role been in encouraging/impeding the growth of the 
textile sector? 
16.  What would you like to see the government do? 
 
17. Important policies that have affected the textile sector in particular and the industrial 
sector as a whole since independence? 
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18. Your experiences of the General Sales Tax? 
19. Your experiences of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan?  
20.  Which major government sectors does the industry/company come in contact with? 
21. Are there any problems faced? If so can they say what problems? 
22. What have been your most successful business strategies? What would you have 
done differently in retrospect?  
23. What role has the financial/banking sector played in encouraging/impeding growth of 
the industrial/textile sector? 
24. What bank do you deal with the most? Where do most of the loans come from? 
 
25. Have they ever defaulted on a bank loan? If so, did you have trouble getting a loan 
the next time?  
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Appendix 2: Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation’s 
Performance in Managing the Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) of 
Various Banks of Pakistan in 2004 
(Rupees in million) 
Referred Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) 
 ADBP 
(Agricultural 
Development 
Bank of 
Pakistan) 
HBL (Habib 
Bank 
Limited) 
IDBP 
(Industrial 
Development 
Bank of 
Pakistan) 
NBP 
(National 
Bank of 
Pakistan) 
NDFC 
(National 
Development 
Finance 
Corporation) 
UBL (United 
Bank 
Limited) 
Total 
Accounts 
Referred  
9 300 138 69 154 109 779 
Outstanding 
Amount 
involved 
1,094 36,190 22,632 11,160 37,212 32,853 141,141 
CIRC Acquired Status of NPAs 
 ADBP HBL IDBP NBP NDFC UBL Total 
Accounts 
Acquired  
9 89 23 7 44 62 234 
Outstanding 
amount 
involved 
1,094 8,236 2,299 1,199 7,746 26,132 46,706 
Purchase 
Price 
22 1,160 229 87 278 4,120 5,897 
Accounts 
Acquired – 
With No 
Assets 
 33   9 26 68 
Outstanding 
Amount 
involved 
 4,160   710 17,336 22,206 
Net Accounts 
Acquired with 
asset 
9 56 23 7 35 36 166 
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Outstanding 
amount 
involved 
1,094 4,077 2,299 1,199 7,036 8,795 24,500 
Accounts in 
process of 
acquisition 
  30    30 
Outstanding 
amount 
involved 
  5,510    5,510 
CIRC Auction and Settlement Status of the Acquired Portfolio 
 ADBP HBL IDBP NBP NDFC UBL Total 
Accounts 
Exclusively 
Auctioned by 
CIRC 
7 19 15 6 29 18 94 
Outstanding 
Amount 
involved 
812 1,239 1,440 1,157 6,035 1,894 12,576 
Purchase price 20 181 142 87 278 173 881 
CIRC share 81 267 126 89 765 231 1,559 
Gross Sale Price 94 259 173 121 1,518 811 2,976 
CIRC-running 
surplus / 
(deficit) 
61 86 (16) 2 486 57 678 
 ADBP HBL IDBP NBP NDFC UBL Total 
Auctioned 
accounts settled 
by CIRC 
2 1   1 1 5 
Outstanding 
amount involved 
282 49   60 749 1,140 
Purchase price 2 5   0 60 67 
CIRC Share 68 7   9 78 161 
Total Proceeds 
received by 
CIRC 
75 7   9 164 254 
CIRC running 
surplus / 
65 1   9 19 94 
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(deficit) 
Accounts 
exclusively 
settled by CIRC 
 5 1 1 1 4 12 
Outstanding 
amount involved 
 282 228 43 55 5,258 5,866 
Settlement 
amount 
 46 17 22 5 895 986 
Purchase price  41 17 0 0 750 808 
CIRC-running 
surplus / 
(deficit) 
 5 0 22 5 146 178 
Total NPAs 
auctioned/settled 
      111 
Total gross 
proceeds 
      4.216 
Total surplus 
achieved by 
CIRC 
      950 
Source: Corporate Industrial Restructuring Document dated 28/09/2004. 
 
  
278 
 
Appendix 3: Basic Textile Statistics (1948 to 2004-05) 
Year No. of 
report-
ing 
mills 
Installed capacity Working at the end of 
the periods 
Spindle 
hours 
worked 
(Million) 
Looms 
hours 
worked 
(Mill-
ion) 
Consump-
tion of 
cotton 
(Million 
kg) 
Total yarn 
produced 
(Million 
kg)  
Surplus 
yarn 
(Million 
kg) 
Total 
product-
ion of 
cloth 
(Million 
Square 
Meter) 
No. of 
spind-
les 
(000) 
No. of 
looms 
(000) 
No. of 
spindles 
(000) 
No. of 
looms 
(000) 
1948 .. 78 3 78 3 330 6.8 6.8 6.2 1.9 29.5 
1949 .. 137 3 137 3 495 7.3 8.7 8.3 2.9 37.4 
1950 .. 182 3 182 3 725 10.1 13.6 12.1 5.5 46.3 
1951 .. 225 3 225 3 1,008 12.5 21.8 16.5 8.0 58.5 
1952 .. 499 6 302 4 1,386 18.8 27.1 22.4 2.9 87.9 
1953 .. 649 9 603 7 2,930 34.4 49.4 46.1 22.8 160.9 
1954 .. 1,113 15 940 13 4,191 57.4 99.0 77.9 43.7 236.0 
1955 .. 1,449 23 1,355 19 6,513 92.0 146.2 114.2 67.1 325.6 
1956 .. 1,518 24 1,422 22 7,091 109.6 158.4 123.6 70.6 366.5 
1957 .. 1,568 25 1,447 22 8,079 119.3 164.5 128.1 70.2 393.3 
1958 .. 1,569 26 1,459 24 9,332 128.8 169.7 138.3 72.9 427.2 
1958-59 70 1,581 26 1,448 24 9,599 136.9 181.4 148.8 81.2 451.0 
1959-60 72 1,582 27 1,491 26 .. .. 201.2 160.4 90.4 455.0 
1960-61 .. 1,586 27 1,531 26 .. .. 205.0 163.4 85.7 513.1 
1961-62 71 1,644 28 1,524 26 11,969 161.5 205.3 166.7 83.9 534.4 
1962-63 76 1,850 29 1,810 26 12,419 160.3 213.2 174.4 90.2 516.6 
1963-64 81 1,913 30 1,792 28 13,171 175.3 233.5 198.6 112.1 579.6 
1964-65 83 1,967 31 1,852 28 13,534 175.0 237.4 206.0 111.4 597.6 
1965-66 89 2,056 31 1,871 27 13,318 152.2 230.7 194.0 105.0 544.6 
1966-67 94 2,043 30 1,888 28 13,298 172.7 243.6 207.0 114.6 571.6 
1967-68 95 2,048 30 1,916 28 14,208 173.5 271.9 224.6 126.4 597.7 
1968-69 100 2,175 30 2,090 27 15,247 188.0 296.1 238.8 146.7 593.8 
1969-70 107 2,397 31 2,327 27 16,964 197.1 334.7 273.2 175.4 606.5 
1970-71 113 2,605 30 2,491 27 18,505 202.8 360.0 303.8 205.4 658.3 
1971-72 131 2,848 30 2,650 26 19,629 188.5 407.1 335.7 236.9 628.2 
1972-73 150 3,226 29 3,057 27 22,606 190.6 463.1 376.1 286.2 588.6 
1973-74 155 3,308 29 3,034 26 23,617 192.7 475.3 379.5 283.4 592.2 
1974-75 143 3,410 29 2,823 25 20,438 179.2 420.6 351.2 263.1 555.9 
1975-76 127 3,478 29 2,579 23 20,095 167.4 419.7 349.7 265.7 520.3 
1976-77 135 3,544 29 2,650 19 18,118 138.6 343.2 282.6 217.2 408.3 
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Year No. of 
report-
ing 
mills 
Installed capacity Working at the end of 
the periods 
Spindle 
hours 
worked 
(Million) 
Looms 
hours 
worked 
(Mill-
ion) 
Consump-
tion of 
cotton 
(Million 
kg) 
Total yarn 
produced 
(Million 
kg) 
Surplus 
yarn 
(Million 
kg) 
Total 
product-
ion of 
cloth 
(Million 
Square 
Meter) 
No. of 
spind-
les 
(000) 
No. of 
looms 
(000) 
No. of 
spindles 
(000) 
No. of 
looms 
(000) 
1977-78 140 3,560 26 2,680 15 19,776 110.5 356.0 297.9 242.7 391.3 
1978-79 152 3,704 27 2,772 14 20,456 95.0 387.6 327.8 276.6 339.4 
1979-80 149 3,731 26 2,841 16 21,468 99.1 428.6 362.9 325.0 342.3 
1980-81 158 3,983 25 3,176 13 22,217 90.5 446.6 374.9 331.7 307.9 
1981-82 155 4,180 25 2,944 13 22,924 85.1 501.0 430.2 387.5 325.0 
1982-83 158 4,265 24 3,062 14 23,011 78.6 516.7 448.4 397.9 335.5 
1983-84 162 4,224 24 3,020 12 23,683 91.6 506.5 431.6 396.6 296.6 
1984-85 158 4.396 23 3,022 10 33,274 69.8 558.7 431.7 375.2 271.8 
1985-86 160 4,422 19 3,158 9 24,620 64.7 553.6 482.2 436.3 253.5 
1986-87 187 4,293 17 3,499 9 26,836 57.8 697.7 586.4 550.0 237.9 
1987-88 197 4,330 16 3,690 9 29,823 66.2 779.7 685.0 643.5 281.6 
1988-89 219 4,790 17 3,966 9 32,089 67.9 872.0 757.9 720.3 269.9 
1990-91 247 5,493 15 4,754 8 39,542 60.2 1,197.5 1,041.2 1,001.0 292.9 
1991-92 271 6,141 15 5,260 8 43,606 58.8 1,342.8 1,170.7 1,134.7 307.9 
1992-93 284 6,768 14 5,433 6 46,364 55.5 1,427.0 1,219.0 1,148.6 325.4 
1993-94 320 8,182 14 5,886 6 47,221 44 1,483.4 1,309.6 1,272.8 314.9 
1994-95 334 8,307 14 5,991 5 49,734 418 1,558.9 1,369.7 1,340.6 321.8 
1995-96 349 8,493 13 6,356 5 52,239 37.1 1,661.9 1,495.1 1,434.9 327.0 
1996-97 357 8,137 10 6,465 5 53,625 36.4 1,670.1 1,520.8 1,473.9 333.5 
1997-98 353 8,274 10 6,556 4 55,005 37.7 1,751.0 1,523.3 1,478.9 340.3 
1998-99 348 8,298 10 6,594 5 55,802 35.2 1,839.6 1,540.3 1,482.4 384.6 
1999-00 351 8,383 10 6,750 4 57,205 34.3 1,961.6 1,669.9 1,604.4 437.2 
2000-01 353 8,594 10 7,105 4 59,219 34.1 2,070.1 1,721.0 1,652.7 490.2 
2001-02 354 8,967 10 7,078 5 61,267 36.3 2,155.2 1,808.6 1,731.2 568.4 
2002-03 363 9,216 10 7,623 5 64,274 38.7 2,371.3 1,934.9 1,855.4 576.6 
2003-04 363 9,592 11 8,009 4 70,214 32.6 2,407.6 1,938.9 1,845.8 683.4 
2004-05 423 10,906 9 8,817 5 72,255 30.3 2,622.8 2,280.6 2,175.2 920.7 
Source: Government of Pakistan, 1989; Government of Pakistan, 1997; Government of Pakistan, 2006, 
(Economic Survey of Pakistan 1988-89; 1996-97; 2005-06). 
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Appendix 4: Details of Export of Textiles and Garments (1971-2002/03) 
(Million US$) 
Per-
iod 
Yarn Cloth Tent 
and 
Can-
vas 
Cot-
ton 
Bags 
Tow-
els 
Bed-
wear 
Other 
Made-
ups 
Gar-
ments 
Hos-
iery 
Thr-
ead 
Cotton 
Manufac-
ture 
Total 
Exports 
1971-
72 
127.5 81.5 1.9 1.2 6.1 0.9 1.2 3.2 3.2 2.3 229.0 590.7 
1972-
73 
200.5 126.8 2.3 4.5 7.0 1.3 0.9 3.3 6.2 3.2 356.0 817.3 
1973-
74 
189.5 143.9 7.5 8.1 16.3 4.9 4.5 8.6 8.3 5.3 396.9 1026.4 
1974-
75 
92.3 132.6 22.4 7.2 15.6 5.6 3.7 14.4 10.3 5.8 309.9 1039.0 
1975-
76 
145.0 137.5 25.1 7.9 18.3 3.7 5.0 21.5 10.2 4.0 378.2 1136.7 
1976-
77 
118.4 162.0 25.0 8.3 14.2 3.3 3.8 30.4 11.8 4.4 381.6 1100.8 
1977-
78 
107.0 175.9 26.0 9.0 12.9 4.8 2.9 30.4 9.8 7.1 385.8 1311.1 
1978-
79 
197.6 215.7 27.7 11.2 21.2 7.9 5.4 38.1 12.3 5.8 542.9 1709.6 
1979-
80 
205.9 244.1 31.7 21.2 26.5 12.0 3.9 53.9 20.0 7.1 626.3 2364.7 
1980-
81 
207.0 241.4 65.3 35.7 47.9 20.6 11.1 75.2 23.2 10.1 737.5 2957.5 
1981-
82 
196.7 279.5 64.3 31.4 42.9 35.8 9.7 94.2 28.5 7.7 790.7 2490.0 
1982-
83 
247.3 281.4 93.8 17.9 39.1 67.5 19.5 122.7 36.5 12.8 938.5 2707.7 
1983-
84 
217.6 360.2 64.1 15.5 46.6 53.3 22.9 162.4 56.0 8.6 1007.2 2768.1 
1984-
85 
260.4 305.9 49.6 12.1 49.7 51.0 29.2 132.0 42.6 4.8 937.3 2491.2 
1985-
86 
279.2 314.8 31.1 9.5 67.5 90.1 52.2 206.1 54.6 3.8 1108.9 3069.8 
1986-
87 
506.1 345.3 23.4 8.1 83.9 123.9 51.1 355.2 96.6 3.3 1596.9 3686.4 
1987-
88 
541.0 485.4 30.3 12.3 117.4 136.9 64.1 349.9 134.3 3.8 1875.5 4454.6 
1988-
89 
600.8 464.8 41.1 13.5 140.4 147.9 58.8 335.5 166.9 3.0 1972.8 4661.5 
1989-
90 
833.7 559.0 28.8 13.4 129.8 190.8 78.2 393.7 273.7 3.0 2504.2 4954.3 
1990-
91 
1183.0 675.8 79.6 20.5 129.4 246.2 108.9 497.1 333.6 3.4 3277.4 6133.1 
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1991-
92 
1172.5 819.4 51.2 32.4 136.7 284.0 113.5 613.5 425.1 3.7 3652.1 6904.0 
1992-
93 
1121.5 863.1 39.9 23.7 139.0 351.6 125.5 617.7 464.1 4.8 3750.9 6813.5 
1993-
94 
1259.3 820.6 29.1 17.3 129.2 285.6 129.4 612.2 509.1 4.0 3795.8 6802.5 
1994-
95 
1528.1 1081.4 38.2 19.1 144.8 340.2 163.5 641.7 688.5 1.9 4647.5 8137.2 
1995-
96 
1540.3 1275.9 39.5 24.6 174.1 422.2 179.1 648.5 703.4 1.5 5009.1 8707.1 
1996-
97 
1411.5 1262.4 36.2 27.6 194.1 456.3 208.7 736.4 688.9 1.7 5023.8 8320.3 
1997-
98 
1159.5 1250.3 58.1 23.1 200.1 508.8 245.8 746.5 696.7 1.8 4890.7 8627.7 
1998-
99 
945.2 1115.2 40.8 20.8 177.7 611.0 255.3 651.2 742.1 1.5 4560.8 7779.3 
1999-
2000 
1071.6 1096.2 52.9 19.2 195.6 709.9 307.6 771.7 886.7 1.3 5112.7 8568.6 
2000-
01 
1076.6 1035.0 50.0 19.0 243.0 734.9 328.2 827.5 910.3 1.0 5225.5 9224.7 
2001-
02 
942.3 1132.7 47.4 18.2 269.8 918.5 351.3 882 841.5 - 5404 9123.6 
2002-
03 
930.1 1330.9 69.5 18.2 373.5 1320.8 356.8 1094.4 1136.2 - 6630.4 11030.5 
Source: All Pakistan Textiles Mills Association, 2004. 
 
 
